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This article assumes familiarity with my five prior publications on the Doha Round, at least
with the relevant substantive concepts and events that occurred between the launch of the Round
in November 2001 and negotiations as of July 2009:
(1) Poverty, Islam, and Doha, 36 INT’L LAW. 159–96 (2002), which covers the launch
of the Round in November 2001.
(2) Chapters 3 and 4 of the International Trade Law textbook, referenced above, partic-
ularly concepts and terms in the negotiations and status of those talks through the
July 2007 Draft Modalities Texts issued by Ambassadors Crawford Falconer (New
Zealand) and Donald Stephenson (Canada), Chairmen of the Agriculture and Non-
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(3) Doha Round Schisms: Numerous, Technical, and Deep, 6 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L.
REV. 5 (2008), which covers the Round through the July 2008 collapsed Ministerial
meeting.
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I. ARGUMENT OF THE TRILOGY: TRADE AS COUNTER-TERRORISM
International trade law always has been about economic development.
International trade law always has been about national security. And, since
the advent of Islam in 610 AD with the first revelation from Allaˆh through
the Archangel Gabriel (in Arabic, Jibreel) to the Prophet Muhammad
(Peace Be Upon Him (PBUH)), Muslims have been engaged, in one way or
another, in international trade law.
Thus, it is a fallacy to think that poor or Muslim countries are new-
comers to the modern world trading system. The first two paragraphs of the
Preamble to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) state:
The Governments of the Commonwealth of Australia, the
Kingdom of Belgium, the United States of Brazil, Burma, Ca-
nada, Ceylon, the Republic of Chile, the Republic of China, the
Republic of Cuba, the Czechoslovak Republic, the French Repub-
lic, India, Lebanon, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the King-
dom of the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Kingdom of Norway,
Pakistan, Southern Rhodesia, Syria, the Union of South Africa,
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and
the United States of America:
Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and eco-
nomic endeavour should be conducted with a view to raising
standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and
steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand,
developing the full use of the resources of the world and ex-
panding the production and exchange of goods . . . .1
From these paragraphs, two points are evident.
First, of the twenty-three original GATT contracting parties, eleven
were poor countries (Burma, Ceylon, Chile, China, Cuba, Southern Rhode-
sia, and South Africa, plus India, Lebanon, Pakistan, and Syria). Second,
four of the countries (India, Lebanon, Pakistan, and Syria) were Muslim or
had sizeable Muslim communities. In other words, half of the countries
founding the modern multilateral trading system in the aftermath of the Sec-
ond World War were developing or least developed, and nearly 20% of
them embodied Islam in a significant way. These figures understate both
points because Belgium, France, Netherlands, and United Kingdom all held
sway over vast poor and/or Muslim territories when GATT entered into
force on 1 January 1948.
Second, the original contracting parties did not view international trade
as an end in itself. Rather, it was an instrument for economic growth and
enhanced living standards. International trade was a, but not the only,
1. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, pmbl., Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT], reprinted in RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: INTER-
DISCIPLINARY THEORY AND PRACTICE 113 (3d ed. Supp. 2008).
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means to raise incomes and generate jobs. After all, no nation in history has
achieved sustained economic success through autarky.
It also is a fallacy to think international trade law is divorced from
national security. Since ancient times, securing trade routes and assuring
essential supplies of goods or services that cannot be obtained domestically
has been a critical element in the rise and fall of empires. Sustained impe-
rial development has meant some degree of economic integration and inter-
dependence, and a set of rules for commercial intercourse, which in turn has
demanded attention to threats to patterns and conduits of imports and ex-
ports. The histories of many empires, from the Roman and Carthaginian,
through the Arab-Islamic and Ottoman Turkish, to the British and Ameri-
can, all reveal a link between international trade and national security.
This long-standing nexus among international trade law, economic de-
velopment, and national security, in which Islam is engaged, is all the
tighter in the post-9/11 world. Spread around the world, many Muslim com-
munities, marginalized by poverty, have little hope for a brighter future
through opportunities from multilateral trade liberalization. Extremism,
even accompanied by violence, is a gravely sinful temptation to which
some of the marginalized poor are vulnerable. Weapons technology aided
by evil genius has multiplied the force threat posed by violent extremist
organizations (VEOs) to the global capitalist order, of which the trading
system is an essential part.
It was this nexus, in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist at-
tacks, which drove Members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to
launch the Doha Development Agenda (DDA), commonly called the Doha
Round, in November 2001. It is this nexus that the Members have long
since betrayed. The thesis of this article is that the Doha Round is a failed
counter-insurgency operation. The Round has lost nearly all links to its
original purpose. That purpose was trade liberalization to spur development
in a post-9/11 context in which extremism is wrongly perceived by some
disaffected, impoverished, and thus marginalized Muslims as an alternative
to stake-holding in the world trading system.
Why this failure? Because the WTO Members have succumbed utterly
to the pursuit of commercial self-interest, so their Doha Round dealings
have become a monstrous mishmash of minutiae. The Members have pro-
duced draft-negotiating texts that are so devoid of vision and so replete with
exceptions that they are not fit for a dog’s breakfast. To use a different
metaphor, Members have turned the Round into an exercise in Social Dar-
winism, forgetting the common good—to use multilateral trade liberaliza-
tion to fight poverty and thereby Islamist extremism.2
2. See generally RICHARD HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARWINISM IN AMERICAN THOUGHT
(George Braziller, Inc. rev. ed. 1959) (explaining Social Darwinism).
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Not surprisingly, therefore, in anticipation of the December 2011
WTO Ministerial Conference in Geneva, Members in August 2011, after a
decade of Doha Round negotiations, sounded three themes. First, to save
face for the WTO, it should be made clear to the international trade commu-
nity that the Organization and Round are not synonymous.3 Failure of the
Round should not damage the credibility of the WTO. Second, the single
undertaking methodology, by which Members do not officially agree on
any item until all of them have agreed on all items (i.e., nothing is agreed
until everything is agreed, and all Members must agree to everything, thus
horizontal trade-offs across different sectors and topics are required), should
be revisited.4 Possibly, it should be abandoned in favor of a more flexible
approach that would account for the size, diversity, and complexity of the
Membership. Third, to move beyond the Round without formally declaring
it dead, discussions on “twenty-first century issues” should proceed.5 Such
issues would include agricultural export restrictions and food security, cli-
mate change, electronic commerce (particularly whether to extend the 1998
Moratorium on Customs Duties on Electronic Transmissions, i.e., the mora-
torium on collecting duties on goods transmitted digitally over the internet),
foreign direct investment (FDI) and competition policy, foreign exchange
rates and trade, intellectual property protection (particularly whether to ex-
tend a moratorium on non-violation nullification and impairment cases
under the WTO Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights (TRIPs)), trade rules and innovation, and transparency in cus-
toms facilitation.
All three themes are problematic. The first one is a lie. If the WTO
cannot conclude a multilateral trade bargain, then it has failed at one of its
essential purposes—multilateral trade liberalization. To be sure, there are
other reasons for its existence, most notably, dispute resolution and moni-
toring and surveillance. But, it no longer is the single, indispensable forum
for grand, global trade bargains. The second theme calls for betrayal of a
historic mode of operation, dating from the era of how the Contracting Par-
ties, acting jointly (i.e., the CONTRACTING PARTIES), under GATT worked.
It also intimates a betrayal of developing and least developed countries,
accusing some of them of playing the role of “spoiler,” seeking the “lowest-
common denominator outcomes,” or free-riding on the concessions of
others.6 In an age when they comprise the vast majority of the Membership,
3. See Daniel Pruzin, Upcoming WTO 2011 Ministerial Expected to Echo 2009 Gathering
as Low-Key Affair, 28 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 32, at 1305 (Aug. 11, 2011).
4. See Len Bracken, Business Representatives Explore Ways to Liberalize Trade as Doha
Round Falters, 28 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 31, at 1274, 1274–76 (Aug. 4, 2011).
5. See Pruzin, supra note 3, at 1305; Bracken, supra note 4, at 1275.
6. Such were the epithets used in Susan C. Schwab, After Doha—Why the Negotiations Are
Doomed and What We Should Do About It, FOREIGN AFF., May–June 2011, at 104, 111 (emphasis
added). Ms. Schwab served as United States Trade Representative (USTR) from 2006–2009. Yet,
Ambassador Schwab goes on to note that “one of the WTO’s most important characteristics is the
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their individual and collective voice, through their ability to join or block a
consensus, is suppressed. The third theme is misleading. Several of the is-
sues are not time-bounded; that is, they existed in the twentieth century, and
Members considered some of them when they debated what to put on the
Doha Round agenda.
Regardless of the merits of the three themes, what is telling is that the
WTO Members raised them. Their doing so manifests their loss of purpose.
No longer are they dedicated to poverty alleviation and the struggle against
Islamist extremism. That is, no longer do they seek to use multilateral trade
liberalization as a counter-terrorist weapon.
It is said the Doha Round is “intended to improve global market access
by cutting massive farm subsidies in rich countries and import tariffs in
poorer ones . . . .”7 That characterization is simplistic: it is true as far as it
goes, but it does not go far enough. The Round—intentionally launched in
the heart of the Arab Muslim World—was thought to be an important way
to fight oppression, and thereby wean people in poor countries, especially
ones with significant Islamic populations, away from anti-capitalist thinking
and, worse yet, violent action.
Unfortunately, in the Doha Round, the Members, and chiefly among
them the United States (U.S.), European Union (E.U.), Brazil, China, and
India, have used legal details to advance their narrow agendas. Since an-
cient times, city-states and countries have negotiated out of self-interest.
Yet this time, in this Round, the dominant Members have taken self-interest
to such a level that it is proper to query whether they are the extremists.
They have lost all sight of the common good, and sacrificed the broad pur-
pose of the DDA, which might be characterized as an effort to prove once
and for all that Francis Fukuyama, in The End of History and the Last Man
(1992), not Samuel Huntington, in The Clash of Civilizations (1996), was
right. The middle “D” bespeaks the purpose of the Round, development,
and intimates the follow-on link between boosting development and fight-
ing Islamist extremism.
Yet, as the Round has ground on, to a halt, over the years, the middle
“D” has gone missing, and the link between fighting poverty through trade
liberalization, on the one hand, and reducing vulnerability to Islamist ex-
tremism, on the other hand, has been lost. Thus, the International Food Pol-
icy Research Institute (IFPRI), a prominent non-governmental organization
(NGO), released a study on 30 November 2009, the second day of the Sev-
enth WTO Ministerial Conference, concluding that “[t]he Doha agree-
ment . . . has an ambivalent impact on developing countries and does not
offer enough to the poorest countries . . . . It has to offer more in terms of
inclusion of these developing economies in governance and decision-making from its origins as
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1948.” Id. at 117.
7. Tripti Lahiri, New Delhi ‘Breakthrough’ Sets Restart of Doha Round Ag, NAMA Talks
for Sept. 14, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 36, at 1191 (Sept. 10, 2009).
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market access and reduced trade costs.”8 Notably, 110 of the 153 Members
of the WTO—nearly three-quarters of the Membership—are poor, that is,
they are self-identified developing countries or classified by objective eco-
nomic criteria as least developed countries.9 One-fifth, or 20%, of the Mem-
bership (roughly thirty-one countries) fits into the “least developed”
category.10 And, critically, the above-quoted conclusion applies to Muslim
countries, insofar as nearly all of them are developing or least developed. In
sum, another way to state the thesis of this article is as follows: Notwith-
standing rhetoric from the WTO about the importance of the Doha Round
to poverty alleviation, what the Members have done in the Round is en-
shrine Social Darwinism as trade policy.11
Even for seasoned experts, the proposed terms and conditions for a
Doha Round bargain are devilishly complex. International trade law, like
other fields of international business law, is not for the faint-hearted or
wooly-headed. Pontification is more persuasive if it is based on cateche-
sis.12 No reliable meta-inferences can be drawn without first meditating on
practical details in real-world negotiating documents. The results make the
effort worthwhile. There are grand themes buried in, but extractable from,
8. Laura MacInnis, World Economy Has Outgrown Doha, WTO Meet Told, REUTERS, Dec.
1, 2009, available at http://af.reuters.com/article/commoditiesNews/idAFGEE5B00G320091201?
sp=true\ (emphasis added) (quoting International Food Policy Research Institute study).
9. See RAJ BHALA, DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 279 (2008) (entry for
“least developed country”); Daniel Pruzin & Gary G. Yerkey, U.S. Sought to Water Down Propo-
sal for ‘Stock-Taking’ Meeting on Doha, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 48, at 1673, 1674–75
(Dec. 3, 2009) (discussing remarks by Mari Pangestu, Minister of Trade, Indonesia). See also the
website of the World Trade Organization, www.wto.org, for information and listings on develop-
ing and least developed countries.
10. See Global Trading System Must Deliver More to the Least-Developed—Lamy in Istan-
bul, WORLD TRADE ORG. (May 9, 2011), http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl191_e.
htm.
11. As one illustration among many of this rhetoric, see, for example, World Trade Organiza-
tion, Seventh Ministerial Conference, Chairman’s Summary, Dec. 2, 2009, available at http://
www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min09_e/stat_e/velasco_closing_e.doc. See generally
HOFSTADTER, supra note 2, (explaining Social Darwinism ideology).
12. One example is the argument that (1) the Doha Round is increasingly irrelevant because
it focuses on issues of declining importance, such as cutting tariffs (when the average worldwide
duty rate is about 10%) and domestic agricultural support (when those subsidies are declining in
significance), and (2) therefore the agenda of the Round should be enlarged to cover issues like
collusion among oil-producing countries, the regulation of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs), and
global financial supervision. See Aaditya Mattoo & Arvind Subramanian, From Doha to the Next
Bretton Woods—A New Multilateral Trade Agenda, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.–Feb. 2009, at 15–26. The
argument rests in part on the technically false premise that the Round proposals contain no mean-
ingful guarantees against WTO Members reversing their trade policies or resorting to high puni-
tive import tariffs. See id. at 17. A careful reading of the July and December 2008 Draft
Modalities Texts on Agriculture, NAMA, and the November 2007 Draft Trade Remedy Rules
Text, evinces such proposals. See also the sources cited supra, note 1. The argument also rests on
the entirely unrealistic premise that broadening, rather than narrowing, the issues for negotiation
would help conclude the Round. Amidst all the rhetoric among trade negotiators in the Round, one
of the claims not heard is that they are unable or unwilling to reach a successful outcome on trade
unless they strike a deal on oil, SWFs, and global finance.
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the details. Those themes are hardly less grand than war and peace, wealth
and poverty, Islam and globalization, statesmanship and self-interest, and
accessibility and opaqueness of law.
II. TRADE LIBERALIZATION, POVERTY ALLEVIATION,
AND ISLAMIST EXTREMISM
A. Is There Really a Link?
No less an authority than the Roman Catholic Church has identified
poverty as a cause of violence between nations and peoples. As part of the
Second Vatican Council (October 1962–December 1965), the Church is-
sued in December 1965 Gaudium et Spes. Chapter V of this document is
entitled “The Fostering of Peace and the Promotion of a Community of
Nations.” It begins with a definition of “peace:”
78. Peace is not merely the absence of war, nor can it be reduced
solely to the maintenance of a balance of power between enemies,
nor is it brought about by dictatorship. Instead, it is rightly and
appropriately called an enterprise of justice. Peace rests from that
order structured into human society by its divine Founder, and
actualized by men as they thirst after ever greater justice. The
common good of humanity finds its ultimate meaning in the eter-
nal law. But since the concrete demands of this common good are
constantly changing as time goes on, peace is never attained once
and for all, but must be built up ceaselessly. Moreover, since the
human will is unsteady and wounded by sin, the achievement of
peace requires a constant mastering of passions and the vigilance
of lawful authority.
But this is not enough. This peace on earth cannot be obtained
unless personal well-being is safeguarded and men freely and
trustingly share with one another the riches of their inner spirits
and talents.13
Manifestly, a necessary but not sufficient condition for true peace is
justice, which includes vigilant attention to constantly changing economic
conditions suffered by others. Such justice is required, above and beyond
internal self-control.
Section 1 of Chapter V discusses “The Avoidance of War.” It ex-
pressly mentions “terrorism” as a form of “war.”14 It dubs the “arms race”
an “utterly treacherous trap for humanity, and one which ensnares the poor
to an intolerable degree.”15 That is because vast expenditures go to arms,
the opportunity cost of which is alleviation of “multiple miseries” around
13. Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World (Gaudium et Spes), in THE
SIXTEEN DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II ¶ 78, at 705–06 (1999) (emphasis added).
14. Id. ¶ 79.
15. Id. ¶ 81, at 709.
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the world.16 Section 2 discusses “Setting up an International Community.”
Key paragraphs from these Sections state:
83. In order to build up peace above all, the causes of discord
among men, especially injustice, which foment wars must be
rooted out. Not a few of these causes come from excessive eco-
nomic inequalities and from putting off the steps needed to rem-
edy them. Other causes of discord, however, have their source in
the desire to dominate and in a contempt for persons. And if we
look for deeper causes, we find them in human envy, distrust,
pride and other egotistical passions. Man cannot bear so many
ruptures in the harmony of things. Consequently, the world is
constantly beset by strife and violence between men even when
no war is being waged. Besides, since these same evils are present
in the relations between various nations as well, in order to over-
come or forestall them and to keep violence once unleashed
within limits, it is absolutely necessary for countries to cooperate
more advantageously and more closely together and to organize
together international bodies and to work tirelessly for the crea-
tion of organizations which will foster peace.
84.  In view of the increasingly close ties of mutual dependence
today between all the inhabitants and peoples of the earth, the apt
pursuit and efficacious attainment of the universal common good
now require of the community of nations that it organize itself in
a manner suited to its responsibilities, especially toward the many
parts of the world which are still suffering from unbearable want.
. . . .
85.  The present solidarity of mankind also calls for a revival of
greater cooperation in the economic field. Although nearly all
peoples have become autonomous, they are far from being free of
every form of undue dependence, and far from escaping all dan-
ger of serious difficulties.
The development of a nation depends on human and financial
aids. The citizens of each country must be prepared by education
and professional training to discharge the various tasks of eco-
nomic and social life. But this in turn requires the aid of foreign
specialists, who when they give aid will not act as overlords, but
as helpers and fellow-workers. Developing nations will not be
able to procure material assistance unless radical changes are
made in the established procedures of modern commerce. Other
aid should be provided as well by advanced nations in the form of
gifts, loans or financial investments. Such help should be ac-
corded with generosity and without greed on the one side and
received with complete honesty on the other side.17
16. Id.
17. Id. ¶¶ 83–85, at 711–12 (emphasis added).
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Simply put, avoidance of war requires more than just a military strat-
egy. Paragraph 83 calls attention to underlying evils that cause conflict, one
of which is gross disparities within and across communities, and which, in
turn, emanates from egoism. The insight of the Church is as true today as it
ever was. The reference in Paragraph 84 to cooperation through interna-
tional organization almost augurs the birth of the WTO on 1 January 1995
and agreement on the DDA six years thereafter. The discussion in Para-
graph 85 is a reminder of the adage that poverty anywhere is a threat to
prosperity and security everywhere, almost prescient about threats from ter-
rorist organizations, and daring in the call for “radical” changes in the con-
duct of international business.
In the post-9/11 environment, the question the Doha Round presents to
the world might be put this way: Why be a courier for Osama Bin Laden, as
was the Kuwaiti-born Pakistani, Abu Ahmed (alias Arshad Khan), his most
trusted messenger, if one can own and operate an import-export business
that trades lawful goods and services or be gainfully employed in such an
enterprise?18 Admittedly, some Islamist extremists—particularly leaders
within a terrorist organization—are from wealthy or middle-class back-
grounds. They have their choice of occupations. Admittedly, too, some ex-
tremists are motivated by ideology regardless of their socioeconomic station
in life. Salafi Jihaˆdists are one example of religious zealots, and their move-
ment originated in wealthy Saudi Arabia.19 They are determined to over-
throw any regime they deem un-Islamic; hence, the Doha Round is quite
irrelevant to them. But, to start with wealth or ideology is to beg a key
question: Under what conditions is a person more liable to encounter, re-
ceive, accept, and execute an Islamist extremist message?
Manifestly, not every poor person is a terrorist or even disposed to
extremism. If they were, the world would be far less safe than it is, given
the roughly one billion people who live on less than $1 U.S. per day.
Equally evident is that not every Muslim is a terrorist or even inclined to
violence. Again, the world would be a lot less safe were that not so, as there
are about 1.3 billion Muslims in the world. Moreover, Islam is most defi-
nitely not susceptible to terrorism. To think otherwise is prejudicial, and
like most prejudices, this one is based on ignorance. The genuine, properly
interpreted rules of the Sharıˆ’a (Islamic Law) do not support terrorist acts
or extremist ideologies.20 Islam and its legal system is, of course, a beauti-
18. M. Ilyas Khan, Who Was the Courier Who Led U.S. to Osama Bin Laden?, BBC NEWS
(May 5, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-13300680. Interestingly, the business
in which the courier engaged to cover his work with Osama Bin Laden is unclear. The theories are
dealing in smuggled auto parts, foreign exchange, and running a goods transport company. Id.; see
also Elise Labott & Tim Lister, Courier Who Led U.S. to Osama Bin Laden’s Hideout Identified,
CNN WORLD (May 3, 2011), http://articles.cnn.com/2011-05-03/world/bin.laden.courier_1_al-
qaida-members-al-qaeda-leader-tora-bora?_s=PM:WORLD (identifying the courier).
19. See Coming out of the Arab Woodwork, ECONOMIST, April 30, 2011, at 49, 49–50.
20. See RAJ BHALA, UNDERSTANDING ISLAMIC LAW (Sharıˆ’a) chs. 49–50 (2011).
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ful paradigm characterized by considerable diversity within a unity of core
precepts. This diversity includes people who hold religiously extreme ideas,
but who are non-violent, and also politically active Muslims who are in-
spired by their faith, but who are not fixated on seizing power by any means
in the name of Islam.21 The sad reality is a tiny minority in any religion can
distort genuine doctrines for evil purposes, and each religion has endured
dastardly distortion at one juncture or another in its history.
In other words, blaming a religion for sponsoring terrorism is wrong.
Accordingly, it would be equally reasonable, though perhaps euphemistic,
to refer not to “Islamist extremism,” but rather “VEOs” and the “Persons of
Interest” (POI) who run them, and who are recruited as evil minions to
serve in them. What is clear is that “Islamic,” as distinct from “Islamist,” is
the incorrect adjective: None of the bloodshed wrought by VEOs or their
POIs is authentically Islamic.
In any case, there is not a great deal that international trade law, or the
Doha Round, can do to change religious precepts or their abuse by fanatics.
Poverty, however, is a different matter. The law as shaped by the Round
can make a difference in the lives of poor people. Most obviously, it can
create opportunities for new employment and higher income, and thereby
help alleviate poverty. The question thus is joined: Does poverty alleviation
through trade liberalization matter, in terms of reducing proclivity toward
terrorism?
That is, is there a link between poverty alleviation and Islamist extrem-
ism? Surely the answer is yes. President Barack H. Obama declares: “Ex-
tremely poor societies . . . provide optimal breeding grounds for disease,
terrorism, and conflict.”22 His Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton, therefore
categorizes economic development as “an integral part of America’s na-
tional security policy.”23
The link is not adamantine. The precise causal connection is not en-
tirely clear. But, the basic connection is obvious enough, both self-evident
and clear from observed experience: poverty, in the narrow sense of a lack
of income, and a broader sense of capabilities deprivation or an even
broader sense of oppression, connotes a lack of status as a stakeholder in
the global trading system.24 Put succinctly, marginalization, which is a hall-
21. See Better than Cure—But Difficult, ECONOMIST, June 11, 2011, at 61, 61.
22. Exploding Misconceptions, ECONOMIST, December 18, 2010, at 146, 146 (quoting Presi-
dent Barack Obama) (emphasis added).
23. Id. (quoting Secretary of State Hilary Clinton) (emphasis added).
24. The link is especially apparent to American military personnel who have served in Af-
ghanistan, Indonesia, Iraq, Philippines, Thailand, and other theaters plagued by Islamist extrem-
ism. The author has put the question to such personnel (whose names must remain anonymous for
security reasons) who serve as Special Operations Forces (SOF) officers. Invariably, the answer is
affirmative, typically with an almost quizzical look because the point is so obvious.
On capabilities deprivation, see AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999), and the
summary of this book in BHALA, supra note 9, at 116–22 (entry for “development as freedom”).
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mark of poverty, is a contributory factor in vulnerability to violent religious
fanaticism. Conversely, a world trading system in which a person finds op-
portunity through decently-paying jobs, and thereby hope for the socioeco-
nomic advancement of himself and his family, is one—but by no means the
only—way to offer the status of stakeholder. Concomitant with that status is
the opportunity for better education and health care, both of which, along
with a reduction in income poverty, give a person a rational basis for hope
in the system.
This affirmative answer also is based on careful academic research.
Consider the analysis offered by Oxford economist Paul Collier in his ac-
claimed book, The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing
and What Can Be Done About It (2007). He identifies an unmistakable link
between economic underdevelopment and conflict. The gist of his argument
is that the economic health of a country is a primary determinant of its
susceptibility to conflict.25 The poorer a country, in economic terms, the
more prone it is to be mired in civil strife—a “Conflict Trap”—whereas the
better its economic performance, the more likely it will not experience, or at
least not remain mired in, conflict. While not linking poverty to Islamist
extremism in particular, the Collier analysis is applicable: The former is a
microcosm of the latter, which is the macrocosm.
To be sure, some Islamist extremists are home-grown in wealthy coun-
tries, like the United Kingdom and U.S. Among them, however, some are
from poor or marginalized communities within those countries. Many ter-
rorists are from poor countries—Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, and
Yemen are proven fertile grounds for recruiting and training Salafi Jihaˆdis,
who are active in yet other poor countries, such as Jordan and Libya.26
Pakistan, the population of which is 97% Muslim, rightly has attracted con-
siderable attention.27 That is for reasons more than its notoriety as the place,
specifically Abbottabad, hardly two hours from Islamabad, where Osama
Bin Laden was killed by American Special Operations Forces in May 2011.
That also is because all of its regions bordering Afghanistan, from north to
south, are marked by considerable poverty: the Northern Areas (Kashmir),
Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP), Federally Administered Tribal Areas
(FATA), North and South Waziristan, and the province of Balochistan. As
National Geographic put it, these regions, “[w]here the mountains meet the
lowlands” are where “the fierce fundamentalism of the Afghan frontier con-
fronts the moderate Islam of the Indian subcontinent.”28 Overall in Paki-
stan, the unemployment rate is 15% (and probably, unofficially, much
25. See PAUL COLLIER, THE BOTTOM BILLION: WHY THE POOREST COUNTRIES ARE FAILING
AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT 19–20 (2007).
26. See Coming out of the Arab Woodwork, supra note 19, at 49–50.
27. See Don Belt, Struggle for the Soul of Pakistan, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, Sept. 2007, at 32,
40.
28. Id. at 43.
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higher), and 24% of the population ekes out an existence below the poverty
line.29
That defeating Islamist extremism in Pakistan (or Afghanistan) is not
purely a military matter is indisputable, as America’s Commander-in-Chief
observed. In his acclaimed June 2009 speech at Cairo University, President
Barack H. Obama stated:
We [the U.S.] also know that military power alone is not going to
solve the problems in Afghanistan and Pakistan. That is why we
plan to invest $1.5 billion each year over the next five years to
partner with Pakistanis to build schools and hospitals, roads and
businesses, and hundreds of millions to help those who have been
displaced. And that is why we are providing more than $2.8 bil-
lion to help Afghans develop their economy and deliver services
that people depend upon.
I know that for many, the face of globalization is contradictory.
The Internet and television can bring knowledge and information,
but also offensive sexuality and mindless violence. Trade can
bring new wealth and opportunities, but also huge disruptions
and changing communities. In all nations—including my own—
this change can bring fear. Fear that because of modernity we will
lose control over our economic choices, our politics, and most
importantly our identities—those things we most cherish about
our communities, our families, our traditions, and our faith.
But I also know that human progress cannot be denied. There
need not be contradiction between development and tradition.
Countries like Japan and South Korea grew their economies while
maintaining distinct cultures. The same is true for the astonishing
progress within Muslim-majority countries from Kuala Lumpur to
Dubai. In ancient times and in our times, Muslim communities
have been at the forefront of innovation and education.30
But, solving the problem is not purely a trade matter, either. That is,
the question is not whether a development-friendly set of rules agreed upon
by WTO Members in the Doha Round would rid Pakistan of its many Is-
lamist extremist groups.
After all, Pakistan—specifically, endemic corruption, poor govern-
ance, military interference in politics, and dysfunctional public education—
is sometimes its own worst enemy. Small wonder why the Taliban or its
sympathizers reputedly provide social services—they fill a gap a properly
29. The World Factbook, Pakistan, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/li-
brary/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pk.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2012). Yemen is even
worse off, with over 45% of its population below the poverty line. The World Factbook, Yemen,
CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/
ym.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2012).
30. Barack H. Obama, Remarks by the President on a New Beginning, Speech at Cairo Uni-
versity (June 4, 2009) (emphasis added).
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functioning state should cover, and they expand their ideological base in
doing so. (The scenario is replayed in Lebanon by Hezbollah.) Consider,
then, the observation of Javed Ibrahim Paracha:
a bearded, heavyset former member of [Pakistan’s] parliament
who has been dubbed “Al Qaeda’s lawyer” for successfully repre-
senting several hundred jihaˆdists captured in Pakistan after 9/11.
He explains what emboldens these young women [i.e., about 200
female religious students wearing black veils, who in 2007 took
over a public children’s library in Islamabad to protest the de-
struction by the government of mosques run by extremist clerics,
which the government said were built without permits] to risk
their lives for Islam: “This government [of General Pervez
Musharraf] has lost all credibility,” he says. “People look at
Musharraf and they see a U.S. puppet who’s willing to declare
war on fellow Muslims to satisfy America. They also see his
generals getting rich, while they’re getting poorer every day. Peo-
ple are losing hope. Pakistan and its government are becoming
two different things. This will have to change, and soon.31
In other words, poverty is one among several structural problems to
which Mr. Paracha refers that are causal factors as to why a minority of
Muslims turn to extremism.32 The Doha Round cannot cure all such
problems.
But, as President Obama suggests, there are some opportunities worth
pursuing, beyond the obvious ones concerning trade rules governing agri-
cultural and industrial products. Consider trade in services, which includes
as a major sector educational services. There are over 10,000 Islamic
schools (madrasas) in Pakistan. Many of them cater to poor students and
are run by moderate Islamic clerics. But, about 60 percent of the madrasas
are affiliated with the extremist Deobandi sect of Sunni Islam.33 They teach
a severe brand of the Sharıˆ’a, calling for a return to its fundamentals,
namely, the Holy Qur’aˆn and Sunnah (traditions) of the Prophet Muham-
mad (PBUH) that were set in the seventh century AD.
Pakistani parents tend not to want to send their children to such
schools, where their kids memorize the Holy Qur’aˆn but receive no practi-
cal life skills. Typically, they do so for financial reasons. The schools are
well-funded, providing free meals, uniforms, and a copy of the Holy
31. Belt, supra note 27, at 42 (emphasis added). The government later backed down and
allowed not only the mosques to be rebuilt, but also the removal from the library of any book
deemed to be un-Islamic.
32. Similarly, in Somalia, the Minister of Finance, Mohamed Abdullahi Omaar, dubbed in-
ternational efforts to fight piracy as fatally flawed because they focused on containment of symp-
toms rather than the root causes of piracy—state fragmentation, incapacity, and a lack of
investment to “improv[e] the stability and prosperity of Somalia.” Michael Peel, Somali Minister
Hits at Anti-Piracy Policy, FIN. TIMES, April 19, 2011, at 2. In other words, piracy, like terrorism,
is symptomatic of deeper causal factors, a key one of which—but not the only one—is poverty.
33. See Belt, supra note 27, at 44.
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Qur’aˆn. Parents who lose their jobs or suffer income declines—perhaps (if
they are cotton farmers) because of competition from subsidized American
cotton or high barriers in the EU to textiles and apparel (T&A) merchandise
(if they work in a mill or garment factory)—have little choice. Suppose the
Doha Round yields, not only trade liberalization in primary and secondary
educational services, but also assistance to Islamic countries to import first-
rate teachers and pedagogies of essential modern skills, like reading, writ-
ing, arithmetic, and critical thinking. Might these imports put pressure on
extremist madrasas by giving them competition? That is, might an increase
in the supply of foreign educational services give parents a viable choice?
More generally, the question is whether development-friendly trade
rules, if implemented alongside fundamental reforms, would support re-
forms that Pakistan ought to take. Might they boost employment and in-
comes for a large swathe of Pakistan’s population at the lower tiers, and
thereby help engineer a transformation in Pakistan’s dreadfully skewed so-
cioeconomic order? In turn, would the empowerment of millions dispose
them against a radical agenda to convert Pakistan into a strict Islamic state,
far distant from the vision of its founder, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, that it be a
secular democracy in which Islam imparted its cultural, but not political,
influence?34
There are other examples. Nigeria, a WTO Member, the population of
which is about 50% Muslim, is one. Nigerian Muslims live in the north,
where per capita income is 50% less than in the predominantly Christian
south, and declining, and where literacy rates are two-thirds lower than in
the commercial capital, Lagos, which is a port city in the south.35 In the
principal northern city of Kano, two of the nine million residents are beg-
gars, and the industrial zones that once were home to garment manufactur-
ers are abandoned.36 Thus, The Economist reported in May 2011,
“[m]ilitancy is on the rise,” “[i]t is no surprise that extremists thrive in this
climate,” and “Boko Haram, a local terror group, is roaming ever wider and
fine-tuning its methods; a link up with al-Qaeda may be next.”37 Two
months later, these fears were confirmed: In August, this VEO blew up the
United Nations Headquarters in Abuja, killing twenty-three people and
wounding more than eighty, and the individual who planted the bomb was
linked to Al Qaeda.38 Poor governance, meaning corruption and communal
divisions, is the cause. Once again, the relevant question is not whether a
successful Doha Round can eliminate the threat of Islamist extremism in
34. See id. at 40.
35. A Man and a Morass, ECONOMIST, May 28, 2011, at 27, 27.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See Nigeria U.N. Bomb: ‘Al-Qaeda Linked’ Man Named as Suspect, BBC NEWS (Aug.
31, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14734738. Loosely translated from Hausa,
“Boko Haram” means “Western education is forbidden,” and this VEO seeks imposition in Nige-
ria of what it calls the “Sharıˆ’a.” Id.
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Nigeria. It cannot do so. Rather, the question is whether the Round, along
with appropriate governmental reforms, can reduce poverty in Nigeria and
thereby the appeal of extremism that some alienated Muslims might feel.
B. Nevermind the Regressions
Certain statistical and multivariable regression analyses suggest the
link between poverty and extremism is tenuous.39 They argue terrorism re-
sults from political oppression and other non-economic factors. But, these
studies miss the mark, and in any event do not gainsay a link between pov-
erty and extremism.
First, that suggestion defies common sense, as well as historical and
field experience. Simply put, a person who has nothing to live for has noth-
ing to lose. Resorting to violence in the grossly distorted name of a religion
is perceived to hold few offsetting disadvantages. The lack of a decent edu-
cation, because of poverty, means the inability to think critically, and
thereby realize that name is being perverted, is under-developed.
Second, these analyses focus on terrorists who commit violent acts,
making much of the fact that some terrorists (as on 9/11) are from wealthy
backgrounds. The studies often measure wealth by education, and thus
point out some terrorists have high school diplomas. Al Qaeda, Hamas,
Hezbollah, the Taliban, and other VEOs acting in the name of Islam are
well aware that while they can and do obtain some recruits from educated
but disaffected youths, their large, fertile recruiting pool is stocked with the
marginalized poor. Moreover, those diplomas mean little.40 Bluntly put, a
diploma from a typical school in many parts of the Arab world does not
measure up to one from Western Europe, Japan, or the U.S. All that can be
said is that to carry out a spectacularly evil terrorist attack with sophisti-
cated devices or weaponry, special training is required to master those in-
struments.41 (Flying a plane into a building illustrates the point.)
Third, many poor people are facilitators of terrorism but not picked up
in the datasets of economists. For example, some Bedouins in the Sinai
Peninsula and tribal peoples in Waziristan trade arms and narcotics because
39. For a summary of these studies, see Exploding Misconceptions, supra note 22, at 146
(discussing a 2008 survey of studies by Alan Krueger of Princeton University, as well as other
individual studies). The discussion above is not intended to be a comprehensive review and cri-
tique of these studies.
One oft-cited study is Alan B. Krueger & Jitka Maleckova, Education, Poverty and Terror-
ism: Is There a Causal Connection?, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 119, 119 (2003).
40. Here again, the author has put the question to U.S. SOF officers (whose names must
remain anonymous for security reasons), who invariably confirm the point.
41. See Exploding Misconceptions, supra note 22, at 146 (discussing a study by Claude Ber-
rebi of the RAND Corporation and Efraim Benmelech of Harvard University concluding, as The
Economist put it, that “more educated suicide-bombers are assigned to attack more important
targets”). Note, however, this study is limited to Palestinian suicide bombers between 2000 and
2005.
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they have no other lucrative means of support.42 To whom do they sell
arms, for example, except terrorists? For such traders, a development-
friendly Doha Round, which brought them into the formal trading system,
could do wonders, with the knock-on benefit of cutting off from terrorists at
least some of their intermediaries for weapons. Likewise, trafficking in
counterfeit goods—i.e., products that violate a lawful copyright, trademark,
or patent—may be tempting to impecunious people seeking to eke out a
living. Some of the proceeds of such sales may find their way into the hands
of terrorists.
Finally, empirical analyses may suffer from one or the other of various
shortcomings common in econometric research. For instance, one study fo-
cuses only on data from the Middle East, but neglects hotbeds of terrorist
activity elsewhere, including Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, and both North
and Sub-Saharan Africa.43 As another instance, one study argues the typical
terrorist is not “unusually poor or badly schooled.”44 But, delineating poor
or badly educated from “unusually” poor or badly educated people may be
difficult in practice—and perhaps not that relevant in terms of policies to
promote development and counter-terrorism. As another example, one
study considers only male Palestinian suicide bombers recruited by Hamas
and Islamic Jihaˆd from the West Bank and Gaza, while another focuses on
militants recruited by Hezbollah from the Shıˆ’ıˆte majority region of South-
ern Lebanon.45 These studies urge that the average suicide bomber or mili-
tant, respectively, tends to be better educated and less poor than others in
the respective statistical reference group. Yet, terrorists come from far more
places than the Levant, come from far more nationalities than Palestinian,
and may be women and children.
Still another problem concerns definitions. One study contends there is
no hard link between the per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of a
country and the propensity of that country to spawn terrorists.46 But, it de-
fines “poverty” in terms of low literacy rates or residence in a country with
a stagnant economy.47 In truth, broader concepts like capability deprivation
or marginalization may be more appropriate measures to explore the link
between poverty and generating terrorists. Likewise, a result in that study
(that suicide attackers are less likely to come from the poorest than from
42. On the general problem that many poor countries with large Muslim populations cannot
effectively police their international boundaries, thus creating a vacuum in which Islamist extrem-
ists can operate, see Susan E. Rice, The Threat of Global Poverty, NAT’L INT, Spring 2006, at 76,
76–82.
43. See Krueger & Maleckova, supra note 39.
44. See Exploding Misconceptions, supra note 22, at 146 (discussing a study by Alan Krue-
ger of Princeton University).
45. See id. (discussing a study by Claude Berrebi of the RAND Corporation and one by Alan
Krueger of Princeton University).
46. See id. (discussing a study by Claude Berrebi of the RAND Corporation and one by Alan
Krueger of Princeton University).
47. Id.
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relatively better-off countries) may be skewed by restricting the definition
of a terrorist event to suicide bombing.48
To be sure, quantitative research on the causes and causal mechanisms
of terrorism must not be categorically dismissed. One worthwhile insight
may be provided by a study that indicates an inverse relationship between
the skill level of the average terrorist, on the one hand, and economic condi-
tions, on the other hand.49 As those conditions improve, educated people
have enhanced job opportunities that earn higher incomes.50 VEOs thus
have a smaller pool of good talent from which to recruit evildoers.51 Con-
versely, the skill level of the average terrorist rises when job and income
prospects are grim. However, this study is limited to Palestinian suicide
bombers between 2000 and 2006.52 In brief, the point is simply to appreci-
ate the limitations of statistical and econometric methodologies.
C. Did They Know of the Link?
The link between trade liberalization and poverty alleviation, and the
follow-on link from poverty alleviation to reduced vulnerability to Islamist
extremism, was on the minds of world leaders and their trade ministers
when they launched the Doha Round in November 2001 in the Qatari capi-
tal. To think otherwise is to deny history.53 The Round “was originally
championed as a means of demonstrating international solidarity and coop-
eration in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks.”54 Indeed,
48. See id. (discussing a study by Alan Krueger of Princeton University).
49. See id. (discussing a study by Esteban Klor of Hebrew University in Jerusalem, Efraim
Benmelech of Harvard University, and Claude Berrebi of the RAND Corporation).
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. Id.
53. Countless news stories discuss the launch of the Doha Round “in 2001 in the capital of
Qatar with the goal of helping poor countries prosper through greater access to markets in rich
countries.” Doug Palmer, Analysis: WTO Faces Tough Choices After Latest Doha Setback,
REUTERS, Apr. 21, 2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/21/us-trade-wto-
doha-idUSTRE73K8I220110421. Such descriptions draw both an explicit link to poverty allevia-
tion, and an implicit link (by mentioning the launch date and venue) to fighting terrorism. Some
accounts are a bit more direct as to the latter link, stating (for example) that “the long-stalled
round . . . was launched after the Sept. 11, 2001 [attacks] . . . .” Tom Barkley, U.S. Says Too Early
to Declare Doha Round Dead, MARKETWATCH (Apr. 21, 2011), http://www.marketwatch.com/
story/us-says-too-early-to-declare-doha-round-dead-2011-04-21. But, it is unsurprising that ex-
plicit mention of Islamist extremism is not always made. Aside from concerns by some observers
or commentators about offending Muslim constituencies by linking “Islam” with “extremism,” not
every WTO Member stressed this link with equal vigor, either when the Round was launched, or
during the subsequent history of the Round.
54. Daniel Pruzin, WTO Members Give Up on Deliverables Pact, To Push for Work Program
to Advance Doha, 28 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 30, at 1228, 1230 (July 28, 2011) (emphasis
added).
Likewise, in March 2002, world leaders gathered in Monterrey, Mexico, for the United Na-
tions International Conference on Financing for Development. That Conference articulated a goal
of increasing economic assistance to poor countries as a way to help prevent future terrorists acts.
See United Nations International Conference on Financing for Development, Mar. 18–22, 2002,
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in the Declaration launching the Round, Ministers made explicit the first
step in the link—between trade liberalization and poverty alleviation:
1.  The multilateral trading system embodied in the World Trade
Organization has contributed significantly to economic growth,
development and employment throughout the past fifty years. We
are determined, particularly in the light of the global economic
slowdown, to maintain the process of reform and liberalization of
trade policies, thus ensuring that the system plays its full part in
promoting recovery, growth and development. We therefore
strongly reaffirm the principles and objectives set out in the Mar-
rakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
and pledge to reject the use of protectionism.
2. International trade can play a major role in the promotion of
economic development and the alleviation of poverty.  We recog-
nize the need for all our peoples to benefit from the increased
opportunities and welfare gains that the multilateral trading sys-
tem generates. The majority of WTO Members are developing
countries. We seek to place their needs and interests at the heart
of the Work Programme adopted in this Declaration. Recalling
the Preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement, we shall continue to
make positive efforts designed to ensure that developing coun-
tries, and especially the least-developed among them, secure a
share in the growth of world trade commensurate with the needs
of their economic development. In this context, enhanced market
access, balanced rules, and well targeted, sustainably financed
technical assistance and capacity-building programmes have im-
portant roles to play.
. . . .
10.  Recognizing the challenges posed by an expanding WTO
membership, we confirm our collective responsibility to ensure
internal transparency and the effective participation of all Mem-
bers. While emphasizing the intergovernmental character of the
organization, we are committed to making the WTO’s operations
more transparent, including through more effective and prompt
dissemination of information, and to improve dialogue with the
public. We shall therefore at the national and multilateral levels
continue to promote a better public understanding of the WTO
and to communicate the benefits of a liberal, rules-based multilat-
eral trading system.55
Report of the International Conference on Financing for Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.198/
11 (2002), available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/392/67/PDF/N02392
67.pdf?OpenElement.
55. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration on the Doha Development Agenda
(DDA) for Multilateral Trade Negotiations, ¶¶ 1, 2, 10, WT/MIN (01)/DEC/1 (Nov. 20, 2001)
(adopted Nov. 14, 2001) (emphasis added), available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/min
01_e/minded_e.htm.
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Why not also make explicit in the Declaration the second, final step in
the link, namely, from poverty alleviation to vulnerability to Islamist ex-
tremism? The answer is a matter for speculation. One possibility is to save
face for Islamic countries, i.e., not to single them or the religion of Islam
out as uniquely plagued with the problem of extremism, and thereby not
foster Islamophobia. No matter, though, as this next step was obvious
enough, and regrettably, the hysteria spread and still exists.
To deny the existence of the link at the launch of the Doha Round also
is to ignore a strong, optimistic, and long-standing vision for international
trade, summarized by the phrase “peace through trade.”56 The vision, cham-
pioned by America’s longest-serving Secretary of State (from 1933 to 1944,
under President Franklin Roosevelt), Cordell Hull (1871–1955), is that
trade generates economic prosperity, and sooner or later, directly or indi-
rectly, political democracy. In turn, people who are well off, or who have
hope for a better future, are unlikely to want to overturn the status quo
violently or support war with people in other well-off democracies. The
vision is not uniquely American. Tanzania’s former President, Benjamin
Mkapa, aptly summarized that “it is futile, if not foolhardy to think there is
no link between poverty and terrorism. . . .”57 In turn, the former U.S. As-
sistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Susan Rice, observed that
Africa is the “world’s soft underbelly for global terrorism,” and VEOs seek
to recruit from among its “poor, disillusioned populations . . . .”58
America has not lost faith in the vision of peace through trade. To the
present, it is part of the rhetoric of U.S. trade policy. It was a hallmark of
that policy when the DDA was launched. That is, America viewed trade
policy and multilateral trade liberalization as an important component of its
national security strategy. Multilateral trade liberalization was one tool in
the kit to be used in the Global War on Terror that had been thrust upon
America.
There is no better evidence of this linkage—trade as an element of
counter-terrorism—than the official U.S. government report of the 9/11
Commission. It summarizes the relationship of underdevelopment and sense
of hopelessness that goes with it to trade liberalization and counter-
terrorism:
Economic openness is essential. Terrorism is not caused by
poverty. Indeed, many terrorists come from relatively well-off
56. Kishore Mahbubani, Trade in the New Asian Hemisphere, in PEACE AND PROSPERITY
THROUGH WORLD TRADE 6 (Fabrice Lehmann & Jean-Pierre Lehmann eds., 2010) (discussing the
peace-through-trade theory); see generally DANIEL GRISWOLD, MAD ABOUT TRADE: WHY MAIN
STREET AMERICA SHOULD EMBRACE GLOBALIZATION (2009).
57. Adam Lusekelo, Africa’s War on Terror Targets Poverty, BBC NEWS (Feb. 27, 2003),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/2797405.stm.
58. Africa and the War on Global Terrorism: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Africa of
the Committee on International Relations, 107th Cong., 18 (2001) (testimony of Susan Rice, As-
sistant Sec’y of State and Consultant on African Affairs).
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families. Yet when people lose hope, when societies break down,
when countries fragment, the breeding grounds for terrorism are
created. Backward economic policies and repressive political re-
gimes slip into societies that are without hope, where ambition
and passions have no constructive outlet.
The policies that support economic development and reform
also have political implications. Economic and political liberties
tend to be linked. Commerce, especially international commerce,
requires ongoing cooperation and compromise, the exchange of
ideas across cultures, and the peaceful resolution of differences
through negotiation or the rule of law. Economic growth expands
the middle class, a constituency for further reform. Successful
economies rely on vibrant private sectors, which have an interest
in curbing indiscriminate government power. Those who develop
the practice of controlling their own economic destiny soon desire
a voice in their communities and political societies.
The U.S. government has announced [in May 2003] the goal of
working toward a Middle East Free Trade Area, or MEFTA, by
2013. The United States has been seeking comprehensive free
trade agreements (FTAs) with the Middle Eastern nations most
firmly on the path to reform. . . . Muslim countries can become
full participants in the rules-based global trading system, as the
United States considers lowering its trade barriers with the
poorest Arab nations.
Recommendation: A comprehensive U.S. strategy to counter
terrorism should include economic policies that encourage de-
velopment, more open societies, and opportunities for people
to improve the lives of their families and to enhance prospects
for their children’s future.59
To be clear, underdevelopment, of which poverty is a ubiquitous fea-
ture, is a condition in which extremist ideas simmer. Neither it generally,
nor income deprivation specifically, leads inexorably to terrorism. There are
intervening variables, as well as other causal variables. Deprivations of po-
litical and social rights, and religious freedoms, operate in either or both
senses.
In other words, neither underdevelopment nor poverty is a necessary or
sufficient condition for Islamist extremism. But, neither can they be ig-
nored. They are repeatedly observed phenomena connected with this ex-
tremism. VEOs like Al Qaeda know it and exploit it to their advantage. As
Professor Kevin J. Fandl rightly states:
59. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 9/11
COMMISSION REPORT—FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS
UPON THE UNITED STATES 378–79 (authorized ed., July 22, 2004) (bold emphasis in original,
italics emphasis added).
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Poverty is rampant in rank and file Muslim terrorists; how-
ever, it is not found in the leadership of these groups. So while the
large majority of members of terrorist groups hail from impover-
ished areas in the Middle East and Southern Asia that do not af-
ford sufficient opportunities for members’ self sufficiency, the
wealthy leadership continue to belong “to an old tradition in
which self-serving elites seize upon and manipulate the griev-
ances of the poor.” By manipulating ideas and subsequently the
minds of individuals, these power-hungry leaders are able to seize
upon the lack of opportunity of these often impoverished and oth-
erwise peaceful citizens, convincing them to rise up and take the
lives of others and/or themselves in the name of the leadership’s
cause—not Islam, but vengeance. . . .
. . . .
. . . This conventional method of warfare [military means], while
effective in pinpointing targets in complete darkness, will be use-
less in eliminating the ideology that fuels terrorism. Terrorists are
non-conventional actors using non-conventional means through
amorphous concepts that cannot be identified, contained, or la-
beled. These are actors whose most potent weapon is the commu-
nication of ideas among masses of people awaiting an opportunity
for a better life.60
American trade negotiators involved in the launch of the Round, and
the early years of that Round, knew it, too—that to attack poverty through
appropriate new trade rules is to attack terrorism. If they did not, then why
in May 2003 would the U.S. have launched its Middle East Free Trade
Initiative (MEFTA), the stated goal of which is to stitch together countries
in that region into a network of free trade and democracy?61
Accordingly, successive iterations of the U.S. National Strategy Re-
port, an explanation and analysis of American national security strategy
submitted by the President to Congress annually pursuant to Section 108 of
the National Security Act of 1947, have linked poverty alleviation and
broader economic development to reducing the threat from Islamist extrem-
ism.62 President George W. Bush wrote in the 2002 National Strategy
Report:
[T]he United States will use this moment of opportunity to extend
the benefits of freedom across the globe. We will actively work to
bring the hope of democracy, development, free markets, and free
trade to every corner of the world. The events of September 11,
60. Kevin J. Fandl, Terrorism, Development & Trade: Winning the War on Terrorism With-
out the War, 19 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 587, 594, 599 (2004) (quoting Ken Booth & Tim Dunne,
Worlds in Collision, in WORLDS IN COLLISION: TERROR AND THE FUTURE OF GLOBAL ORDER 9
(Ken Booth & Tim Dunne eds., 2002)) (emphasis added).
61. For a discussion of MEFTA, see RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: INTERDISCI-
PLINARY THEORY AND PRACTICE 694–95 (3d ed. 2008).
62. See 50 U.S.C. § 404a (2006).
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2001, taught us that weak states, like Afghanistan, can pose as
great a danger to our national interests as strong states. Poverty
does not make poor people into terrorists and murderers. Yet pov-
erty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states vul-
nerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders.
The United States will stand beside any nation determined to
build a better future by seeking the rewards of liberty for its peo-
ple. Free trade and free markets have proven their ability to lift
whole societies out of poverty—so the United States will work
with individual nations, entire regions, and the entire global trad-
ing community to build a world that trades in freedom and there-
fore grows in prosperity. . . .
. . . .
We are also guided by the conviction that no nation can build a
safer, better world alone. Alliances and multilateral institutions
can multiply the strength of freedom-loving nations. The United
States is committed to lasting institutions like the United Nations,
the World Trade Organization, the Organization of American
States, and NATO [the North Atlantic Treaty Organization], as
well as other long-standing alliances.63
Entitled “Ignite a New Era of Global Economic Growth through Free
Markets and Free Trade,” Section VI of the 2002 National Strategy Report
amplifies the theme of peace-through-trade:
A strong world economy enhances our national security by ad-
vancing prosperity and freedom in the rest of the world. Eco-
nomic growth supported by free trade and free markets creates
new jobs and higher incomes. It allows people to lift their lives
out of poverty, spurs economic and legal reform, and the fight
against corruption, and it reinforces the habits of liberty.
. . . .
The concept of “free trade” arose as a moral principle even before
it became a pillar of economics. If you can make something that
others value, you should be able to sell it to them. If others make
something that you value, you should be able to buy it. This is
real freedom, the freedom for a person—or a nation—to make a
living. To promote free trade, the United States has developed a
comprehensive strategy:
• Seize the global initiative. The new global trade rounds we
helped launch at Doha in November 2001 will have an ambi-
tious agenda, especially in agriculture, manufacturing, and
services, targeted for completion in 2005. The United States
has led the way in completing the accession of China and a
63. PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA v–vi (2002), available at http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/USnss2002.pdf
(emphasis added).
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democratic Taiwan to the World Trade Organization. We
will assist Russia’s preparations to join the WTO.64
Manifestly, the Doha Round was not completed by the Hong Kong
Ministerial Conference in December 2005, and while China and Taiwan
acceded to the WTO in 2001 and 2002, respectively, negotiations for Russia
to join have yet to be finished. (As for the remaining eight of the nine
bullet-point elements in the comprehensive strategy, the U.S. made progress
on some of them, but not in any enduring or conclusive manner, in the Bush
and Obama Administrations.65) In the intervening years, as the Round has
dragged on, trade negotiators—both American and foreign—have lost sight
of the theme, not to mention the fervor, of believing trade liberalization to
be a “moral principle.”
To be sure, in November 2001, not all WTO Members held exactly the
same perspectives on the project on which they were about to embark as did
the U.S. Some countries were slower to the mark to appreciate how drasti-
cally the world had changed after September 11, and thus to think about
links between terrorism and trade. But, to one degree or another, the nexus
of trade liberalization, poverty alleviation, and fighting Islamist extremism
was perceptible. The former United States Trade Representative (USTR),
Ambassador Susan Schwab, writes that:
[T]he [Doha Round] talks have sought to promote economic
growth and improve living standards across the globe—especially
in developing countries. . . .
. . . .
When the Doha Round finally began in the wake of Septem-
ber 11, 2001, negotiators continued to disagree over its objectives
and how to achieve them.
The use of trade liberalization and reform to generate eco-
nomic growth and help alleviate poverty formed the core of the
initiative.66
Ujal Singh Bhatia, the former Indian Ambassador to the WTO, notes
that “[c]onsensus on launching the Round emerged under the extraordinary
situation created by the 9/11 events.”67 That many if not most trade officials
at the November 2001 Ministerial Conference in Doha had those events on
64. Id. at 17–18 (emphasis on “Seize the global initiative” in original; other emphasis added).
65. Those other eight elements are: pressing regional initiatives, moving ahead with bilateral
free trade agreements, renewing the partnership between the executive branch and Congress on
trade, promoting the connection between trade and development, enforcing trade agreements and
laws against unfair trade practices, helping domestic industries and workers adjust, protecting the
environment and workers, and enhancing energy security. See id. at 18–19.
66. Susan C. Schwab, After Doha—Why the Negotiations Are Doomed and What We Should
Do About It, 90 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 104, 104–06 (2011) (emphasis added).
67. Ujal Singh Bhatia, WTO Members are Lashed to the Mast of the Doha Round, FINANCIAL
TIMES, May 16, 2011, at 8 (letter to the Financial Times) (emphasis added). Mr. Bhatia served as
Ambassador from 2004–2010.
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their minds, and thought about how they might structure their good work to
combat evil, is scarcely disputable.
D. The World Has Not Changed
One of the oft-used arguments by the U.S. in the Doha Round, particu-
larly in the later years of the Round, is that “the world has fundamentally
changed since the Doha Round was launched in November 2001, with Bra-
zil, China, India, and others becoming world-leading exporters in some sec-
tors of the global economy over the past decade.”68 Thus, American trade
officials argue, the key question in the Round is “to what extent should the
major emerging economies take on additional responsibilities to liberalize
global trade in order to reflect their growing importance in the global econ-
omy[?]”69 This argument is not untrue, but rather is made in the wrong
venue.
It is not untrue because the world has changed in the sense of the
importance of major emerging powers. The likes of Brazil, India, and China
are vastly more important to the U.S. and other developed countries than
they once were. Between 1998 and 2001, less than half of the growth in
world GDP came from outside of rich countries.70 Between 2011 and 2014,
the countries that are not rich, i.e., developing and (to a lesser extent) least
developed countries, will account for 75% of the addition to global GDP.
That is why:
America sees the Doha talks as its final opportunity to get fast-
growing emerging economies like China and India to slash their
duties on imports of such [manufactured] goods, which have been
reduced in previous [GATT] rounds but remain much higher than
those in the rich world. It wants something approaching parity, at
least in some sectors, because it reckons its own low tariffs leave
it with few concessions to offer in future talks. But emerging mar-
kets insist that the Doha Round was never intended to result in
such harmonization.71
The emerging markets are right, and it is in relation to their point that
the world has not changed.
In fact, even with the death of Osama Bin Laden in May 2011, much
of the world has not fundamentally changed since November 2001 when the
Doha Round was launched. Islamist extremism remains a global threat.72
68. Daniel Pruzin, WTO Chief Calls for Rethink on Doha Talks, Says Differences on
Sectorals ‘Unbridgeable,’ 28 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 17, at 686, 687 (Apr. 28, 2011).
69. Id.
70. See The Doha Round: Dead Man Talking, ECONOMIST, Apr. 28, 2011, at 81. This and the
projected contribution to world GDP are from the International Monetary Fund.
71. Id. (emphasis added).
72. See, e.g., Daniel Dombey, Al-Qaeda ‘Still a Formidable Network,’ FINANCIAL TIMES,
May 10, 2011, at 3 (reporting that according to the U.S. State Department, Al Qaeda remains as
deadly as ever, notwithstanding the demise of Bin Laden).
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The conditions of poverty, and a generalized sense of oppression, both of
which incubate Islamist extremists, have not changed. Thus, when the U.S.
offers up the argument that Brazil, China, India, and other emerging devel-
oping countries must offer concessions commensurate with their enhanced
global commercial status, the U.S. is not wrong about their new status and
what the consequences of it ought fairly to be. Rather, the U.S. is just mak-
ing a reasonable argument in the wrong venue and betraying the very pur-
pose on which it helped launch the Round: counter-terrorism.
The Doha Round never was intended for a re-balancing of trade con-
cessions, although developing and even least developed countries never
were told they would have no obligations whatsoever. That is, while the
Round never was designed as a one-sided exercise whereby rich countries
take on all market access and subsidy reduction commitments, and poor
countries do nothing, it was intended to address the single gravest threat
facing all nations: terrorism, specifically, Islamist extremism. To be sure,
no WTO Member saw the Round as a magic bullet that would end terror-
ism. But, many if not most of the Members appreciated the role trade liber-
alization could play in combating one of the conditions that spawns this
extremism: poverty, or put more generally, a sense of oppression.
The fact that India is home to the largest concentration of Muslims in
the world and that China has a sizeable Muslim population have not
changed. What has changed, for those two countries, since November 2001,
is they have been struck by Islamist extremism and have had to devote
considerable military and security resources to fighting it. The “new” fact
that China and India have had success in exporting does not alter the “old”
fact that they are home to roughly 700 and 600 million poor people, respec-
tively, who live in squalid conditions and have little stake in the world trad-
ing system, and many of them are Muslim.
Brazil, too, is beset with a large population of poor people, albeit non-
Muslim. Yet, even with Brazil, the link with Islamist extremism may exist.
Radical Islamist groups, such as Hezbollah, traffic pirated intellectual prop-
erty goods (as well as narcotics and weapons), such as music CDs and
movie DVDs. Such pirated goods have been found in South America and
surely are attractive to poor people, who cannot afford authentic items. To
what ends do the radical groups put their ill-gotten gains from the sale of
counterfeit assets? The answer is not just social welfare projects they spon-
sor in impoverished places like South Lebanon, but also surely includes
terrorist activities.
III. TEXTS AND DOCUMENTS
A. The December 2008 Draft Modalities Texts
The course of evolution is perhaps less apparent in the world of inter-
national trade law than biology. Chronic Doha Round problems on agricul-
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ture and non-agricultural market access (NAMA) remained unresolved
during the fall of 2008, summing to a list of issues needing convergence
before a resurrection of the Round was more than the object of hope. Yet,
none of the then-153 WTO Members appeared to have a vision that the
extraordinary still was possible. None seemed to believe progress on details
would lead to salvific resurrection of the moribund Round.
China, for example, did little else than call for realism and dampen
expectations with Sun Zhenyu, its Ambassador to the WTO, stating in No-
vember 2008:
One important thing for all Members is that they should be realis-
tic, and also try to have a balanced outcome. . . . These [i.e., the
Special Safeguard Mechanism (discussed below) and sensitive
products in agriculture, and sectoral negotiations and preference
erosion in NAMA (also discussed below)] are all very delicate
issues, and eventually there must be a kind of balance. . . . Now
everybody is in crisis . . . in order to get what we did not get in
July [2008], we have to be more realistic on those issues. . . . If
you raise the stake[s] at this stage, try to ask for more on the basis
of July, that will probably not fly. . . .73
Fortunately, two unsung heroes of the Round kept the faith that a res-
urrection could happen, and, that if it did, the world might be a little better
place: the Chair of the Agricultural Negotiations, Ambassador Crawford
Falconer of New Zealand, and the Chair of the Market Access Negotiations,
Ambassador Luzius Wasescha of Switzerland.
These Chairmen issued new Draft Modalities Texts on 6 December
2008 in their respective areas.74 If there is a resurrection of the Doha
73. Chinese Ambassador Calls for Realism in WTO Trade Talks, CHINA VIEW (Nov. 28,
2008), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-11/28/content_10423758.htm; see also China,
U.S. Have “Robust” talks on Turmoil, REUTERS, Dec. 4, 2008, available at http://uk.reuters.com/
article/2008/12/05/china-usa-idUKBJB00052620081205 (reporting on the 5th Strategic Economic
Dialogue (SED) talks between the U.S. and China, in which the two sides issued a bland reitera-
tion of the importance of completing the Doha Round, with meaningful progress by the end of
2008).
74. See World Trade Organization, Committee on Agriculture, Special Session, Revised
Draft Modalities for Agriculture, TN/AG/W/4/Rev.4 (Dec. 6, 2008) [hereinafter December 2008
Draft Agriculture Modalities Text]; World Trade Organization, Negotiating Group on Market Ac-
cess, Fourth Revision of Draft Modalities for Non-Agricultural Market Access, TN/MA/W/103/
Rev.3 (Dec. 6, 2008) [hereinafter December 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text].
Chairman Falconer also issued three documents covering issues on which major disputes
remained, offering possible compromise solutions:
(1) On Sensitive Products—
World Trade Organization, Committee on Agriculture, Special Session, Revised
Draft Modalities for Agriculture Sensitive Products: Designation, TN/AG/W/5
(Dec. 6, 2008).
(2) Also on Sensitive Products—
World Trade Organization, Committee on Agriculture, Special Session, Revised
Draft Modalities for Agriculture Sensitive Products: Tariff Quota Creation, TN/
AG/W/6 (Dec. 6, 2008).
(3) On SSMs—
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Round, then the terms and conditions in those Texts will be the setting for
it.75 That is not to say Members will complete the Round based on each and
every proposal in the Texts. To the contrary, the Texts almost surely will
undergo revisions that vary from the insubstantial to the immense, depend-
World Trade Organization, Committee on Agriculture, Special Session, Revised
Draft Modalities for Agriculture Special Safeguard Mechanism, TN/AG/W/7 (Dec.
6, 2008).
75. See World Trade Organization, WTO to Move Quickly on Wider Front in 2009 – Lamy
(Dec. 17, 2008), http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news08_e/tnc_dg_stat_17dec08_e.htm.
Notably, using the December 2008 Texts as a basis for negotiations was India’s official
position following the return to power of the Congress Party in the May 2009 general elections
and appointment of a new Minister for Commerce and Industry—the Anand Sharma, replacing
Kamal Nath. India was able to take that position with greater ease, and profess a renewed commit-
ment to the Doha Round, because the election results permitted the Congress Party to shed its
most left-wing, protectionist partners in the governing coalition. See Daniel Pruzin, WTO Mem-
bers Set December 15–17 as Date for 2011 Ministerial Gathering, 27 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No.
42, at 1628, (Oct. 28, 2010); Tripti Lahiri, New Delhi ‘Breakthrough’ Sets Restart of Doha Round
Ag, NAMA Talks for Sept. 14, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 36, at 1191 (Sept. 10, 2009); Serena
Tarling & George Parker, New Delhi Ready to Resume Doha Round of World Trade Talks, FINAN-
CIAL TIMES, June 23, 2009, at 6.
Likewise, the Group of 20 developing countries insisted ever since the Agriculture Text was
issued that it is the “basis for resuming negotiations and represents the end-game in terms of the
landing zones,” and has rejected a “selective reopening” of the Text. See Daniel Pruzin, New WTO
Ag Negotiations Chair Walker Outlines Work Plans for Immediate Term, 26 Int’l Trade Rep.
(BNA) No. 25, at 840, 841 (June 25, 2009). Indeed, that insistence applies to both draft modalities
agreements, covering agriculture and NAMA, and (as observed above) is held to by (inter alia)
Brazil, China, and India, as they did not want to see back-sliding, or a return to square one, in
Doha Round negotiations—an outcome they feared, perhaps wrongly, that the Administration of
President Barack H. Obama sought. See Daniel Pruzin, WTO Members Vow to Press Forward
with Intensified Talks on Doha Round, 28 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 6, at 215 (Feb. 10, 2011)
(quoting Brazil’s Ambassador to the WTO, Roberto Azevedo, saying that any attempt to push far
beyond the December 2008 texts might “backfire, risking to unravel the delicate network of trade-
offs we so carefully wove over the last nine years”); Daniel Pruzin & Gary G. Yerkey, U.S.
Sought to Water Down Proposal for ‘Stock-Taking’ Meeting on Doha, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA)
No. 48, at 1673 (Dec. 3, 2009); Lahiri, supra at 1191. See also Daniel Pruzin, Lamy Sees Low-
Profile ‘Stock-Taking’ Meeting as Frustration Over Doha Grows, 27 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No.
8, at 248, 249 (Feb. 25, 2010) (reporting that while the U.S. was the most critical of the December
2008 Draft Texts on Agriculture and NAMA, most WTO Members agreed a final deal should not
stray too far from them); Jonathan Lynn, Intensified Doha Talks to Resume this Month, REUTERS,
Sept. 4, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/09/04/us-trade-doha-idUSTRE583
10Q20090904 (noting that key trade ministers—albeit representing just 39 of the then 153 Mem-
bers—agreed at a September 2009 meeting in New Delhi, in advance of the G-20 summit in
Pittsburgh, to resume Doha Round talks on the basis of the December 2008 Texts, and quoting
USTR Ron Kirk as saying “[i]t has never been our argument that we should start all over again or
reopen them, but we have to have some idea of what those gaps and blanks are”); Gary G. Yerkey,
India Plans to Host G-20 Trade Ministerial this September to Help Advance WTO Talks, 26 Int’l
Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 26, at 841 (June 25, 2009) (quoting Minister Sharma as saying USTR Ron
Kirk agreed to build on the existing texts); Daniel Pruzin, New WTO Ag Chair Vows Fast Action
to Revive Doha Round Farm Trade Talks, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 18, at 568, 568–69
(Apr. 30, 2009); Daniel Pruzin, Ministers Pledge to Refrain from Imposing New Trade Barriers,
Will Push for Doha Deal, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 6, at 180, 180–81 (Feb. 5, 2009) (report-
ing the trade ministers of Brazil and Switzerland regard the December 2008 Texts as the basis for
any deal).
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ing on the topic.76 Indeed, following the November 2010 G-20 Summit in
Seoul, Members pledged to redouble their efforts to agree to revised agri-
culture and NAMA texts, which they (not the Chairmen) promised to pre-
pare, by April, or at least the middle of, 2011, with a view to signing the
deal at the eighth WTO Ministerial Conference in Geneva in December
2011.77 Members feared the window of opportunity—one of many during
the interminable Round—to finish the Round would close in 2012 because
of presidential elections in France, India, and the U.S.
While Brazil, China, and India argue these Texts ought not to be al-
tered in any material way, the U.S. insists on significant changes.78 Some
WTO Members, such as South Africa, have rejected them. Overall, as the
Minister of Trade for New Zealand and former Chair of the Agriculture
Negotiations, Tim Groser, remarked in June 2009:
We’ve got agreement, not necessarily comfortable agreement,
that you can’t [walk] away from seven years of text that’s been
developed [for the Doha Round negotiations]. There have been
people wanting essentially to go back to square one. That was a
recipe for disaster. [Not building on the December 2008 Agricul-
ture Text, and presumably the NAMA Text as well, would be]
either naivete´ of the highest order or cynicism of the lowest
order.79
The point is the December 2008 Draft Texts on Agriculture and
NAMA embody a final judgment Members must make—do they accept,
with modifications as need be, the proposals for freeing up world trade in
farm and manufactured products, or not? Only a “yes” answer leads to a
resurrection. A “no” answer means final death of the Doha Round, at least
in the sense of completion via a single undertaking, which is the approach
of all previous multilateral trade rounds.80
76. See Gary G. Yerkey, U.S. Cautions Lamy Against Pushing for Early Restart of WTO
Trade Talks, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 13, at 404 (Mar. 26, 2009).
77. See Daniel Pruzin, Officials Meet to Begin Preparations in Geneva for Accelerated Doha
Talks, 27 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 48, at 1874 (Dec. 9, 2010); Daniel Pruzin, WTO Members
Endorse Work Plan to Secure Doha Agreement in 2011, 27 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 47, at
1832 (Dec. 2, 2010); see also World Trade Organization, Farm Talks To Aim for ‘Modalities’ in
First Quarter of 2011 (Dec. 6 and 10, 2010), http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news10_e/
agng_06dec10_e.htm.
78. See Daniel Pruzin, WTO Ministerial Ends with a Whimper; Members to Review Doha
Talks in Early 2010, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 48, at 1638, 1639 (Dec. 3, 2009).
79. Murray Griffin, Cairns Ministers Seek Rapid Re-Engagement on Doha; USTR Urges
Openness to New Ideas, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No.  24, at 772 (June 11, 2009).
80. As of the end of the Seventh Ministerial Conference in Geneva, held from 30 November
through 2 December 2009, there were increasingly numerous and desperate calls, from rich and
poor countries alike, to abandon the single undertaking and aim for separate, less ambitious deals
on individual topics such as—
• Disciplines on fishing subsidies.
• Duty-free access for merchandise from the least developed countries.
• Ending cotton subsidies.
• Settlement of the Bananas dispute.
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The faith of Chairmen Falconer and Wasescha was tempered by real-
ism, of course. The WTO Director-General Lamy decided not to call a
meeting of trade ministers before year-end 2008, admitting there was no
political will among key Members—including, without naming them,
China, India, the U.S., and EU—to make the compromises necessary to
complete the Doha Round.81 The Chairmen were under tremendous pres-
sure to issue the December Texts. The Director-General hoped they might
come up with the magic formulae needed to reconcile theretofore intracta-
ble differences. He also hoped that in 2009 he would secure re-appointment
as Director-General (which he did), and to some degree his success was
bound to that of the Round.82
Yet, in a Member-driven organization such as the WTO, Chairmen
Falconer and Wasescha hardly could impose solutions. Chairmen are
neither scribes nor dictators. They occupy an uneasy position, being more
than facilitators (though that is their technical description) but having no
management authority. Their position can and does change, depending on
• Trade liberalization for environmental goods and services.
The U.S. continued to favor the single undertaking approach, as it was keen to see what it
would “get” in return for what it “gave.” See Laura MacInnis, Calls Grow To Smash WTO Deal
into Digestible Pieces, REUTERS, Dec. 3, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/
12/03/us-trade-wto-deals-idUSTRE5B229G20091203. Each of these topics, including the U.S.
position calling for reciprocity, is explored more fully below.
81. See World Trade Organization, Lamy Recommends No Ministerial Meeting By End of
This Year (Dec. 12, 2008), http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news08_e/tnc_dg_12dec08_e.htm;
Daniel Pruzin, Lamy Says Spring G-20 Meeting Should Include Commitment to End Doha, 26
Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 5, at 144, 144–45 (Jan. 29, 2009); Daniel Pruzin & Gary G. Yerkey,
WTO’s Lamy Calls Off Doha Ministerial; Deal Up to Obama Team, U.S. Official Says, 25 Int’l
Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 50, at 1766, 1766–77 (Dec. 18, 2008); Roberta Rampton, “Many Gaps”
Nix World Trade Deal Breakthrough: USTR, REUTERS, Dec. 12, 2008, available at http://www.
reuters.com/article/2008/12/12/us-trade-wto-schwab-idUSTRE4BB5BP20081212.
For a comparative journalistic account of the political economy of China and India in light of
global economic recession, see China and India: Suddenly Vulnerable, ECONOMIST, Dec. 13,
2008, at 15. For a briefing on Chinese economic reforms ushered in by Deng Xiaoping in 1978,
see China’s Reforms: The Second Long March, ECONOMIST, Dec. 13, 2008, at 30–33. For a dis-
cussion of obstacles to Indian economic development, including labyrinthine politics, a creaky
infrastructure, terrorist threats, and gross inequities, see A Special Report on India: An Elephant,
Not a Tiger, ECONOMIST, Dec. 13, 2008, at 62.
82. The unanimous, four-year re-appointment, effective 1 September 2009, occurred in April
2009 after the WTO Members required Pascal Lamy to make a presentation on his vision for the
future of the WTO, and engage in a question-and-answer session. See THE WORLD TRADE ORGAN-
IZATION, http://www.wto.org.
With no others announcing their candidacy by the 31 December 2008 deadline, Lamy be-
came the first uncontested selection in WTO history. See Daniel Pruzin, Lamy Secures Second
Term at WTO Helm After No Challengers to Leadership Emerge, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No.
2, at 38 (Jan. 8, 2009); UPDATE 1—Lamy Only Candidate for Next Head of WTO, REUTERS, Jan.
5, 2009, available at http://uk.reuters.com/article/2009/01/05/uk-trade-wto-lamy-idUKTRE
5041VE20090105. Aside from an endorsement of his performance in the post, that fact may re-
flect the lack of other viable candidates, a reluctance among Members to engage in a contentious
changing of the guard (especially amidst a difficult global economic environment), and a percep-
tion among Members that the position is a thankless one (at least in the present climate).
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the circumstances, in the large area between these extremes. Deals must
come from the Members.
Thus, the Chairmen did their best to strike the right balance between
capturing points of convergence among Members and suggesting possible
solutions to reach consensus on outstanding disputes. If trade ministers did
not reconvene for another go at a final deal, then at least the reason would
not be the lack of revised negotiating documents, however modest, even
trivial, the revisions might be. Both Chairmen prefaced their December
2008 Draft Modalities Texts with the same caution: “[E]verything is condi-
tional in the deepest sense.”83 About three months later, Chairman Falconer
added a post-script to his Text. In March 2009, he announced his departure
from his posts as Chairman and as New Zealand’s Ambassador to the
WTO, to return to Wellington to serve as Deputy Secretary at the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs and Trade.84
While he was replaced by another New Zealander, Ambassador David
Walker,85 that post-script was an ominous portent: Having served as the
Chairman since July 2005, few, if any, officials knew more about trade and
agriculture, and had labored with greater tenacity and good cheer in the
Doha Round, than Chairman Falconer. Another bad omen came in Septem-
ber 2009, when the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced
Ambassador Walker was being reassigned to a different post effective early
2010, a date later put off to April 2011.86 Despite his heroic efforts, the
two-year tenure of Chairman Walker was marked by little else than a stale-
mate over entrenched differences on major substantive issues and grinding,
mind-numbing work on technical issues of templates WTO Members could
use to list their final agricultural concessions and attendant data.
Following issuance of the Draft Modalities Texts in December 2008,
negotiations proceeded, in fits and starts, as chronicled below. By early
2011, there was pressure from the WTO Director-General, Pascal Lamy,
and certain Members, like the EU, on the Chairman of the respective nego-
83. December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, pmbl., at ¶ 2; Decem-
ber 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 74, revision, ¶ 1.
84. See Daniel Pruzin, Chair of WTO Farm Trade Talks to Leave in April, Will Return to
New Zealand, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 13, at 408 (Mar. 26, 2009).
85. See Daniel Pruzin, Deal Reached on New Doha Agriculture Chair; New Zealander
Walker to Succeed Falconer, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 16, at 507 (Apr. 16, 2009); Daniel
Pruzin, New Zealander Walker Set to Secure Ag Chair in Doha Talks, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA)
No. 15, at 477 (Apr. 9, 2009). Interestingly, the Group of 33 developing countries, which includes
India, opposed the appointment of Ambassador Guillermo Valles Galme´s of Uruguay, because he
had been critical in July 2008 of the position taken by many developing countries in favor of a
special agricultural safeguard mechanism (which is discussed below). See id.
86. See Daniel Pruzin, Lamy Postpones Meeting Amid Continued Bickering Over ‘Deliver-
ables’ Package, 28 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 24, at 974 (June 16, 2011); Daniel Pruzin, WTO
Members to Begin Search for New Agriculture Negotiations Chair, 27 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No.
35, at 1336 (Sept. 9, 2010).
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tiating groups to issue revised texts by Easter (24 April 2011).87 That way,
the remainder of the year could be used to fill in schedules of commitments,
and the Doha Round could be finished by the end of the year. Every meet-
ing held among the Members, in various configurations, toward that end in
January through early April 2011 failed. That is, no breakthrough agree-
ment emerged. And, with heads of governments captivated by revolutions
in the Arab World, and war in Libya, they paid little attention to the Round.
The U.S., along with India and other Members, took the position that no
new texts should be issued and that doing so would risk the appearance, if
not reality, that the Chairs were imposing modalities agreements on the
Members, contrary to the Member-driven way in which the WTO conven-
tionally operates. Such texts would have no traction with domestic
legislatures.
Following the work of his colleagues on the Draft Modalities Texts in
Agriculture and NAMA, Ambassador Guillermo Valles Galme´s of Uru-
guay, Chairman of the Negotiating Group on Rules, issued a revised Draft
Consolidated Text on trade remedies, specifically, antidumping (AD), coun-
tervailing duties (CVDs), and fishing subsidies.88 He did so about one week
after issuance of the Agriculture and Modalities Texts. Vast tracts of the
December 2008 Rules Text were identical to the previous iteration, which
the Chairman had issued in November 2007. The new Rules Text had only
one advantage over its predecessor: It identified clearly the points of disa-
greement among WTO Members and the range and depth of their disagree-
ment. The disadvantage was unmistakable: The new Text deleted proposed
drafting language on those points because that language had attracted
neither consensus nor convergence toward consensus.
Confessedly, the December 2008 Draft Rules Text was dispiriting. It
embodied no strong faith in the possibility of a Doha Round resurrection.
87. See Daniel Pruzin, WTO Chairs to Issue Doha ‘Documents’ April 21, Lamy to Brief on
NAMA Progress, 28 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 15, at 609 (Apr. 14, 2011).
88. See World Trade Organization, Negotiating Group on Rules, New Draft Consolidated
Chair Texts of the AD and SCM Agreements, TN/RL/W/236 (Dec. 19, 2008) [hereinafter Decem-
ber 2008 Draft Rules Text].
The term of Mr. Galme´s as Ambassador expired in May 2010, thus he had to step down as
Chairman of the Rules Negotiations, a post he held since October 2004. In the first few months of
2010, no one expressed any interest in replacing him in this post, and several candidates rejected
the possibility. See Daniel Pruzin, WTO Members Endorse Chair Lineup; Search on for New
Doha Rules Talks Chair, 27 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 8, at 255 (Feb. 25, 2010). By June, a
taker had been found—Dennis Francis, the WTO Ambassador from Trinidad and Tobago—and
WTO Members approved him in July, the fourth Rules Negotiations Chair since the Doha Round
was launched in November 2001. Notably, Mario Matus of Chile had been identified as the lead-
ing candidate, but he drew objections because of the strong stance of his country in the rules
negotiations. Chile favors abolition of zeroing, which the U.S. does not, and Chile favors strict
disciplines on fishing subsidies, which Japan, Korea, and Taiwan do not. See Daniel Pruzin, WTO
Members Approve New Rules Chair; U.S. Maintains Hard Line on Antidumping, 27 Int’l Trade
Rep. (BNA) No. 28, at 1072–73 (July 15, 2010); Daniel Pruzin, WTO Set to Appoint New Chair
for Doha Negotiations on Rules, 27 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 24, at 887 (June 17, 2010).
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Perhaps that was for good reason. In the preceding thirteen months since the
earlier version, WTO Members had given the Chairman precious little to
work with, in terms of a consensus on AD, CVD, or fishing subsidies. He
had no choice but to drop proposed compromise language and replace it
with an insert summarizing the ongoing fights.
B. The April 2011 Documents
At the end of March 2011, the U.S. declared the gaps in the Doha
Round had become unbridgeable.89 The Director-General admitted the talks
had reached an impasse. Consequently, the Chairs abandoned the idea of
issuing new negotiating texts. They resigned themselves to issuing, on 21
April 2011, “Documents” that reflected progress in the Round since De-
cember 2008.
Thus, on 21 April 2011, for the first time in the history of the Round,
the Chairs of all nine negotiating groups simultaneously summarized the
work that had occurred to date. The groups and associated “Documents”
covered:
(1) Agriculture.90
(2) NAMA.91
(3) Services.92
(4) Rules, which cover, not only the conventional trade remedies
of AD and CVDs, but also the matter of fisheries subsidies
and regional trade agreements (RTAs), specifically, trans-
parency and systemic RTA issues.93
89. See Pruzin, supra note 87, at 609.
90. See World Trade Organization, Committee on Agriculture, Special Session, Negotiating
Group on Agriculture—Report by the Chairman, H.E. Mr. David Walker, to the Trade Negotia-
tions Committee, ¶ I.A.6, TN/AG/26 (Apr. 21, 2011) [hereinafter April 2011 Agriculture Docu-
ment]. This Document also provides minor typographical corrections to the December 2008 Draft
Agriculture Modalities Text. See April 2011 Agriculture Documents, supra ¶ I.D.49.
91. See World Trade Organization, Negotiating Group on Market Access, Textual Report by
the Chairman, Ambassador Luzius Wasescha, on the State of Play of the NAMA Negotiations, TN/
MA/W/103/Rev.3/Add.1 (Apr. 21, 2011) [hereinafter April 2011 NAMA Document]; see also
World Trade Organization, Trade Negotiation Committee, Report by the Director-General on His
Consultations on NAMA Sectoral Negotiations, TN/C/14 (Apr. 21, 2011).
92. See World Trade Organization, Council for Trade in Services, Special Session, Negotia-
tions on Trade in Services—Report by the Chairman, Ambassador Fernando de Mateo, to the
Trade Negotiations Committee, TN/S/36 (Apr. 21, 2011) [hereinafter April 2011 Services
Document].
93. See World Trade Organization, Negotiating Group on Rules, Communication from the
Chairman, TN/RL/W/254 (Apr. 21, 2011) [hereinafter April 2011 Rules Document].
Concerning RTAs, see World Trade Organization, Negotiating Group on Rules, Negotiations
on Regional Trade Agreements: Transparency Mechanism for Regional Trade Agreements—Re-
port by Ambassador Dennis Francis Chairman, Negotiating Group on Rules, TN/RL/W/252 (Apr.
21, 2011) [hereinafter April 2011 RTA Transparency Mechanism Document], and World Trade
Organization, Negotiating Group on Rules, Negotiations on Regional Trade Agreements: Systemic
Issues—Report by Ambassador Dennis Francis Chairman, Negotiating Group on Rules, TN/RL/
W/253 (Apr. 21, 2011) [hereinafter April 2011 RTA Systemic Issues Document].
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(5) Intellectual Property (IP), in particular, multilateral notifica-
tion and registration of geographic indications (GIs) for wines
and spirits, extension of GI protection to non-alcoholic prod-
ucts, and protection of traditional knowledge and
biodiversity.94
As regards transparency, since 14 December 2006, the WTO has implemented on a provi-
sional basis a General Council Decision Establishing a Transparency Mechanism for Regional
Trade Agreements. See The World Trade Organization, General Council, The Transparency
Mechanism for Regional Trade Agreements, WT/L/671 (Dec. 14, 2006). Paragraph 23 of that
Decision obligated WTO Members to debate, within the context of the Doha Round, whether the
Decision should be made permanent. That is, Members had to consider whether the RTA trans-
parency mechanism created by the 2006 Decision should be replaced by a permanent (and possi-
bly modified) mechanism. See April 2011 RTA Transparency Mechanism Document, supra, at ¶¶
1, 3. The Annex to the April 2011 Transparency Mechanism Document sets out the 2006 Deci-
sion, with possible modifications in bracketed text.
The thrust of the 2006 Decision was to enhance the transparency of RTAs, particularly in
view of their proliferation, through early announcements and notifications, subsequent reporting,
and technical support. See April 2011 RTA Transparency Mechanism Document, supra, at ¶¶ 1–2
(on early announcement), 3–4 (on notification), 14–17 (on reporting), and 19 (on technical sup-
port for developing countries). The Annex to the Decision requires RTA parties to submit specific
data about tariff concessions, MFN duty rates, preferential product-specific rules of origin, and
import statistics, as well as information on services trade. The end result, at least in theory, should
be improved compliance with disciplines on RTAs in GATT Article XXIV and GATT Article V.
Other than the requirement that the WTO Secretariat provide technical support to developing and
least developed countries to implement the Decision, particularly with respect to preparing and
submitting data, there were no provisions tailored to poor countries. Likewise, there were no
provisions to encourage formation of RTAs among poor or Muslim countries or to improve inte-
gration among such RTAs as do exist.
As for systemic issues posed by RTAs, the April 2011 RTA Systemic Issues Document
merely recounted that discussions among WTO Members had focused on the “substantially all the
trade” discipline in GATT Article XXIV:8(a)(i) (for customs unions) and XXIV:8(b) (for free
trade agreements), and special and differential treatment for poor countries. See April 2011 RTA
Systemic Issues Document, supra, at ¶¶ 1–5. On the first issue, one-third of the proposals advo-
cated a minimum benchmark to qualify as “substantially all the trade,” which would be based on
bilateral trade (between proposed RTA partners), tariff lines covered (by the proposed RTA), or
both, or would be based on a combined average of bilateral trade and tariff lines covered. Such
proposals called for measuring the benchmark at the time a proposed RTA entered into force, and
at the end of a transition period prescribed by the RTA. See April 2011 RTA Systemic Issues
Document, supra, at ¶ 4. On special and differential treatment, Members debated whether any
flexibilities they agreed to should be placed in GATT Article XXIV, the 1994 Uruguay Round
Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV, the 1979 Tokyo Round Enabling Clause, or
both. That is, Members had reached consensus neither on the substance of flexibilities nor on their
placement. Thus, the Chairman reported:
8. To conclude, it is clear that notwithstanding the mandate in Doha and the Ministerial
Declaration in Hong Kong, China:
i. in essence, the objectives of various Members in these negotiations remain con-
ceptually different; and
ii. gaps persist in Members’ positions on all elements proposed.
9. I reaffirm my advice to Members that unless they adopt a pragmatic, flexible and
less doctrinaire approach to these negotiations it is unlikely that this impasse will be
overcome.
Id. at ¶¶ 8–9 (emphasis added). In light of their failure to reach agreement on these two issues, it
was surprising that the Members contemplated a post-Doha Round work program on systemic
issues—unless, of course, they sought to defer hard bargaining until after the Round. See id. at ¶
6.
94. The WTO issued three documents on 21 April 2011 dealing with IP and GI matters. See:
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(6) Environment.95
(1) World Trade Organization, Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights, Special Session, Multilateral System of Notification and Registration of
Geographical Indications for Wines and Spirits—Report by the Chairman, Ambas-
sador Darlington Mwape (Zambia) to the Trade Negotiations Committee, TN/IP/21
(Apr. 21, 2011) [hereinafter April 2011 Geographical Indications Document].
(2) World Trade Organization, Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights, Special Session, Attachment, Multilateral System—Notification and Re-
gistration of Geographical Indications for Wines and Spirits—Draft Composite
Text, Revision, JOB/IP/#/Rev.1 (Apr. 20, 2011) [hereinafter April 2011 Geographi-
cal Indications Draft Composite Text].
(3) World Trade Organization, General Council, Trade Negotiations Committee, Issues
Related to the Extension of the Protection of Geographical Indications Provided for
in Article 23 of the TRIPs Agreement to Products Other than Wines and Spirits and
those Related to the Relationship between the TRIPs Agreement and the Convention
on Biological Diversity—Report by the Director-General, WT/GC/W/633, TN/C/
W/61 (Apr. 21, 2011) [hereinafter April 2011 TRIPs Article 2—CBD Document].
See also World Trade Organization, Intellectual Property: Geographical Indications Negotia-
tions—Formal Meeting, Geographical Indications Draft Completed Swiftly But with 208 Differ-
ences (Mar. 3, 2011), http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news11_e/trip_ss_03mar11_e.htm
(reporting on the status of the negotiations and production of the nine-page draft composite text).
The topic of geographical indications, while set in the context of intellectual property, also
relates to agriculture. Though this topic is not addressed in the December 2008 Draft Agriculture
Modalities Agreement, many geographically-indicated products are primary or processed farm
products. See December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Agreement, supra note 74, at § V.B.
Negotiations on a proposed multilateral register for GIs pre-date the Doha Round, having
commenced in 1997 under the auspices of Article 23.4 of the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, which states:
4. In order to facilitate the protection of geographical indications for wines, negotiations
shall be undertaken in the Council for TRIPS concerning the establishment of a mul-
tilateral system of notification and registration of geographical indications for wines
eligible for protection in those Members participating in the system.
Quoted in RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: INTERDISCIPLINARY THEORY AND PRAC-
TICE—DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT 533 (3d ed. 2008).
The fact these talks pre-date the Round (as do certain issues relating to the General Agree-
ment on Trade in Services, discussed below), is shameful. It highlights how little progress WTO
Members had made in well over a decade of negotiations on a reasonably focused issue.
Mention of the on-going GI negotiations was included in Paragraph 18 of the Ministerial
Declaration launching the Doha Round, thereby folding them into the Round:
18. With a view to completing the work started in the Council for Trade-Related As-
pects of Intellectual Property Rights (Council for TRIPS) on the implementation of
Article 23.4, we agree to negotiate the establishment of a multilateral system of
notification and registration of geographical indications for wines and spirits by the
Fifth Session of the Ministerial Conference.  We note that issues related to the ex-
tension of the protection of geographical indications provided for in Article 23 to
products other than wines and spirits will be addressed in the Council for TRIPS
pursuant to paragraph 12 of this Declaration.
Quoted in RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: INTERDISCIPLINARY THEORY AND PRAC-
TICE—DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT 637 (3d ed. 2008).
The GI topic is mentioned again in Paragraph 39 of the December 2005 Hong Kong Ministe-
rial Declaration. For further discussion of the GI negotiations, see RAJ BHALA, DICTIONARY OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW (3d ed. 2008) (entry for “Geographical Indication[s]”).
95. See World Trade Organization, Committee on Trade and Environment, Special Session,
Committee on Trade and Environment in Special Session—Report by the Chairman, Ambassador
Manuel A. J. Teehankee, to the Trade Negotiations Committee, TN/TE/20 (Apr. 21, 2011) [herein-
after April 2011 Trade and Environment Document].
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(7) Development.96
(8) Trade Facilitation.97
(9) Dispute Settlement.98
As always had been true in the Round, the first four negotiating groups
were the most important. Without a deal in them, a comprehensive Round,
agreed to by all WTO Members as a single undertaking, was impossible.
Collectively, the April 2011 Documents gave a clear picture of what
had been agreed to and, more importantly, what areas of disagreement re-
mained. This picture was “vertical,” in the sense that the devilish details of
proposals within each negotiating group could be seen. This picture also
was “horizontal,” in the sense that the broad package, across all nine areas,
could be appreciated.
The WTO Director-General, Pascal Lamy, characterized the Docu-
ments as both “impressive and realistic.”99 Those adjectives were euphe-
misms. If they were “impressive,” then it was as much because of their
cleverness in obfuscating simple trade liberalization issues with hideously
complex rules, as it was for whatever economic gains they might happen to
yield. As for the Documents being “realistic,” the more accurate assessment
would be “depressing.” After a decade of negotiations, the Documents were
long, convoluted regurgitations showing that nothing much had happened
since the issuance of the December 2008 negotiating texts.100 Indeed, fol-
lowing twelve single-spaced pages of discussion, the April 2011 Agricul-
ture Document simply attached the December 2008 Draft Agriculture
96. See World Trade Organization, Committee on Trade and Development, Special Session,
Special Session of the Committee on Trade and Development—Report by the Chairman, Ambassa-
dor Shahid Bashir (Pakistan), to the Trade Negotiations Committee, TN/CTD/26 (Apr. 21, 2011)
[hereinafter April 2011 Trade and Development Document].
97. See World Trade Organization, Negotiating Group on Trade Facilitation, Draft Consoli-
dated Negotiating Text—Revision, TN/TF/W/165/Rev.8 (Apr. 21, 2011) [hereinafter April 2011
Draft Trade Facilitation Text].
98. See World Trade Organization, Dispute Settlement Body, Special Session, Special Ses-
sion of the Dispute Settlement Body—Report by the Chairman, Ambassador Ronald Saborı´o Soto,
to the Trade Negotiations Committee, TN/DS/25 (Apr. 21, 2011) [hereinafter April 2011 DSU
Report].
Appendix A to the April 2011 DSU Report contained another Report by the Chairman, and
Annex 1 to Appendix A contained the July 2008 “Consolidated Draft Legal Text (proposed as a
basis for further work).” Id. app. A, annex 1. (Both the Appendix A Report and the Draft DSU
Text bore the TN/DS/25 document coding number of the Report to which they were appended.)
Also in April 2011, the Chairman issued Annex 2 to Appendix A, entitled “Thematic Overview,”
which discussed various DSU reform issues (and which also bore the TN/DS/25 coding number).
Id. app. A, annex 2.
Finally, at the same time, the Chairman published “Appendix B: Informal DSB Special Ses-
sion Meetings (May 2010 to April 2010)—Chairman’s Summaries of Recent Work.” Appendix B
(which bore the TN/DS/25 coding number) essentially contained minutes of meetings of the DSB
on DSU reform.
99. World Trade Organization, Trade Negotiations Committee, Cover Note by TNC Chair,
TN/C/13 (Apr. 21, 2011).
100. See Daniel Pruzin, WTO Chief Calls for Rethink on Doha Talks, Says Differences on
Sectorals ‘Unbridgeable,’ 28 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 17, at 686 (Apr. 28, 2011).
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Modalities Text. Likewise, following twenty-two single-spaced pages of
discussion, the April 2011 NAMA Document simply attached the Decem-
ber 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text.
What also was “depressing” was the lack of agreement on the cause of
stagnation. Lamy said the entire Doha Round was blocked by a “classic
mercantilist issue: tariffs on industrial products, the bread and butter of
WTO negotiations since their inception.”101 True, sectoral negotiations
within NAMA were a major obstacle. True also, some of the major trading
powers behaved like mercantilists in these negotiations. But, as the Deputy
USTR and Ambassador to the WTO, Michael Punke, indicated, by no
means would the rest of the pieces of the Round fall into place if a NAMA
deal were reached.102 Large, sometimes extraordinarily large, gaps re-
mained on agriculture, services, and essentially all of the topics covered in
the Round.
Thus, the roughly 600 pages of Documents highlighted the difference
between “work” and “progress,” and between “motion” and “productivity,”
that so often mars international organizations. The Director-General bla-
tantly over-stated the strengths of the Documents in saying they represented
“greater opportunities for the poorest [and] for the first time plac[ed] devel-
opment at the heart of the global trading system.”103 In truth, the April 2011
Documents marked the fact the Round had “entered the most serious crisis
since a failed ministerial meeting in July 2008, when trade ministers from
key WTO member[s] came close to clinching a deal.”104 Moreover, the
Documents could be faulted for their scandalous evasion of the purpose on
which the Round was founded: fighting poverty, enhancing development,
and thereby countering terrorism.
Perhaps one of the most glaring examples came from the Committee
on Trade and Development. Pursuant to the DDA, this Committee was
charged with considering how best to monitor and evaluate special and dif-
ferential (S & D) treatment provisions in multilateral trade agreements.
Such provisions, by definition, are supposed to offer more favorable treat-
ment to developing countries, and still more favorable treatment to least
developed countries, than to developed countries. After a decade of talks,
the Committee had done little, as evident from the April 2011 Trade and
Development Document. Its author, the Chairman of the Trade and Devel-
opment negotiations, could not have been a stranger to the links between
trade, poverty, and Islamist extremism: He was Ambassador Shahid Bashir
of Pakistan.
101. Daniel Pruzin, U.S. Criticizes WTO Chief Lamy’s Assessment of Doha Impasse, Says
NAMA Not Only Issue, 28 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 18, at 724  (May 5, 2011).
102. See id.
103. World Trade Organization, Trade Negotiations Committee, Cover Note by TNC Chair,
TN/C/13 (Apr. 21, 2011).
104. Pruzin, supra note 100, at 686.
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Had the WTO Members reached a consensus on a “Monitoring Mech-
anism” by which to check the extent to which developed countries were
implementing S & D treatment rules? No. They agreed the Mechanism
should include, not only all GATT-WTO texts and any Doha Round agree-
ments, but also Ministerial and General Council Decisions.105 They also
agreed the Mechanism should convene biannually.106 But, they could not
agree on what they would do. That is, there was no clear consensus on what
“Monitoring” means, i.e., whether it is “meant to be an exercise in ‘trans-
parency,’ overseeing the implementation of S & D provisions, or a perma-
nent negotiating forum on S & D provisions, even after conclusion of the
DDA.”107 In a proposed compromise, they waffled: “Monitoring” would
not be a negotiating body, but it could make recommendations or proposals
for other WTO bodies, and it will complement, not replace, other relevant
WTO mechanisms.108 The Members also failed to make headway on S & D
treatment proposals for specific GATT-WTO texts. In brief, the decade-
long work of the Round negotiating group most obviously entrusted with
managing the link between trade liberalization and poverty alleviation, by
ensuring the existence and operation of development-friendly rules, was
singularly unimpressive.
Scrambling to preserve some measure of credibility, in May 2011 Di-
rector-General Lamy said negotiations on expanding the WTO Agreement
on Government Procurement (GPA) might be part of a package of delivera-
ble items at the December 2011 Ministerial Conference.109 Never before
had GPA negotiations been linked to or part of the Doha Round. He was
stretching outside the Round for some victory to tout. Yet, with three major
hurdles to cross, GPA negotiations were far from complete.
First, the U.S. and EU awaited a credible offer, with significant central
and sub-central government coverage, from China, so that China would be a
party to the plurilateral accord. As part of its 11 December 2001 terms of
accession to the WTO, China promised to join the GPA.110 But, it has been
slow in working toward keeping its promise. China submitted its initial of-
fer—the government entities that it scheduled under the GPA positive-list
approach—in December 2007. That offer was grossly inadequate, in terms
of entities covered, and China revised it in July 2010.
105. See World Trade Organization, Special Session of the Committee on Trade and Develop-
ment, Report by the Chairman, Ambassador Shahid Bashir (Pakistan), to the Trade Negotiations
Committee, ¶ (a), Annex 1, ¶ 2, TN/CTD/26 (Apr. 21, 2011) [hereinafter Monitoring Mechanism].
106. Id. at ¶¶ (c), (d), Annex 1, ¶¶ 9, 12. According to ¶ (d), and ¶¶ 9 and 12 of the Annex,
WTO Members would reappraise the Mechanism three years after its operation, and thereafter as
necessary.
107. Id. at ¶ (b).
108. Id. at ¶ (b), Annex 1, ¶¶ 3-8.
109. Daniel Pruzin, WTO’s Lamy Says Public Procurement Deal Could be in December De-
liverables Package, 28 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 21, at 846 (May 26, 2011).
110. Id.
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To the chagrin of the U.S. and EU, the revised offer was insufficient.
They called on China to expand the central government entities covered.111
They also asked China to include procurement by all subcentral govern-
ments in all of China’s twenty-two provinces and five autonomous regions,
and in the four municipalities (Beijing, Chongqing, Shanghai, and Tianjin)
under central government authority. The United States and EU also said
China needed to include the twenty-three municipalities at the prefecture
level. In respect of all these requests, the U.S. and EU noted that China
should include subordinate agencies operating under the relevant entities.
Second, the EU demanded more ambitious offers of coverage from
Canada, Japan, and Korea. With Japan, for example, the EU insisted it
lower its thresholds for government construction contracts that would be
subject to GPA disciplines.112 The EU also demanded Japan allow foreign
suppliers to bid on procurement contracts issued by private Japanese rail-
way operators.
Third, and most importantly, the U.S. had to open further its govern-
ment procurement market. The U.S., said the EU, needed to schedule more
central government entities and subject more state governments to GPA dis-
ciplines. (Thirteen states had not scheduled any of their official entities in
the GPA: Alabama, Alaska, Georgia, Indiana, Nevada, New Jersey, New
Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, South Carolina, Virginia, and
West Virginia.) The U.S. also needed to reduce the competitive distortions
created by its set-aside programs. That is, the EU wanted the U.S. to elimi-
nate the exemption the U.S. inserted in the GPA from GPA disciplines for
procurement schemes that require certain federal procurement contracts be
awarded to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).113 Ironically given
its much-ballyhooed interest in the environment, the EU also sought an end
to U.S. procurement rules that prefer “green” firms that endeavor to protect
the environment.
Until the U.S. and other countries enhanced their offers, the EU would
adhere to strict reciprocity vis-a`-vis such countries when fashioning its of-
fers and awarding government procurement contracts. Thus, it would open
up the EU procurement market to Iceland, Lichtenstein, Norway, and Swit-
zerland, but not to Canada, Japan, Korea, or the U.S.114 In sum, these three
hurdles meant the likelihood of completing an accord to expand the GPA
was low, at least in the short or medium-term.115 In turn, the difficulties
111. Id.
112. Daniel Pruzin, Deal on Revised WTO Procurement Accord Will Depend on U.S., EU,
Japan Trade-Offs, 28 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 892 (June 2, 2011).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. The EU and U.S. could not even agree on what form a GPA deal, if reached, should take.
The Europeans favored an entirely new accord, because of EU rules under the Treaty of Lisbon.
The U.S. insisted on a revision to the existing GPA, because with its lack of fast-track trade
negotiating authority, Congress might not pass a new accord. See id.
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manifest in the April 2011 Documents, on matters that properly were in the
Round, could not be offset or covered up easily by a GPA deal.
C. Technical Details as a Foundation for Thematic Appraisal
What follows in this Trilogy of law review articles is an analysis of the
December 2008 Draft Modalities Texts, along with the April 2011 Docu-
ments (where relevant). This analysis is at two levels, technical details and
thematic appraisal:
• Progress—
How, if at all, do the December 2008 Texts and April 2011
Documents differ from their immediate predecessors of July
2008? This question asks what progress the WTO Members had
made in the critical final six months of 2008, and what key
areas of disagreement remained.
• The Deal on the Table—
What is the possible consensus reflected in the December 2008
Texts and April 2011 Documents? This question asks what deal
is on the bargaining table for the Members to accept or reject,
and thereby conclude the Round, one way or the other.
The complexity of the terms and conditions compel a lengthy analy-
sis—hence, the Trilogy. After all, ruminations and pontifications about the
Round are bluster without strong grounding in legal fact.
IV. CUTTING DOMESTIC FARM SUBSIDIES
A. Overview
In virtually all material respects, the December 2008 Draft Agriculture
Modalities Agreement proved to be the same as its predecessor of July
2008.116 The new Text covered the familiar topics—the three dimensions of
the WTO Agreement on Agriculture from the Uruguay Round (1986–1994),
all of which needed reform, namely, domestic support, market access, and
export subsidies.117 The December Text also identified the choices facing
the WTO Members. Large swathes of it, aside from episodic formatting or
116. This discussion is based on a paragraph-by-paragraph, line-by-line comparison of the
December 2008 and July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Texts, and the December 2008 Re-
vised Draft Modalities for Sensitive Product Designation and Agriculture Special Safeguard
Mechanisms [SSMs]. These texts are available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/
chair_texts08_e.htm. It also is based on the unofficial explanation of these texts prepared by the
Information and Media Relations Division of the WTO Secretariat. See WTO Secretariat, Unoffi-
cial Guide to the Revised Draft Modalities—Agriculture (Dec. 6, 2008, corr’d Dec. 9, 2008),
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/ag_modals_july08_e.htm [hereinafter Unofficial
Guide to Revised Draft Modalities].
117. The Agreement on Agriculture is reprinted in a variety of sources, including BHALA,
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 1, at 247–73. For an analysis of the Agreement, see Raj
Bhala, World Agricultural Trade in Purgatory, 79 N.D. L. REV. 691 (2003).
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stylistic improvements, were a verbatim repetition of the former
document.118
By April 2011, nothing much had changed. Thus, in his April 2011
Document, Chairman Walker concluded:
Members have not been in a position to substantively [sic] resolve
matters, nor is there any discernible progress on these [ten catego-
ries of agricultural] issues [(1) Blue Box subsidies, (2) cotton sub-
sidies, (3) Sensitive Products, (4) tariff caps, (5) tariff quotas, (6)
tariff simplification, (7) Special Products, (8) Special Safeguard
Mechanism, (9) Tropical Products, and (10) Preference Erosion]
that can be captured in [a new negotiating] text.119
If WTO Members agreed to the proposals, then they would implement
them textually, as necessary, in part through corresponding changes made
to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture.120 Conversely, if no Doha Round
agreement were reached by the fall of 2012, then the Uruguay Round com-
mitments for the United States would remain the guideposts for it in fash-
ioning agricultural policy, particularly in respect of subsidies.121 (That is
because American farm spending is set in roughly five-year cycles by agri-
cultural legislation known as “Farm Bills,” with the 2008 Farm Bill—for-
mally entitled the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008122—setting
appropriations through the end of 2012.) Other WTO Members undoubt-
edly faced similar issues of farm legislation timing in relation to outcomes
from the Round.
Reducing agricultural subsidies, particularly in rich countries, had
been a goal of the Doha Round since it commenced in November 2001. To
achieve this aim in any meaningful sense, negotiators focused their efforts
on a five-part strategy:
(1) Tiered formula reductions (meaning steeper cuts on higher
levels) to, and binding limitations on, overall trade-distorting
domestic support (OTDS), which is the sum total of subsidies
in the Amber Box, Blue Box, and De Minimis subsidies.123
One notable issue unmentioned on which no rules were proposed in the December 2008
Draft Agriculture Modalities Text is tariff inversion (i.e., higher duties on raw materials than on
processed products, a problem that is the mirror image of tariff escalation).
118. Generally speaking, the Annexes in the two documents (except as noted below) are iden-
tical or closely resemble one another.
119. April 2011 Agriculture Document, supra note 90, ¶ I.A.6.
120. December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶¶ 12, 18, 29, 34,
52–53, 128, 146, 170, Annex M.
121. Daniel Pruzin, Chief U.S. Ag Negotiator Admits Slow Progress in Doha Talks, Slams
China, 27 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 40, at 1542 (Oct. 14, 2010).
122. Pub. L. No. 110-234 (2008).
123. Distortion, of course, is measured in relation to what occurs (in terms of prices and
quantities), or would occur, in a competitive market (i.e., distortion is in relation to a free or nearly
free trade equilibrium).
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(2) Tiered formula cuts to, and binding limitations on, domestic
support in the Amber Box, or Aggregate Measure of Support
(AMS), which is the most trade-distorting kind of subsidy
(other than an outright export subsidy) because it is coupled
with output, or it supports prices.
(3) Cuts to, and binding limitations on, domestic support classi-
fied as “De Minimis” (i.e., subsidies that fall below thresh-
olds defined in terms of a percentage of domestic agricultural
output).
(4) Cuts to, and binding limitations on, domestic support classi-
fied in the “Blue Box,” which contains subsidies tied to limits
on output.
(5) Binding limitations on Product-Specific Support (i.e., subsi-
dies for individual products).
Point (1) reflects an effort to impose discipline on all subsidies, regard-
less of their Box category. Points (2), (3), and (4) are designed to prevent
box-shifting, whereby a WTO Member renders cuts to subsidies in one Box
but not to support categorized in a different Box. Point (3) also aims to
lower the de minimis threshold, thus lowering the exemption from cuts and
subjecting more subsidies to reduction. Point (5) is supposed to prevent
crop-shifting, whereby a Member imposes a cut on a subsidy to one product
but not to support for another product. For the most part, on all these points,
throughout 2008 there were few material changes to provisions in the nego-
tiating texts.124
124. In January 2009, the United States notified the WTO of its domestic agricultural support
expenditures for marketing years (MYs) 2006 and 2007. (MYs do not correspond with calendar
years. Hence, for example, MY 2007 carried over into mid-2008, and even further for certain
crops.) Those figures, with certain updates, are summarized as follows:
• OTDS—
In MY 2006, $11.34 billion, and in MY 2007, $8.52 billion. The average for MYs
2002–2005 was $15.9 billion. The OTDS limit proposed for the United States (dis-
cussed in Table I, infra) is $14.46 billion.
• Amber Box—
In MY 2006, $7.74 billion and in MY 2007, $6.26 billion. In MY 2008, the figure was
$6.25 billion. The Uruguay Round bound limit on Amber Box spending for the United
States is $19.1 billion. The proposed Doha Round cut (discussed in Table II, infra)
would lower this limit by 60% to $7.64 billion. Interestingly, virtually all American
Amber Box support went to two categories of products—dairy ($5.01 billion in MY
2007) and sugar ($1.23 billion in MY 2007).
• De Minimis Support—
In MY 2006, for Product-Specific De Minimis Support, $171 million and in MY 2007,
$237 million. For Non-Product Specific De Minimis Support, in MY 2006, $3.6 bil-
lion and in MY 2007, $2.02 billion. For both MY 2006 and 2007, U.S. De Minimis
support was under the 5% limit (discussed infra).
• Countercyclical Support—
In MY 2006, $1.49 billion and in MY 2007, $893 billion. The United States classified
countercyclical payments in the Amber Box yet explained they were de minimis and
thus exempt from Amber Box reduction commitments.
• Cotton Subsidies—
In MY 2006, $1.37 billion and in MY 2007 $208 million. The United States classified
cotton subsidies in the Amber Box. In MY 2006, over $1 billion of this support was
not exempt from Amber Box reduction commitments. But, in MY 2007, the United
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States declared its cotton subsidies were de minimis because the $208 million figure
fell below the de minimis threshold of 5% of the total value of American cotton pro-
duction (which was $5.2 billion).
• Non- or Minimally-Trade Distorting (Green Box) Subsidies—
In MY 2006, $76.04 billion and in MY 2007, $76.16 billion. U.S. spending in the
Green Box jumped from $58.3 billion in MY 2002 to $71.8 billion in 2005 and there-
after has essentially reached a plateau. Child nutrition and food stamp programs ac-
count for roughly two-thirds of American Green Box subsidies.
Daniel Pruzin, U.S. Reports Less Trade-Distorting Subsidies for Farms in ‘06-’07, But Increase
Expected, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 5, at 146 (Jan. 29, 2009).
Note the American classification of some subsidy schemes is the subject of deep skepticism
in the WTO, particularly in light of the Appellate Body decision in United States—Subsidies on
Upland Cotton. Appellate Body Report, United States—Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/
AB/R (Mar. 21, 2005) (finding that U.S. cotton subsidies violated the Agreement on Agriculture
and the SCM agreements). For a treatment of this case, see Raj Bhala & David Gantz, WTO Case
Review 2005, 23 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 107 (2006). At the 12 March 2009 meeting of the
Committee on Agriculture, Australia, Brazil, and Japan questioned whether the United States
could rightly classify counter-cyclical support as non-product specific, as such support effectively
requires recipients to produce, or eschew, certain crops. These three countries also cast doubt on
whether direct payments to farmers are decoupled and thus properly classified by the United
States in the Green Box because some funding depends not on fixed and unchanging base acre-
ages and yields (but rather requires crops not to be produced on base acres). See Committee
Focuses on Monitoring Agriculture Commitments, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Mar. 12, 2009), http://
www.wto.org/english/ news_e/news09_e/ag_com_12mar09_e.htm [hereinafter Committee Fo-
cuses on Monitoring].
By way of partial comparison, the EU lists the following figures as per its March 2009 and
January 2011 WTO notifications:
• Green Box Subsidies—
As reported in the January 2011 notification, C= 62.6 billion for MY 2007–2008 and
C= 56.5 billion for 2006–2007, the largest share of which are payments under the EU
Single Payment Scheme (discussed infra)—namely, C= 31 billion in 2007–2008. As
reported in the March 2009 notification for MY 2006–2007, C= 37 billion, but included
in this figure are Blue Box payments based on fixed areas and yield, or fixed livestock
head, which are not subject to reduction under the Uruguay Round Agreement on
Agriculture. For MYs 2004–2005 and 2005–2006, respectively, the figures are C= 24.4
and C= 40.3 billion.
• Amber Box Subsidies—
For MY 2003–2004, the EU reported to the WTO in December 2006 it had spent
C= 30.9 billion in Amber Box support (far below its annual spending limit of C= 67
billion, bound during the Uruguay Round) and C= 24.78 billion in the Blue Box. In its
March 2009 notification, the EU again stated its Amber Box support for MYs
2004–2005 and 2005–2006, respectively, were C= 31.2 and C= 28.4. The commodity
product categories to which the EU gave the largest Amber Box payments in MY
2005–2006 were sugar (C= 7 billion), butter (C= 4.1 billion), apples (C= 2.8 billion), and
olive oil (C= 2.6 billion). Its subsidies for these products took the form of price support.
In its January 2011 notification, the EU said Amber Box spending dropped by 54%,
from C= 26.63 billion in MY 2007–2008 to C= 12.35 billion in MY 2007–2008. As in
previous years, sugar and butter were the largest recipients of product-specific Amber
Box support, so the large drop in such support was due mainly to cuts in sugar and
butter subsidies: in sugar, a cut from C= 6.8 billion in MY 2006–2007 to C= 3.5 billion in
MY 2007–2008 and in butter from C= 3.6 billion in MY 2006–2007 to C= 2.7 billion in
MY 2007–2008.
• Blue Box Subsidies—
According to the March 2009 notification, Blue Box support totaled C= 27.2 billion for
MY 2004–2005 and C= 13.4 billion for MY 2005–2006. In the January 2011 notifica-
tion, the EU said Blue Box support declined by 9%, from C= 5.7 billion in 2006–2007
to C= 5.2 billion in 2007–2008.
See Daniel Pruzin, EU Notifies WTO of Sharp Drop in Trade-Distorting Farm Subsidies, 28 Int’l
Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 4, at 150 (Jan. 27, 2011) [hereinafter Pruzin, EU Notifies WTO]; Daniel
Pruzin, EU Issues New Farm Subsidy Notification; Trade-Distorting Support Remains Stable, 26
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B. OTDS
For OTDS, on all key issues—namely, computation of the base level,
tiered reduction formula, implementation period and staging, S & D treat-
ment, recently acceded Members (RAMs), and other commitments—the
deal on the table in December 2008 was the deal set out in Ambassador
Crawford Falconer’s December 2007 Working Paper on Overall Reduction
of Trade-Distorting Domestic Support: A Tiered Formula. The stability of
the provisions throughout 2008 meant either the positions of Members had
converged on essential elements of a deal on OTDS; or their positions had
hardened, and they had not bridged any of their schisms.
In general terms, “OTDS” is the sum of support in the Amber Box,
formally called “AMS,” defined below, plus De Minimis support and sup-
port in the Blue Box.125 The December 2008 Text contained the same for-
mulaic definition as did the December 2007 Working Paper for the so-
Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 11, at 344 (Mar. 12, 2009) [hereinafter Pruzin, New Farm Subsidy
Notification]; Daniel Pruzin, EU to Exempt $47 Billion from WTO Agricultural Subsidy Spending
Caps, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 10, at 307 (Mar. 5, 2009).
Note the clear pattern in the EU CAP of shifting support away from the Amber and Blue
Boxes and into the Green Box. This pattern indicates the EU is positioning itself for a Doha
Round agreement in which caps on Amber and Blue Boxes constrain its spending in those Boxes
(i.e., it is restructuring the CAP to ensure its farmers continue to get support, but of the kind that
does not violate anticipated new international limitations).
Conversely, the United States does not seem to be undertaking similar anticipatory structural
reforms, and no optimistic inferences should be made from the above American figures. That is,
just because these figures show a reduction in American farm subsidies does not mean the United
States was ready to cut and bind its support at those lower levels. During MYs 2006–2007, com-
modity prices were at high levels. Especially because of counter-cyclical subsidies, farm support
expenditures fall when prices are high, and vice versa. Commodity prices collapsed in 2008, and
global economic recession deepened. (For example, between March and December 2008, soybean
prices fell 20%, and corn prices dropped 25%. Both crops are covered commodities under Ameri-
can farm subsidy law.) Thus, American farm support spending, particularly counter-cyclical
prices, is destined to rise. That is why the United States insists on significant headroom (i.e.,
subsidy cuts and caps that leave bound levels above actual expenditures). To use the academic
jargon, at issue is future policy space for American farm legislation. Viewed in retrospect, the
failed Ministerial meeting in July 2008 was a critical missed opportunity to clinch a deal on
agriculture when farm product prices were high and subsidy payments low. See Committee Fo-
cuses on Monitoring, supra.
125. Conceptually, it should not be necessary to define “OTDS.” As its name (“aggregate”
measure of support) suggests, the first figure, AMS, is supposed to capture the sum total of subsi-
dies a Member provides to its farm sector. This figure does not do so, however, because (via the
WTO Agreement on Agriculture), it excludes De Minimis and Blue Box payments. BHALA, supra
note 1, at 1479–80 (for a broader treatment, see chapters 45 and 46). Hence, OTDS is closer to the
truly aggregate measure of support that AMS ought to be, but for legally-permissible exemptions
from AMS. To be sure, it is not perfectly all-inclusive.
Under certain Doha Round proposals, De Minimis and Blue Box subsidies would remain
largely exempt from cuts. Including the second variable in OTDS reflected an effort to discipline,
albeit modestly, the extent to which a WTO Member could exempt Product- and Non-Product
Specific subsidies from cuts by dubbing them “De Minimis.” Similarly, under either alternative for
the third figure (but most obviously under the second one), including the third figure in the calcu-
lation of OTDS, was an effort to subject at least a portion of Blue Box Payments to cuts.
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called “Base Level” for OTDS.126 That Level is critical. Reduction coeffi-
cients are applied to it under the tiered formula (discussed below).
That is, the Base Level is the starting point for making cuts. The higher
that Level, then for any given percentage cut, the less ambitious the end
result (in terms of decreases in trade-distorting farm subsidies). The formula
established Base Level as the sum of three figures:
Base Level for OTDS = Final Bound Total AMS + 10% (Average
Total Value of Production in 1995–2000) + the higher of either
5% (Average Total Value of Agricultural Production in
1995–2000) or Blue Box payments127
where:
The first figure on the right-hand side of the equation, “Final
Bound Total AMS,” is the AMS a WTO Member sets out
and binds in its Schedule associated with the Agreement on
Agriculture. This figure consists of all Amber Box Support
(i.e., subsidies not in the Blue Box and not De Minimis).
That is, it is the Amber Box commitment ceiling.
The second right-hand side figure, 10% of the Average Value of Pro-
duction in 1995–2000, consists of 5% of the Average Value of Production
for Product-Specific Support that is in the Amber Box plus 5% of the Aver-
age Value of Production for Non-Product Specific that is in the Amber Box.
(These domestic subsidies are called, respectively, “Product-Specific AMS”
and “Non-Product Specific AMS.” Of course, a certain percentage of these
subsidies qualify as De Minimis. That percentage is not classified in the
Amber Box as Total AMS subject to reduction commitments (i.e., it is not
in the first figure but captured in the second figure).) That is, the term for
the second figure—“Average Value of Production”—is a generic one en-
compassing both Product- and Non-Product Specific subsidies.
Also in respect of the second figure, developing countries receive S &
D treatment in the form of a 20% threshold (consisting of 10% each on
Product- and Non-Product Specific AMS). That treatment means poor
countries would be entitled to include a higher percentage of this support in
their OTDS, thus increasing their Base Level from which they are to make
funding cuts. Developing countries could select either 1995–2000 or
1995–2004 as the period in which to gauge average total value of agricul-
tural output. The obvious choice would be to select the period in which the
In sum, the essence of the strategy in defining a Base Level was to cap OTDS. At no point in
the Round did negotiators ever believe it would be economically viable, much less politically
feasible, to eliminate all farm subsidies.
126. See December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶¶ 1–2.
127. The formula sometimes is simplified to: Base Level for OTDS = Bound Level of Amber
Box + 15% of the Total Value of Agricultural Production, where the 15% term consists of: 5% of
Non-Product Specific De Minimis support, 5% of Product-Specific De Minimis Support, and 5%
of Blue Box support. Unofficial Guide to Revised Draft Modalities, supra note 116, at 6.
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\9-1\UST102.txt unknown Seq: 47  1-OCT-12 14:33
2011] POVERTY, ISLAMIST EXTREMISM . . . 51
Base Level is highest so as to yield a higher Level and thereby reduce
OTDS from a higher Base. The end result would be an elevated level of
permissible OTDS expenditures.
As for the third right-hand side figure, Members would have to include
the higher of two figures: (1) 5% of the Average Total Value of Farm Pro-
duction in 1995–2000 or (2) existing average Blue Box Payments.
Manifestly, computing the Base Level OTDS would be intricate. Oper-
ationally, it would be impossible without accurate agricultural output and
subsidy data from each Member.
As for cutting Base Level OTDS, between July and December 2008,
essentially the same critical figures in the tiered formula remained in
place.128 Table I summarizes these figures as set out in the December 2008
Text, along with the various sorts of S & D treatment in that Text. The July
2008 Text identified ranges for OTDS reductions: 75% or 85% by the EU
(in the Top Tier (i.e., $60 billion and above)), 66% or 73% by Japan and the
United States (in the Second Tier (i.e., between $10 and $60 billion)), and
50% or 60% by the rest of the developed countries (in the Third Tier (i.e.,
below $10 billion)). For each range, the December 2008 Text split the dif-
ference. The new Text called for reductions in OTDS of 80%, 70%, and
55%, respectively, in the three Tiers. WTO Members would be expected to
ensure their actual applied levels of OTDS in each component of the
formula (i.e., Product- and Non-Product Specific Amber Box and Blue Box
support) do not exceed their bound OTDS levels.129
128. December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 3; Special Session of
the Committee on Agriculture, Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture, ¶ 3, TN/AG/W/4/Rev.3
(July 10, 2008) [hereinafter July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text].
WTO Members would put their final bound OTDS figures in the appropriate part of their
Schedules. Developing countries not required to make a reduction commitment would list only
their Base Level OTDS in their Schedules. Two categories of Members would not have to list any
OTDS figure in their Schedules: (1) a net food importing developing country that agreed not to
sponsor Blue Box subsidy programs and (2) the five least developed countries—Cameroon,
Congo (Brazzaville), Ghana, Nigeria, and Swaziland. See December 2008 Draft Agriculture Mo-
dalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 10.
129. December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 11; July 2008 Draft
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 11.
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Table I: Reduction Commitments on OTDS in December 2008 Draft
Agriculture Modalities Text
Base Level for Top Tier Reduction Second Tier Third Tier
OTDS Commitments Reduction Reduction
(all figures in U.S. (percentage cut Commitments Commitments
dollars) required to Base (percentage cut (percentage cut
Level OTDS) required to Base required to Base
OTDS is over $60 Level OTDS) Level OTDS)
billion. OTDS is over $10 OTDS is $10
billion and up to billion or less.
$60 billion.
Reduction 80% 70% 55%
Coefficients for The EU is in this The United States
Developed Tier. and Japan are in
Countries The Base Level for this Tier.
fifteen EU states is The Base Level for
estimated at C= 110.3 the United States is
billion. estimated at $48.2
The cut would billion.
mean a new annual The cut would
spending cap of mean a new annual
C= 22.06 billion. spending cap of
$14.46 billion.
Implementation The down payment Same as Top Tier The down payment
Phases for is that one-third of is that 25% of cut
Developed cut must be made must be made on
Countries on the first day of the first day of
the implementation implementation.
period of any Doha Remaining cuts
Round agreement. must be in equal
Remaining cuts annual installments
must be in equal over five years.
annual installments
over five years.
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Additional No Yes No
Reduction A developed
Commitments for country in the
Developed Second Tier with a
Countries? high Base Level
OTDS, meaning
one equal to or
above 40% of the
Average Total
Value of its
Agricultural
Production
(between
1995–2000), must
make an additional
cut to its Base
Level of OTDS.
The additional cut
must be one-half of
the difference
between the Top
and Second Tier
reduction
percentages (e.g.,
with a difference of
80% and 70%, then
an additional cut of
5% is required).
Japan is in this
category, meaning
that it would make
a 75% cut to its
Base Level OTDS.
Reduction No cuts required No cuts required No cuts required
Coefficients for for a developing for a developing for a developing
Developing country that has not country that has not country that has not
Countries made a bound AMS made a bound AMS made a bound AMS
commitment. commitment. commitment.
Otherwise, the Otherwise, the Otherwise, the
percentage percentage percentage
reduction is two- reduction is two- reduction is two-
thirds the thirds the thirds the
commitment that commitment that commitment that
applies to applies to applies to
developed countries developed countries developed countries
in the Top Tier. in the Second Tier. in the Third Tier.
2/3 of 80% = 2/3 of 70% = 2/3 of 55% =
53.33% cut 46.67% cut 36.67% cut
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Implementation The first installment Same as Top Tier Same as Top Tier
Phases for must be a 20% cut.
Developing Thereafter, actual
Countries OTDS must be less
than 80% of Base
Level OTDS.
Remaining cuts to
OTDS must be
made in equal
annual installments
over eight years.
Reduction No cuts required No cuts required No cuts required
Coefficients
NFIDCs—
Such as Jordan,
Morocco, Tunisia,
and Venezuela
Reduction None, if RAM has Same as Top Tier Same as Top Tier
Coefficients for not made a bound
RAMs AMS commitment.
Otherwise,
essentially same as
for developing
countries (i.e., two-
thirds commitment
in relation to
developed
countries, other
than United States,
EU, and Japan).
Implementation Same as for Same as for Same as for
Phase for RAMs developing developing developing
countries countries countries
Reduction No cuts required No cuts required No cuts required
Coefficients for
Newer RAMs—
Macedonia, Saudi
Arabia, Ukraine,
and Vietnam
Reduction No cuts required No cuts required No cuts required
Coefficients for
Small, Low-Income
RAMs with
Transition
Economies—
Albania, Armenia,
Georgia, Kyrgyz
Republic, Moldova,
and Mongolia
Left unchanged across the July and December Texts was a proposed
down payment (i.e., an immediate cut) to OTDS of 33.3% by the top three
subsidizers—the EU, Japan, and United States—and 25% by all other de-
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veloped countries.130 Remaining OTDS cuts would be phased in equal an-
nual installments over five years for developed countries. Also left the same
was the provision that larger cuts would be expected of developed coun-
tries—namely, Japan—the OTDS in which is over 40% of the value of
agricultural output as measured between 1995–2000.131
In December 2010, Japan came under criticism for trying to dodge the
larger cut required of it under the “40 percent rule.” Japan told the WTO it
forgot to include its mushroom sector when calculating the total value of its
agricultural production between 1995 and 2000.132 Including the mushroom
sector raised the denominator (of the fraction in which OTDS is the numer-
ator and the total value of agricultural output is the denominator) and thus
lowered the fraction from over 40% to 39.7%. Therefore, Japan claimed, it
would not have to make an additional 5% cut to its OTDS beyond the 70%
required reduction. Japan asserted it would make a 75% cut, but only if it
could protect additional agricultural products from proposed tariff cuts.133
That is, Japan linked its position on OTDS reductions to its demand for a
sui generis rule that it be allowed to designate an additional 2% of its farm
tariff lines as “Sensitive” beyond the 6% maximum allowed under the De-
cember 2008 Text.
As a practical matter, many poor countries lack the resources to pro-
vide significant subsidies to their farmers. From a legal perspective, the
December 2008 Text, like its predecessor, assured poor countries with the
means to provide agricultural subsidies that they would not automatically
be subject to OTDS reduction commitments. Only developing countries
with existing Amber Box reduction commitments (i.e., ones with a ceiling
above the De Minimis level of domestic support and thus obligated to cut
Amber Box support) would have to make cuts to OTDS.134 But, even those
cuts would be two-thirds the amount for developed countries and could be
phased in over eight years.135
All other developing countries would commit to staying within their
base levels of support. Net food importing developing countries
(NFIDCs)—such as Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, and Venezuela—would not
have to reduce their OTDS, though they would not be permitted to go above
130. December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 5; July 2008 Draft
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 5.
131. December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 4; July 2008 Draft
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 4.
132. Daniel Pruzin, Japan Slammed at WTO over Attempt to Dodge Subsidy Reduction Com-
mitment, 27 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 50, at 1969 (Dec. 23, 2010).
133. Id.
134. December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 6; July 2008 Draft
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 6. A developing country would have an Amber
Box reduction commitment if its ceilings exceeded the De Minimis levels. It thus would be
obliged to reduce those ceilings.
135. December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶¶ 7–8; July 2008
Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶¶ 7–8.
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their Base Level OTDS. Least developed countries (for which sponsoring
farm subsidies is financially improbable, if not impossible) would be en-
tirely exempt from OTDS reduction commitments.
Regarding RAMs, the same rules for developing countries would ap-
ply to them. But, not all RAMs would be deemed alike. RAMs that had
acceded to the WTO very recently or had low incomes would be exempt
from OTDS reduction commitments.136 Considered newer RAMs were
Macedonia, Saudi Arabia, Ukraine, and Vietnam. The small, low-income
RAMs with economies in transition were Albania, Armenia, Georgia,
Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, and Mongolia. Mongolia was the new country
on the list not only for OTDS purposes but also throughout the December
2008 Text. Mongolia acceded to the WTO on 29 January 1997.137 Its addi-
tion to the new 2008 Text suggested Mongolia had a successful campaign
during the fall of 2008 for inclusion for special benefits.
On OTDS, therefore, the pattern of creating special rules for special
sovereign interests is unmistakable—carving out RAMs from developing
countries, then carving out newly acceded and low-income transitional
RAMs from RAMs, and finally, tossing in Mongolia. To any one anointed
country, the pattern is satisfying. From a systemic perspective, the ever-
finer gradations of anointment are a ludicrous distortion of the collective
objectives of the Doha Round, explainable only by the pursuit of self-
interest.
In historical context, this pattern heralded the end of the simple
GATT-WTO S & D treatment classification system. In GATT Part IV (Ar-
ticles XXXVI, XXXVII, and XXXVIII, which took effect in 1966) and the
1979 Tokyo Round Enabling Clause, the general distinction appeared be-
tween developed and less developed countries.138 In the 1986–1994 Uru-
guay Round texts, the cohort of less developed countries was bisected into
developing and least developed countries. Following the birth of the WTO
on 1 January 1995, and as the Doha Round evolved following its launch in
November 2001, developed countries occasionally agreed to slot them-
selves into separate categories. Developing and least developed countries—
collectively, poor nations—demanded the right to slot themselves into all
sorts of novel, narrow categories.
At a micro level, some of the new lines and groupings have a plausi-
ble, development-oriented justification. At a macro level, the pattern is as-
tonishingly abstruse. It belies the notion of a substantively meaningful,
stylistically comprehensible, transparent, single undertaking in pursuit of
136. December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 9; July 2008 Draft
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 9.
137. Members and Observers, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/
whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited June 25, 2012).
138. For a discussion of GATT Part IV and the Enabling Clause, see chapters 38 and 39 of
RAJ BHALA, MODERN GATT LAW 1058–1108 (2005).
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trade liberalization. Nevertheless, the pattern for OTDS—the metastasizing
of S & D treatment categories—is repeated throughout the December 2008
Agriculture and NAMA Texts.
C. AMS (Amber Box)
On AMS (Amber Box) subsidies, there was little evolution throughout
2008. The December 2008 Text was based on the December 2007 Working
Paper on Final Bound Total AMS: A Tiered Formula and established a
tiered reduction formula along the lines of the methodology used to cut
OTDS.139 Table II summarizes the result, plus relevant attendant rules.
Under the tiered formula, the EU, which is in the highest tier of Amber
Box support (over $40 billion), would have to cut these subsidies by 70%.
Japan and the United States, which are in the middle tier of Amber Box
support (between $15 and $40 billion), would reduce Amber Box subsidies
by 60%. The rest of the developed countries, which are in the lowest tier of
Amber Box support (below $15 billion), would decrease their support by
45%. All rich countries would make a down payment of an immediate 25%
cut.140 Larger cuts would be expected of developed countries—namely, Ja-
pan—in which the AMS is over 40% of the value of agricultural produc-
tion.141 Implementation and staging would be via six equal annual
installments over five years, starting on the first day of that period.142
In keeping with traditional S & D treatment, the obligation on poor
countries would be less than that on rich countries. Only developing coun-
tries with bound AMS levels would have to reduce those levels, and any
such country with a total AMS level bound at or below $100 million would
be exempt from any reduction commitments.143 In effect, the December
2008 Text maintained the De Minimis rule from the July Text for poor
countries with low levels of Amber Box support, excepting them from the
obligation to cut this support. Developing countries, along with older
RAMs, would have a two-thirds reduction obligation and an eight-year
phase-out period (nine equal annual installments commencing on the first
day of implementation).144
139. December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 13; July 2008 Draft
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 13.
140. December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 15; July 2008 Draft
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 15.
141. See December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 14; July 2008
Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 14.
142. December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 15; July 2008 Draft
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 15.
143. December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 16; July 2008 Draft
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 16.
144. See December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶¶ 16, 19; July
2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶¶ 16, 19. These countries also would be
given special consideration in calculating their AMS if they faced excessive rates of inflation or
sudden, extraordinary rises in food prices relative to fixed external reference prices. December
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Reflecting novel S & D treatment cohorts, NFIDCs (e.g., Jordan, Mo-
rocco, Tunisia, and Venezuela) would have no reduction obligations.145
Newer RAMs—Macedonia, Saudi Arabia, Ukraine, and Vietnam—would
have no reduction obligations either. Small, low-income RAMs with econo-
mies in transition—namely, Albania, Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyz Republic,
Moldova, and Mongolia (the latter being added in the December 2008
Text)—also would have no such obligations.146 Moreover, these RAMs
would not have to include certain kinds of subsidies in their calculation of
Total AMS.
Table II: Reduction Commitments on Total AMS (the Amber Box) in
December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text
Bound Total AMS Top Tier Reduction Second Tier Third Tier
(all figures in U.S. Commitments Reduction Reduction
dollars) (percentage cut Commitments Commitments
required to Bound (percentage cut (percentage cut
Total AMS) required to Bound required to Bound
Total AMS is over Total AMS) Total AMS)
$40 billion. Total AMS is over Total AMS is $15
$15 billion and up billion or less.
to $40 billion.
Reduction 70% 60% 45%
Coefficients for The EU is in this The United States
Developed Tier. and Japan are in
Countries The Uruguay this Tier.
Round bound AMS The Uruguay
level for the EU is Round bound AMS
C= 67.16 billion.147 level for the U.S. is
The cut would drop $19.1 billion.
this ceiling to The cut would drop
C= 20.15 billion. this ceiling to $7.64
billion.
Implementation The down payment Same as Top Tier Cuts must be made
Phases for would be a first in equal annual
Developed installment cut of installments over
Countries 25%. five years.
That must be
followed by equal
annual cuts over
five years.
2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 20; July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modali-
ties Text, supra note 128, ¶ 20.
145. December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 17; July 2008 Draft
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 17.
146. December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 19; July 2008 Draft
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 19.
147. This cap has been raised to account for EU enlargement. For example, following the 1
January 2007 accession of Bulgaria to the EU, the cap was raised by C= 500 million, and the new
cap became C= 72.3 billion. A 70% cut would imply a drop in the cap to C= 21.69 billion.
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Additional No Yes Yes
Reduction A developed A developed
Commitments for country in the country in the Third
Developed Second Tier with a Tier with a high
Countries? high Bound Total Bound Total AMS,
AMS, meaning one meaning one equal
equal to or above to or above 40% of
40% of the Average the Average Total
Total Value of its Value of its
Agricultural Agricultural
Production, must Production, must
make an additional make an additional
cut to its Total cut to its Total
AMS. AMS.
The additional cut The additional cut
must be the must be one-half
difference between the difference
the Top and Second between the Top
Tier reduction and Second Tier
percentages (e.g., reduction
with a difference of percentages (e.g.,
70% versus 60%, with a difference of
an additional cut of 70% versus 60%,
10% is required). then additional cut
Japan is in this of 5% is required).
category.
Reduction No cuts required No cuts required No cuts required
Coefficients for for a developing for a developing for a developing
Developing country that has not country that has not country that has not
Countries made a bound AMS made a bound AMS made a bound AMS
commitment or has commitment or has commitment or has
a bound level at or a bound level at or a bound level at or
below $100 million. below $100 million. below $100 million.
Otherwise, the Otherwise, the Otherwise, the
percentage percentage percentage
reduction is two- reduction is two- reduction is two-
thirds the thirds the thirds the
commitment that commitment that commitment that
applies to applies to applies to
developed countries developed countries developed countries
in the Top Tier. in the Second Tier. in the Third Tier.
2/3 of 70% = 2/3 of 60% = 2/3 of 45% =
46.67% cut 40% cut 30% cut
Implementation Cuts must be made Same as Top Tier Same as Top Tier
Phases for in equal annual
Developing installments over
Countries eight years.
Reduction No cuts required No cuts required No cuts required
Coefficients for
NFIDCs—
Such as Jordan,
Morocco, Tunisia,
and Venezuela
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Reduction None, if RAM has Same as Top Tier Same as Top Tier
Coefficients for not made a bound
RAMs AMS commitment
or has a bound
level at or below
$100 million.
Otherwise,
essentially same as
for developing
countries (i.e., two-
thirds the
commitment as for
developed
countries, other
than the United
States, EU, and
Japan).
Implementation Same as for Same as for Same as for
Phase for RAMs developing developing developing
countries countries countries
Reduction No cuts required No cuts required No cuts required
Coefficients for
Newer RAMs—
Macedonia, Saudi
Arabia, Ukraine,
and Vietnam
Reduction No cuts required of Same as Top Tier Same as Top Tier
Coefficients for Moldova, which is
Small, Low-Income the only such RAM
RAMs with to have bound its
Transition Total AMS.
Economies— No cuts required of
Albania, Armenia, Albania, Armenia,
Georgia, Kyrgyz Georgia, Kyrgyz
Republic, Moldova, Republic, and
and Mongolia Mongolia because
they have not
bound their Total
AMS.
In addition, this
group of RAMs can
exclude from their
calculation of
current Total AMS
any (1) investment
subsidy generally
available to
agriculture, (2)
agricultural input
subsidy, (3) interest
subsidy to reduce
financing costs, or
(4) grant to cover
debt repayment.
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Beyond mandatory cuts to Total AMS, the December 2008 Text, like
the December 2007 Working Paper and July 2008 Text on which it was
built, called for limits on Product-Specific subsidies.148 As its name con-
notes, a “Product-Specific” subsidy is direct support for a particular crop.
The G-20 developing countries urged that such limits be fixed for individ-
ual products, not capacious sectoral categories like “cereals” or “oilseeds.”
That way, a WTO Member would not be able to spread Product-Specific
Support across multiple commodities or shift it among them within a broad
designation. Accordingly, the December Text put restrictions on the amount
of funds a WTO Member could channel to the direct support of a specific
crop.
The basic limit for all developed countries other than the United States
would be that Product-Specific Support must not exceed the average of that
kind of support actually provided during the Uruguay Round implementa-
tion period.149 That period corresponds to 1995–2000. The United States,
however, received special dispensation as to the base period and calculation
methodology.150
The U.S. Product-Specific Support limit would be the proportionate
average of its (1) average actual Product-Specific AMS during 1995–2004
and (2) average actual Total AMS for 1995–2000. In other words, the
United States alone could include more years in its base period to establish
the ceiling on its Product-Specific Support. This sui generis calculation
would help the United States raise that ceiling. Its calculation would depend
on the total Amber Box support it gave to specific products in 1995–2000,
as shared among products according to the average share during
1995–2004. The United States sought to include the additional years
(2001–2004) because during them it had high Product-Specific expendi-
tures. It scarcely needs mentioning that this special American exception is
yet another instance of a WTO Member—this one, uniquely powerful—
negotiating out of naked self-interest regardless of broader systemic goals
of the Doha Round, which include meaningful reductions to and restraints
on per product farm subsidies.
For all developed countries, the implementation date by which limits
on Product-Specific Support would have to be reached was immediate. Full
implementation would be expected right away. In practice, that would mean
rich countries would have to make the cuts by the first day on which any
Doha Round accord takes effect.151
148. December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 21; July 2008 Draft
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 21.
149. December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 22; July 2008 Draft
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 22.
150. See December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 23; July 2008
Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 23.
151. See December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 26; July 2008
Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 26. Under certain circumstances, phasing
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Developing countries, too, would be obligated to establish limits on
any Product-Specific Support they provided. But, they would receive S & D
treatment to do so, specifically in the manner in which they could calculate
the cap on their Product-Specific AMS.152 Developing countries would
have a choice among three alternatives in setting their limit: (1) average
actual expenditures during 1995–2000 or 1995–2004, (2) twice the Product-
Specific Support limit established in the Uruguay Round and set out in Arti-
cle 6:4 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, or (3) 20% of the bound
Total AMS for the relevant country. Obviously, a developing country
would be inclined to choose the alternative offering the highest ceiling on
subsidies it could channel to a specific crop.
The December 2008 Text maintained the flexibility of the December
2007 Working Paper and July Text in respect of the limits on Product-
Specific Support in the Amber Box.153 There were two possible scenarios in
which the flexibility might be used. First, suppose actual Product-Specific
Support of a WTO Member during the relevant base period was below the
De Minimis level (as Article 6:4 of the Agreement on Agriculture defines
this level). Then, the limit would be set at that level. This flexibility meant
the status quo ante of the Uruguay Round limit set in Article 6:4 would be
ratified and become the new cap. The December Text clarified that in this
scenario, a Member would not be obliged to set its Product-Specific AMS
limit at a level lower than the De Minimis level in the base period.154
Second, suppose actual support provided by a WTO Member, after the
relevant base period, rose above the De Minimis level. Then, the limit for
that Member would be the average amount of Product-Specific subsidiza-
tion by the Member in the two most recent years before adoption of the
Doha Round agreements. Here again, the status quo ante would be ratified,
effectively rewarding large spenders—ones that had spent, following the
Uruguay Round, above their De Minimis thresholds. They got an entitle-
ment to offer Product-Specific Support in the future at past high levels (sub-
ject only to their overall bound OTDS and Total AMS levels). The key
point is they would not have to worry about including Product-Specific ex-
penditures above the De Minimis threshold in Total AMS and subjecting the
would be permitted. If the average Product-Specific AMS in the two most recent years for which
WTO notifications were available exceeded scheduled Product-Specific AMS limits, then cuts to
reach the applicable limit could be made in three equal annual installments (with the starting point
for implementation being the lower of the average figure from those two years or 130% of the
scheduled Product-Specific support limits).
152. See December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶¶ 27–28; July
2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶¶ 27–28.
153. See December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶¶ 24–25; July
2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶¶ 24–25.
154. Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 25 (final
sentence), with July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 25.
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overage to reduction commitments. For past excessive spending, they got a
“pass.”
D. De Minimis Subsidies
De Minimis thresholds are important. Expenditures up to them need
not be included in the calculation of Total AMS. As the rubric connotes, De
Minimis support consists of subsidies in the Amber Box, but which are in
small amounts. Consequently, they are not subject to the cuts required of
AMS. Lowering the thresholds means reducing expenditures previously
considered insignificant, and thereby exempt from cuts. From the Uruguay
Round, those thresholds are defined in terms of Product Specific and Non-
Product-Specific Support, with different limits for developed and develop-
ing countries (and none for least developed countries).
For developed countries (as laid out in Article 6:4(a) of the WTO
Agreement on Agriculture), the De Minimis level of Product-Specific Sup-
port was 5% of the total value of output of the basic agricultural product in
question. Their De Minimis level for Non-Product Specific Support also
was 5%, but of the total value of agricultural production of all commodities.
The December 2007 Working Paper identified as a possible target reducing
these 5% limits by at least 50% through five equal annual installments (us-
ing 1995–2000 as the base period). The December 2008 Text followed the
pattern laid out in the Working Paper and was a nearly verbatim repetition
of the relevant provisions in the July 2008 Text.155 The obligation on devel-
oped countries would be to cut immediately the thresholds in half, to 2.5%
of the value of domestic agricultural production (down from 5%), and thus
reduce both the theoretical level and actual expenditure amount considered
insignificant. Table III summarizes the proposed rules on De Minimis
subsidies.
155. Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 30, with
July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 30.
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Table III: Limitations on De Minimis Subsidies in December 2008
Draft Agriculture Modalities Text
Developed Countries— Product-Specific Support:
Limitation on De Minimis Support in Cap of 5% of total value of production of
Article 6:4(a) of WTO Agreement on the basic agricultural product in question
Agriculture Non-Product Specific Support:
Cap of 5% of the total value of all
agricultural production
Developed Countries— 50% cut on both caps—
Limitation on De Minimis Support in Product-Specific Support:
December 2008 Text New cap of 2.5% of total value of
production of the basic agricultural
product in question
Non-Product Specific Support:
New cap of 2.5% of the total value of all
agricultural production
Developed Countries— Immediate
Implementation Period
Developing Countries— Product-Specific Support:
Limitation on De Minimis Support in Cap of 10% of total value of production
Article 6:4(b) of WTO Agreement on of the basic agricultural product in
Agriculture question
Non-Product Specific Support:
Cap of 10% of the total value of all
agricultural production
Developing Countries— Cut of two-thirds of the amount for
Limitation on De Minimis Support in developing countries (i.e., 2/3 of 50%, or
December 2008 Text 331/3% reduction to both caps)—
Product-Specific Support:
New cap of 62/3% of total value of
production of the basic agricultural
product in question
Non-Product Specific Support:
New cap of 62/3% of the total value of all
agricultural production
Developing Countries— Three years
Implementation Period
Special Categories of Developing No cuts required
Countries—
(1) Developing countries that have not
bound their Total AMS
(2) Developing countries that allocate
almost all of their subsidies to
subsistence and resource-poor farmers
(3) NFIDCs (such as Jordan, Morocco,
Tunisia, and Venezuela)
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Older RAMs Cut of one-third of the amount for
(with a bound AMS and De Minimis developing countries (i.e., 1/3 of 50%, or
Level of 5%) 162/3% reduction of the 5% cap)—
Limitation on De Minimis Support in Product-Specific Support:
December 2008 Text Approximately 3.8% of total value of
production of the basic agricultural
product in question
Non-Product Specific Support:
Approximately 3.8% of the total value of
all agricultural production
Older RAMs— Five years
Implementation Period
Newer RAMs— No cuts required to De Minimis Support
Macedonia, Saudi Arabia, Ukraine, and caps
Vietnam
Small, Low-Income RAMs with No cuts required to De Minimis Support
Transition Economies— caps
Albania, Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyz
Republic, Moldova, and Mongolia
For developing countries (as laid out in Article 6:4(b) of the Agree-
ment on Agriculture), the De Minimis levels were double that of developed
countries—for Product-Specific Support, 10% of the total value of output
of the basic agricultural product in question, and for Non-Product Specific
support, 10% of the total value of agricultural production of all commodi-
ties. The December 2007 Working Paper called for these 10% limits to be
lowered by at least two-thirds of the cuts agreed upon for developed coun-
tries (using the 1995–2000 base period). Developing countries would have
an extra three years (i.e., at least eight years) to reduce their De Minimis
support. The December 2008 Text, like its predecessor of July, stuck to
these figures.156
Three categories of developing countries would not have to make any
reductions in De Minimis support levels or spending: (1) developing coun-
tries that had not bound their Total AMS; (2) developing countries that
allocated almost all of their subsidies to subsistence and resource-poor
farmers; and (3) NFIDCs (e.g., Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, and Venezuela).
For these developing countries, the existing Uruguay Round De Minimis
levels would continue to apply.157 Likewise, newer RAMs—Macedonia,
Saudi Arabia, Ukraine, and Vietnam—would have no obligations to cut De
Minimis thresholds or spending.158 Small, low-income RAMs with econo-
mies in transition—Albania, Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyz Republic,
Moldova, and Mongolia—also would be free from any obligations in re-
156. December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 31; July 2008 Draft
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 31.
157. December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 32; July 2008 Draft
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 32.
158. December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 33; July 2008 Draft
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 33.
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spect of De Minimis cuts. A final category of RAMs—the older RAMs that
had bound Total AMS commitments and existing De Minimis Levels of 5%
(for Product- and Non-Product Specific Support)—would have a modest
obligation—namely, to cut their thresholds by one-third of the reduction
figure for developed countries, with an extra five years in which to imple-
ment the cut.159
E. Cutting Blue Box Subsidies but Expanding the Blue Box
The December 2008 Text followed verbatim the July Text as to pro-
posals for the Blue Box, which in turn were sourced in the relevant Decem-
ber 2007 Working Papers. On this topic, too, no real evolution had occurred
in a year. That was true for both the expanded definition of the “Blue Box”
and the disciplines on Blue Box expenditures concerning an overall cap and
Product-Specific limits. Table IV summarizes these proposals for this Box.
Likewise, the April 2011 Agriculture Document indicated no final agree-
ment on the proposals.160
Uruguay Round negotiators (in Article 6:5 of the Agreement on Agri-
culture) defined the Blue Box only in terms of product-limiting support
(i.e., payments to farmers to set aside acreage (or livestock) from cultiva-
tion). In other words, the traditional understanding of the “Blue Box” was it
contained direct payments to farmers based on the size of the area they
cultivate or the number of livestock they raise, but which are not a reward
for more output. Rather, they are production-limiting (i.e., these payments
are designed to circumscribe over-production).
The December 2008 Text maintained the earlier proposal to expand
this traditional definition and include counter-cyclical payments in the Blue
Box.161 Such payments are direct payments to farmers that do not require
limits on production, but which are based on fixed bases and yields (or for
livestock, fixed head) in the past. The amount of these payments varies with
a prescribed benchmark for a relevant world market or target price. The
intuitive idea underlying them is to protect the income of farmers if prices
fall; thus, the larger the fall (the “cycle”), the higher the subsidy payment
(the “counter” to insulate the farmer from the “cycle”). That is, a farmer is
compensated when the price of a covered commodity tumbles below a fixed
reference price, and the compensation varies directly with the magnitude of
the fall.
159. December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 33 (last sentence);
July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 33 (last sentence).
160. See April 2011 Agriculture Document, supra note 90, ¶ 9.
161. December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶¶ 35–37; July 2008
Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶¶ 35–37.
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Table IV: Expanded Definition of, and Limitations on, Blue Box
Subsidies in December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities
Text
Definition of Blue Box in Article 6:5 of Production set-aside payments
WTO Agreement on Agriculture
Expanded Definition in December 2008 Production set-aside payments plus
Text counter-cyclical payments
Limitation on Blue Box Support in None, and all Blue Box payments are
WTO Agreement on Agriculture exempt from AMS and thereby from
reduction commitments to AMS.
Developed Countries— 2.5% of the average total value of
Overall Limitation on Blue Box agricultural production during the
Support in December 2008 Text 1995–2000 base period
Special lower threshold for countries like
Norway that put 40% or more of their
trade-distorting support in the Blue Box
Developed Countries— Immediate
Implementation Period for Overall
Limitation
Developing Countries and RAMs— 5% of the average total value of
Overall Limitation on Blue Box agricultural production during the
Support in December 2008 Text 1995–2000 or 1995–2004 base period
Developing Countries and RAMs— Immediate
Implementation Period for Overall
Limitation
Developed Countries other than the Average value of support provided to the
United States— product in question, at an individual
Limitation on Product-Specific Support product level, during the 1995–2000 base
in the Blue Box in December 2008 Text period
Special Rule for the United States— 110% (or 120%) of the average product-
Limitation on Product-Specific Support specific amount associated with the
in the Blue Box in December 2008 Text maximum permissible expenditure under
the 2002 Farm Bill
Developed Countries Immediate
(United States and all others)—
Implementation Period for Product-
Specific Blue Box Limitations
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Developing Countries and RAMs— Same as for developed countries (other
Limitation on Product-Specific Support than the United States) but flexibility for
in the Blue Box in December 2008 Text “important crops” (ones accounting for
more than (1) 25% of the average total
value of farm production and (2) 80% of
the average bound Total AMS during the
base period). A developing country or
RAM can shift these crops irreversibly
into Product-Specific support in the Blue
Box, even if the shift causes the country
or RAM to exceed its overall Blue Box
cap.
Developing Countries— Immediate
Implementation Period for Product-
Specific Blue Box Limitations
The United States unabashedly championed the expanded definition.
Recent farm legislation included counter-cyclical payments. The United
States wanted the ability to move them from the Amber Box to the Blue
Box, and thereby immunize these payments from reduction commitments to
Total AMS (which includes Amber Box, but not Blue Box, spending).
However, a WTO Member could not take advantage of both sides of the
Box: it could put either set-aside payments or counter-cyclical support in
the Box, but not both. Nonetheless, the clear proposal was to expand the
Blue Box to include counter-cyclical payments, along with production-lim-
iting support, but Members would have to choose whether to utilize one or
the other kind of Blue Box payment.
To offset this expansion, there had to be a limit on Blue Box expendi-
tures. Otherwise, a Member could engage in abusive Box-shifting, essen-
tially playing with colors by taking support programs out of the Amber
Box, where they would be subject to reduction commitments, and sticking
them in the Blue Box, where they would be protected from such cuts. Criti-
cally, the Texts also made clear Blue Box payments count in OTDS and
thereby are subject at least to cuts under the tiered OTDS formula. Moreo-
ver, the December 2008 Draft Text kept the two caps suggested in the July
Text.
First, Blue Box support would be limited to 2.5% of the value of agri-
cultural production for developed countries and 5% for developing coun-
tries.162 This limit meant the maximum amount of Blue Box spending a
Member could exclude from its calculation of Total AMS would be 2.5% of
the average total value of its agricultural production (with 1995–2000 as the
base period). In essence, no more than 2.5% of the value of its farm output
could be put in the Blue Box and excluded from AMS reduction commit-
ments. Any additional amount in that Box would be subject to cuts. Thus,
162. December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶¶ 38–39, 48; July
2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶¶ 38–39, 48.
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for example, the EU cap would be about C= 7 billion—still a whopping
amount in absolute terms.163
A further restraint would be demanded of Members (such as Norway)
that put an exceptionally large percentage—namely, 40% or more during
the 1995–2000 base period—of their trade-distorting support in the Blue
Box. Their limit would not be 2.5% of the total value of their farm output.
Rather, it would be a relatively lower threshold, computed by applying the
same percentage reduction commitment they use for Total AMS (70%,
60%, or 45%) to their base-period Blue Box spending. They would have to
reach this limit within two years.
Developing countries and older RAMs would receive S & D treatment.
The limit on their overall Blue Box support would be 5% of the average
total value of agricultural production (using either 1995–2000 or
1995–2004 as the base period).164 If a developing country or RAM elected
to transfer subsidies into the Blue Box from a component of AMS (e.g., the
Amber Box), then it could select as its base period the most recent five-year
period for which data are available.
Second, there would be limits on Blue Box spending set on a product-
by-product basis. That is, the December 2008 Text maintained the same
restrictions on Product-Specific Blue Box spending as set out in the July
Text. Here, as with Total AMS, the United States got preferred treatment.
For all Members other than the United States, including developing coun-
tries and RAMs, the Text mandated a Product-Specific limit equal to the
average value of support to the product in question during 1995–2000.165 In
other words, past should be prologue so that there would be no back sliding.
Whatever had been spent in the Blue Box on a particular crop during the
Uruguay Round implementation period should be the future cap. But, the
same past period limiting the rest of the world would not constrain the
United States.
The United States successfully turned its domestic legislative position
into a sui generis international legal obligation. The United States could set
its Product-Specific Blue Box limit at 110% (or, possibly, 120%, depending
on the outcome of negotiations) of the average Product-Specific amount for
the crop in question. That is, the United States would have headroom of
163. Pruzin, New Farm Subsidy Notification, supra note 124, at 344. This estimate is based on
production figures for MYs 2005–2006.
164. December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 48; July 2008 Draft
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 48.
165. December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶¶ 40, 47; July 2008
Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶¶ 40, 47. Suppose a WTO Member had not
made payments specifically to a particular crop, and its Blue Box programs consisted only of set
aside payments during the entirety of the 1995–2000 base period. Then, that Member would use
as its Product-Specific limit in the Blue Box the average level of support during a consecutive
three years within that period. See December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note
74, ¶ 41; July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 41.
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10% (or possibly 20%) above the average amount it had spent under its
previous farm legislation, the 2002 Farm Bill.166 Specifically, the United
States could compute its Product-Specific amount for a crop as a propor-
tionate average of (1) the maximum permissible expenditures allowed in its
2002 Farm Bill and (2) 2.5% of the average total value of its farm produc-
tion.167 Put simply, if a bit simplistically, the limits the United States estab-
lished for itself in a high spending period, 2002–2007, under the 2002 Farm
Bill, would be its international legal constraints.
To create flexibility, any WTO Member could exceed its Product-Spe-
cific Blue Box spending limit.168 If it did, then it would have to reduce
irreversibly its Product-Specific AMS cap on a one-for-one basis. That is,
for every dollar a Member spent in the Blue Box on a crop that exceeded its
Product-Specific Blue Box cap, the Member would have to reduce its Prod-
uct-Specific AMS limit. The penalty for excess would be more stringent if
the crop were cotton. Then, the ratio would be two-to-one (i.e., for every
one dollar of excess Blue Box support to cotton, the Product-Specific AMS
on cotton would have to fall by two dollars). In effect, a Member could shift
spending on specific commodities from the Amber to Blue Box, and exceed
Product-Specific Blue Box caps, but not without lowering Amber Box caps.
And, it would have to respect the overall Blue Box limit.
On Product-Specific Blue Box limits, developing countries would get
S & D treatment for important crops.169 “Important crops” would be de-
fined as ones accounting for more than (1) 25% of the average total value of
farm production and (2) 80% of the average bound Total AMS during the
base period. For such crops, a developing country could shift irreversibly
Product-Specific support into the Blue Box, even if the shift caused it to
exceed its overall Blue Box cap. Presumably, the shift would occur from
the Amber Box and immunize the subsidy from cuts to Total AMS.
166. December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 42; July 2008 Draft
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 42; Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-171, 116 Stat. 134 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 7901 (2006)) (con-
servation provisions of the 2002 Farm Bill were codified in Title 16 of the U.S.C.).
167. December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶¶ 42, 47; July 2008
Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶¶ 42, 47.
168. December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶¶ 43–46; July 2008
Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶¶ 43–46.
169. December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶¶ 49–50; July 2008
Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶¶ 49–50.
For a developing country with no Product-Specific entitlement to a Blue Box limit for a
particular product, and no support in the Amber Box for that product, the December 2008 Text,
like its predecessor in July, offered the following rule: such Members could schedule a Blue Box
limit for an individual agricultural product but only if the total support for that product does not
exceed 30% of the overall Blue Box limit (and a single product limit of 10%). For least developed
countries and NFIDCs, the limit on all Product-Specific Blue Box support would be 75% of the
overall Blue Box limit (and 25% for any single product). December 2008 Draft Agriculture Mo-
dalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 50; July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶
50.
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F. Green Box
Green Box support takes the form of non- or minimally-trade dis-
torting schemes such as agriculture research, disease control, environmental
protection, regional assistance, restructuring aid, and direct payments to
farmers not linked to the amount or type of crop grown or livestock raised.
On Green Box support, there were no new insights in the December 2008
Text. That Text contained the familiar idea about amending the WTO
Agreement on Agriculture to tighten criteria for developed countries. The
criteria should ensure that income support payments, to qualify for the
Green Box, are decoupled and based on a fixed and unchanging base period
of production. They should be sufficiently nuanced to consider structural
adjustment and regional assistance programs (e.g., government intervention
to fight rural poverty or hunger) and food stockpiling purchases at above-
market prices by developing countries from farmers with low incomes or
few resources. As always, Green Box programs would remain exempt from
reduction commitments. That is because they are not (or are only mini-
mally) trade distorting, as per Article 6:1 and Annex 2 of the WTO Agree-
ment on Agriculture.170
170. Therefore, the pledges by President Barack H. Obama to cut American farm subsidies in
the fiscal year (FY) 2010 budget (which started 1 October 2010) did not help jump-start the Doha
Round agriculture talks. That would have been true even if Congress had implemented all of them.
Those cuts were to direct payments to farmers, which are categorized in the Green Box insofar as
they are decoupled from output or prices. Specifically, the FY 2010 proposals were:
• Phase out over three years direct payments to any farmer with annual sales revenue of
more than $500,000. (Under the 2008 Farm Bill, there are two income caps: subsidies
are barred to farmers who earn more than (1) $500,000 in adjusted gross income
(AGI) or (2) $750,000 in farm-related income. As of 2009, about one-third of all
American farmers obtain a direct payment from the U.S. government, regardless of
whether they produce any output.) The proposed change would save the U.S. govern-
ment $85 million in FY 2010, $480 million in FY 2011, and a total of $9.765 million
in FYs 2010–2019.
• Restrict commodity program payments to $250,000 per farmer per year.
• Eliminate the obligation of the federal government to pay for the storage costs of
cotton that is under loan to the Department of Agriculture. Cotton is the only crop for
which the U.S. government subsidizes storage costs, and these payments have a nega-
tive effect on the amount of cotton available on the market. This change would save
the U.S. government $570 million over ten years.
• Reduce subsidies for crop insurance premiums.
• Decrease funding for the Market Access Program (MAP) of the Department of Agri-
culture by 20% a year and shifting the priority of MAP. Under MAP, American
brands of farm products are promoted overseas. Funding would be cut for that kind of
promotion, and emphasis would be placed on marketing generic American products in
foreign countries.
Gary G. Yerkey, President’s Proposed Cut in Farm Subsidies Seen Sending “Positive Signal” to
WTO Talks, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 10, at 306–07 (Mar. 5, 2009).
In fact, these proposals were at best inconsequential in respect of prodding the Doha Round
toward a conclusion. Precisely the opposite moves—shifting subsidies out of the Amber and Blue
Boxes and into the Green Box, as the EU has done in its 2003 and 2008 reforms to the Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP)—would increase the flexibility of the United States in the negotiations
and thereby boost the prospects for the Round. See Roberta Rampton, Obama Farm Subsidy Cut
Won’t Revive Doha: Experts, REUTERS, Feb. 25, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/arti-
cle/2009/02/25/us-usa-agriculture-trade-idUSTRE51O6ES20090225. Between MY 2006–2007
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The lack of new insights meant rules on monitoring and surveillance of
actual or purported Green Box programs, which are essential to prevent
abuse, still were undefined. For example, to calculate decoupled income
support, what fixed base period should be used? What assurances should be
required of developed countries that they transfer only non-distorting subsi-
dies into the Green Box? Similarly, what assurances should be obtained
from them that their Green Box programs are budget neutral (to prevent an
overall increase in farm subsidies)? These questions continued to be of par-
ticular interest to developing countries, such as Argentina and India, con-
cerned about abusive box-shifting by developed countries.171
G. Cotton Subsidies
Since 1991, the U.S. government has spent in excess of $50 billion on
cotton subsidies and averaged $3 billion annually in expenditures in the first
decade of the new millennium.172 The subsidy schemes take the form of
direct payments, export subsidies, market assistance loans, and price sup-
ports. Of the subsidies, 73% go to 10% of American cotton producers, and
25% of the payments go to the top 1% of American farmers.173 In other
words, the support goes not so much to small cotton farmers as to large,
wealthy operators. None of these operators is as poor as their competitors in
the Cotton Four countries—Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Chad. Few (if
any) of them are as efficient either: the U.S. Department of Agriculture
admits the average cost of production of one pound of raw cotton in
America is seventy-three cents, but just twenty-one cents in Burkina Faso,
and the Congressional Research Service states that a sizeable proportion of
American cotton production is not commercially viable, but possible only
through subsidies.174
Thus, at the launch of the Doha Round in November 2001, no issue
was more obviously tied to the hope that trade liberalization could be a
strategy for counter-terrorism than the end of cotton subsidies:
and MY 2007–2008, EU Green Box spending increased by 11%, from $77.25 to $85.59 billion
(C= 56.5 to C= 62.6 billion). Pruzin, EU Notifies WTO, supra note 124, at 150. Under the Single
Payment Scheme (SPS), which is a cornerstone of the CAP reforms, the EU provides support to
farmers decoupled from the amount or type of crop they grow or livestock they raise. In MY
2007–2008, the largest share of EU Green Box subsidies were in the SPS category: $42.38 out of
$85.59 billion (C= 31 out of C= 62.6 billion), or about half of all such subsidies. See id. at 150.
171. See David Haskel, Argentina, India Call for Green Box “Budget-Neutrality” Assurances,
25 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 25, at 922 (June 19, 2008).
172. Brazil’s Victory in Cotton Trade Case Exposes America’s Wasteful Subsidies, WASH.
POST, June 3, 2010, at A16.
173. See KEVIN WATKINS, CULTIVATING POVERTY: THE IMPACT OF U.S. COTTON SUBSIDIES
ON AFRICA 23 (2002), available at www.oxfam.org.uk/resources/policy/trade/downloads/bp30_
cotton.pdf.
174. See Kevin C. Kennedy, The Doha Round Negotiations on Agricultural Subsidies, 36
DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 335, 343–44 (2008).
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In 2001, in the wake of the 9/11 attacks on the United States, a
new series of multilateral trade negotiations began, known as the
Doha Round. The thinking was that a fairer system might reduce
the possibility of attacks like those on New York and Washington.
One of the aims of the Doha Round was to set new global trading
rules which would stimulate growth and wealth in underdevel-
oped countries. One way of doing this would be to reduce tariffs
and subsidies, so creating a “level playing field.” The cotton sub-
sidies were seen quickly as a litmus test. It seemed obviously in-
iquitous to many of the negotiators that poor people who actually
produce cotton very cheaply should in effect be punished by
richer people who produced it at higher cost. It is a problem
which, so far, the Doha Round has failed to solve.175
Many farmers in the Cotton Four countries (Benin, Burkina Faso,
Chad, and Mali) are Muslim, and between 36–80% of the population in
those countries lives below the poverty line.176 The Cotton Four fare at the
bottom in the world in respect of access to water, child and maternal mor-
tality, and illiteracy.177 The strategy, then, is obvious: help reduce the vul-
nerability of these farmers and broader populace to poisonous messages
from Islamist extremists by giving them a greater stake in the global trading
system.
This concept of peace-and-security-through-trade is not manifest in
any cotton subsidy provision of any draft Agriculture Text. The December
2008 Text tracked identically the language on domestic support for cotton
in the July Text.178 (For the most part, the provisions in the July Text were
unchanged from the February 2008 Text.) The formula for cotton subsidy
cuts was proposed by the Cotton Four countries and incorporated into the
negotiating texts by then-Chairman Crawford Falconer because no other
WTO Member had offered a credible counter-proposal.179 Under it, Mem-
bers would be obliged to reduce their cotton subsidies as follows:
Rc = Rg + (100 − Rg) × 100
3 × Rg
175. Mark Doyle, Campaigners Urge U.S. and Europe to Cut Cotton Subsidies, BBC, Nov.
14, 2010, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-11753215 (emphasis added).
176. See Cent. Intelligence Agency, Benin, WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bn.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2012); Cent. Intelligence
Agency, Burkina Faso, WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/uv.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2012); Cent. Intelligence Agency, Mali, WORLD
FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ml.html (last visited
Feb. 20, 2012); Cent. Intelligence Agency, Chad, WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cd.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2012).
177. See Watkins, supra note 173, at 7.
178. December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶¶ 54–55; July 2008
Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶¶ 54–55.
179. See Daniel Pruzin, U.S. Cotton Subsidy Compliance May Have Small Impact on Raising
Prices, Study Says, 27 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 17, at 618 (Apr. 29, 2010).
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where:
Rc = Reduction percentage specifically applicable to cotton
Rg = Reduction percentage generally applicable to AMS
1995–2000 = Base period during which to measure cotton
subsidies, and from which to cut
The difference in the figures for Rc and Rg is the mathematical expres-
sion of the legal and policy desire to impose a deeper cut on cotton subsi-
dies than on support for other agricultural products.
As an illustration, suppose the Amber Box reduction percentage, Rg,
for the United States is 60%. Using this formula, the percentage cut the
United States would have to apply to its cotton subsidies would be 82.2%:
82.2 = 60 + (100 − 60) × 100
(3 × 60)
The exact value for Rc had yet to be agreed, and the values for Rg had
yet to be finalized.
The key point, in terms of potential poverty alleviation, is that Rc is not
100. To the chagrin of the Cotton Four countries, which are heavily depen-
dent on the crop for export revenues, as well as to larger developing coun-
tries that produce significant cotton, such as India, it was a dead certainty Rc
would not be 100. Nevermind that 10 million people in Central and West
Africa depend on cotton for their livelihood. The United States simply
would not agree to eradicate its cotton subsidies, notwithstanding the en-
treaties of poor countries or studies from NGOs like Oxfam.
Here, then, is a linkage the United States knew, but ignored, despite it
being laid out not only by NGOs but also by Cotton Four representatives at
WTO meetings, including the September 2003 Cancu´n Ministerial Confer-
ence: American cotton subsidies suppress or depress world market cotton
prices. To be sure, the United States is not alone to blame. No fewer than
nine economic studies show world cotton prices would be between 2% and
28% higher than market prices if government subsidies provided by the
United States, EU, and China were eliminated.180 A tenth study showed:181
180. Jonathan Lynn, WTO Cotton Deal Will Do Little for Africa—Expert, REUTERS, July 15,
2009, available at http://af.reuters.com/article/maliNews/idAFLF45116320090715.
Oxfam calculated that between 1995 and 2002, world cotton prices were depressed by 50%,
to levels lower than at any period since the Great Depression. See Watkins, supra note 173, at 8,
28.
181. See Pruzin, supra note 179, at 618. This study was prepared by Professor Mario Jales of
Cornell University and published in April 2010 by the International Center for Trade and Sustain-
able Development in Geneva.
This study also forecast the impact on American cotton production and global cotton prices
(as against the 1998–2007 reference period) of compliance by the United States with the 2005
Appellate Body decision in favor of Brazil in the celebrated Cotton case:
(1) a drop in output of 7% and increase in prices of 3.5% if the United States eliminated
all cotton subsidies (including counter-cyclical payments, Step 2 and GSM-103 ex-
port credit guarantee payments, and marketing loan programs); or
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• If the above proposal is not implemented, and instead the regu-
lar draft provisions on agriculture subsidy cuts apply to cotton,
then (using 1998–2007 as the reference period) American cot-
ton production would fall by just 4%, and world cotton prices
would rise by only 2.5%.
• If the above proposal is implemented, whereby sharper cuts are
imposed on cotton subsidies than would be the case under the
regular provisions to cut farm support, then American cotton
production would decline by 9%, and world cotton prices
would rise by an average of 6% (again compared to the
1998–2007 reference period).
In other words, under either scenario the “hit” to American cotton out-
put is not dreadful, but the difference in the impact on global cotton prices
is marked.
An eleventh study, issued in November 2010 by Fairtrade, an NGO,
said the roughly $1 billion rich countries spend on cotton subsidies depress
the income of cotton farmers in the Cotton Four by 10%, or $147 million in
annual revenue.182 Conversely, Fairtrade pays premium prices for organic
agricultural products, including cotton. Farming families use the extra in-
come to send their children to school (with an enrollment rate of 95%, com-
pared to the national average in the Cotton Four of 43%),183 and Fairtrade
has allowed the farming communities to build medical clinics. To be sure,
the National Cotton Council, which represents American cotton producers,
responds that cotton subsidies help over 340,000 people in several poor
southern states of the United States.184 The European Commission makes a
similar argument in respect of Greece and Spain. But, by no stretch of the
imagination are the American or European cotton farmers either as poor as
or more numerous than their counterparts in the Cotton Four countries.
For the Cotton Four countries, the key nexus is that adverse price ef-
fects drive marginal farmers in poor countries off the land into city slums.
(2) a negligible effect on production and 0.7% increase in world cotton prices with
partial compliance by the United States (through eliminating the Step 2 and GSM-
103 export credit guarantees and amending the fee schedules under the Supplier
Credit Guarantee Program).
Id. Partial compliance occurred, albeit in stages, as the United States (1) ceased accepting new
applications for GSM-103 export credit guarantees in July 2006, (2) repealed the Step 2 scheme in
August 2006, and (3) revised the fee schedules under the GSM-102 export credit guarantee
scheme in April 2010. See id.; see also Daniel Pruzin, USDA Hikes Export Credit Fee Rates to
Fulfill Commitments in Cotton Dispute, 27 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 17, at 634 (Apr. 29, 2010).
But, because the United States did not comply fully with the ruling, it paid compensation to
Brazil—in effect, protection money to shield American cotton farmers from losing all subsidies
ruled illegal by the Appellate Body. The amount, $147 million per year, staved off retaliation by
Brazil against the United States. See Alan Beattie, WTO Members Scramble to Salvage Crumbling
Trade Talks, FIN. TIMES, June 13, 2011, at 6.
182. Doyle, supra note 175.
183. Id.
184. Id.
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They take up positions like lorry-driving. If and when some of them engage
in risky sexual behavior, they catch and spread the HIV/AIDS virus in West
African cities. Many of those erstwhile farmers happen to be as-yet moder-
ate Muslims, not Al Qaeda or Taliban adherents. That fact makes the con-
nection between cotton subsidies, poverty reduction, vulnerability to
extremist messages, and national security all the more poignant.
Even if these farmers are not driven off the land, quite possibly their
income is reduced, so they cannot afford private-school tuition for their
children. They are left with little choice but to send their kids to the free
Islamic schools, some of which are subsidized by Saudi interests, and not
all of which teach either marketable skills or messages that serve America’s
national security. It takes nearly no imagination to see the disconnect be-
tween the December 2008 Text in respect of cotton subsidies, on the one
hand, and the original purposes of the Doha Round concerning boosting
development and thereby reducing vulnerability to extremism, on the other
hand.
Nevertheless, following the July 2008 Text, the United States specifi-
cally avoided committing even to an 82.2% cut, as well as eschewing ta-
bling any counter-proposal. Indeed, “U.S. officials have described the
African proposal as unacceptable, arguing the general provisions on reduc-
ing farm subsidies would already reduce U.S. cotton subsidies by 50 per-
cent.”185 In April 2009, Prosper Vokouma, Ambassador to the WTO from
Burkina Faso, revealed that the Cotton Four countries tried to engage the
United States in a cotton deal during the Ministerial meeting in July 2008,
offering five different proposals.186 The United States refused to negotiate,
saying that resolution of other agricultural questions, plus NAMA issues,
must occur first before it would make a final decision on cotton subsidy
reductions.187 The Director-General, Pascal Lamy, appeared to do nothing
to move the United States from this rather self-defeating, and even heart-
185. Pruzin, supra note 179, at 618 (emphasis added).
186. Daniel Pruzin, African Cotton Growers Say Crisis Continues in Absence of Doha Deal,
26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 18, at 591–92 (Apr. 30, 2009).
187. See id. The United States has argued the Cotton Four has failed to take advantage of high
world market cotton prices, as in July–August 2008, when they hit approximately $1.54 per kilo-
gram. (They were about $1.10 per kilo in April 2009.) The United States urges that domestic
reforms are needed in the Cotton Four to put farmers there in a better position to benefit from high
cotton prices. The United States also points out that between 2004 and 2008, the acreage allocated
in the United States to cotton has fallen by 40%, the lowest level in twenty-five years, and usage
of cotton by American mills is at the lowest level since the 1880s.
However, there are three weaknesses in the American argument. First, a decision to plant
cotton must be taken by a farmer a year in advance, especially if that farmer is poor and needs to
arrange loans to finance the planting. A spike in cotton prices, as occurred in July–August 2008, is
difficult to forecast a year in advance. Second, the overall picture of the world cotton market is
one of glut. Annual cotton production is 25 million metric tons, but 2 million tons are held in
reserve. This stock results from subsidization in the United States and other rich countries. Third,
production of cotton has fallen in Africa, too, between 2006 and 2008 from 2 to 1 million metric
tons annually and in Burkina Faso from 750,000 to 400,000 metric tons. See id.
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less, position other than make public pronouncements about the importance
of finding an eventual solution. The April 2011 Agriculture Document con-
firmed that “not all Members are in a position to agree to the text as drafted
but no new contributions, technical or substantive, have been forthcoming
to date.”188
The Cotton Four countries foresaw exactly the “squeeze play” they
perceived the United States was using against them: negotiate a nearly com-
prehensive arrangement on agriculture and NAMA, save for cotton subsidy
cuts, and then present fait accompli a deal on those cuts to the Cotton Four.
The Cotton Four would be under enormous pressure from all other WTO
Members to acquiesce to the deal. Doing so would mean completion of the
Doha Round. Conversely, no matter how bad the deal, the Cotton Four
would not have the political and economic clout to hold out for its interests
and block completion.
As a final technical matter, the December 2008 Text contained the
same limit as its predecessor on Blue Box cotton subsidies. Such subsi-
dies—for example, counter-cyclical payments to cotton farmers—would be
restricted to one-third of the limit established by applying the above
formula. That is, one-third of the amount resulting from application of Rc
would be the cap on Blue Box support for cotton. As for the period in
which to implement reductions to cotton subsidies, it would be one-third as
long as the usual implementation period.189 Developing countries (that had
Amber and Blue Box commitments) would have an obligation to reduce
cotton subsidies equal to two-thirds that for developed countries and would
get a longer (albeit unspecified) time for implementing the cuts.190
Ironically, it is not even clear that application of an 82.2% cut would
help the Cotton Four countries.191 The cut would be based on cotton subsi-
dies notified to the WTO during the 1995–2000 base period. However, the
figures notified by the United States for that period exclude a variety of
cotton subsidy programs, including some the Appellate Body held were in
violation of WTO rules in the famous Brazil Cotton Case.192 By one esti-
mate, the actual total amount of American cotton subsidies during the base
period was $1.74 billion; but the United States notified only $623 million,
188. April 2011 Agriculture Document, supra note 90, ¶ 9.
189. December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 56; July 2008 Draft
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 56. The reference to “the implementation period”
in this paragraph is unclear.
190. December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶¶ 56–58; July 2008
Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶¶ 56–58.
191. See Lynn, supra note 180 (reporting on the work of Abdoulaye Zonon of the Centre
d’Analyse des Politiques, Economiques et Sociales (CAPES) in Burkina Faso).
192. See Appellate Body Report, United States—Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/
AB/R (Mar. 21, 2005) (complaint by Brazil). This case is discussed in Raj Bhala & David Gantz,
WTO Case Review 2005, 23 ARIZ. J. INT’L  & COMP. L. 107 (2006).
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and an 82.2% cut would drop them to about $111 million yet leave the other
non-notified programs intact.
Following publication of the April 2011 Agriculture Document, the
United States response to criticisms of its position in Doha Round cotton
subsidy negotiations was a combination of denial and accusation. First, the
United States insisted its cotton subsidies had tumbled because of recent
increases in the world market price for cotton. That is, a sizeable portion of
its cotton support took the form of counter-cyclical payments, but the price
for such payments had not been triggered. The obvious rebuttal to this argu-
ment was that as soon as market conditions changed sufficiently—and,
sooner or later, they would—the counter-cyclical payments would be trig-
gered. What the Cotton Four and least developed countries required was a
complete cut to American subsidies, made permanent through a meaningful,
bound commitment.
Second, the United States faulted China for its cotton subsidies and for
starting or expanding trade-distorting cotton subsidy schemes. Intoned Dep-
uty USTR and U.S. Ambassador to the WTO, Michael Punke, in May 2011
stated:
“If people wish to discuss cotton, [then] everyone’s cotton pro-
grams must be on the table.” . . . “If we are going to have a
discussion about cotton, [then] it must be a comprehensive dis-
cussion about all forms of market distorting practices.” . . . “We
would need to discuss both direct subsidization and other prac-
tices such as import licenses, sliding tariff scales, and reserves
management—that produce very substantial levels of effective
support for domestic cotton producers.”193
The United States accused China of failing to adhere to the commit-
ment it made when acceding to the WTO on 11 December 2001—namely,
capping its cotton subsidies at or below 8.5% of the total value of domestic
cotton production.194 Moreover, argued the United States, China had failed
to notify the WTO of its cotton (and other farm support) programs since
2006 (with 2004 being the last marketing year (MY) covered) and that noti-
fication was incomplete.195 Based on estimates from the International Cot-
ton Advisory Committee, which is located in the United States, China gave
193. Daniel Pruzin, WTO: WTO Chief Warns Members Not to Get Stuck on ‘Deliverables’
Package, Says LDCs Priority, 28 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 886, 887 (June 2, 2011)
(quoting Michael Punke).
194. See Pruzin, supra note 54, at 1229.
195. See Daniel Pruzin, China to Submit New Subsidy Notification, Says U.S. Claims Exagger-
ated on Wind Power, 28 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 24, at 984, 984 (June 16, 2011). The 2006
notification was the only one China submitted since it acceded to the WTO on 11 December 2001.
In October 2009, China promised a new notification that would chronicle subsidies from the
central government to agriculture and industry between 2005 and 2008. But, as of July 2011,
China failed to produce this notification. China’s 2006 notification covered the years 2001–2004,
but it failed to include support from regional, provincial, or local governmental entities. That
notification listed seventy-eight central government subsidy programs for agricultural and indus-
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$1.95 billion in subsidies for cotton production in the 2008–2009 MY and
$1.96 billion in the 2009–2010 MY.196
Nevermind the fact Mr. Punke represented an Administration headed
by a President whose ethnic paternal roots lay in Sub-Saharan Africa and
who professed a desire to rebalance American foreign policy toward greater
solidarity with the Third World. Cotton subsidies, for the Administration of
President Barack H. Obama, were a matter of commercial self-interest and
market access to, if not rivalry with, China. After all, with a sizeable share
of textile mills and apparel factories, China is the largest cotton market in
the world, and American cotton farmers want those production facilities to
use American cotton.197 Thus, the Ambassador faulted China for reneging
on its obligation to notify, since 2004, the WTO of its agricultural subsidies,
including its support for cotton.
China countered with the contention that American cotton subsidies
reached $3 billion annually, thus depressing world market prices by 13%
and injuring both Chinese and African cotton farmers.198 Moreover, despite
the unlevel playing field created by American subsidies, the share of world
imports of subsidized American cotton accounted for by China rose from
17% in 1999 to 43% in 2005.199 Amidst this familiar Doha Round pattern
of accusation followed by counter-accusation, the interests of the Cotton
Four countries, and the direct link between those interests to fighting pov-
erty and terrorism, were lost.
V. ENHANCING AGRICULTURAL MARKET ACCESS
THROUGH TARIFF CUTS
A. Tiered Tariff Reductions
It comes as a surprise to non-trade professionals that marked discrep-
ancies exist in average most favored nation (MFN) tariffs maintained by
developed countries on industrial versus agricultural products. The reason is
clear enough: over a half-century of GATT trade rounds have yielded sub-
trial producers but gave expenditure details on only twenty-nine of those programs, most of which
pertained to agriculture and rural development. See id. at 984.
196. Daniel Pruzin, WTO: U.S., Others Stress Quick Decision Needed on Content of WTO
‘Deliverables’ Package, 28 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 26, at 1063, 1065 (June 30, 2011).
197. See Pruzin, supra note 193, at 887. China is losing its comparative advantage, owing to
rising labor costs. Almost half of all EU garment imports, and 41% of America’s garment imports,
come from China (as of June 2011). Good Darning, Vietnam: Rising Costs in China Are Sending
More Buyers to South-East Asia, ECONOMIST, June 2, 2011, at 78, available at http://www.econo-
mist.com/node/18775499/. But, increasingly, garment factories are shifting to Cambodia and Viet-
nam, where labor costs are lower than in China. Thus, Vietnam ranks as the second largest source
of garments for the United States. If and when Cambodia, Vietnam, Indonesia, and other members
of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) create regional supply chains (for exam-
ple, whereby Indonesia, which produces denim, can export it duty free to Vietnam, which does not
make denim, for jeans to be sewn in Vietnam), then China’s advantage may erode further.
198. Pruzin, supra note 193, at 887.
199. Id.
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stantial reductions in industrial tariffs, but agricultural tariffs have fallen far
less dramatically because major players such as the United States, EU, and
Japan have protected their farm sector. Canada is a case in point: as of
2007, its average MFN tariff on industrial products was 3.8%, but its aver-
age farm tariff was 22.4%.200 The Doha Round was an opportunity to re-
duce this discrepancy. Yet, in all substantive respects on market access, the
December 2008 Text was an exact reincarnation of its predecessor of July
2008. That predecessor, in turn, was grounded on a January 2008 Working
Paper. So, as with most other areas of agricultural negotiations, little
changed in 2008. Table V below summarizes the key proposals in the Texts
designed to boost opportunities for agricultural exporters around the globe.
The basic strategy is to reduce farm tariffs according to a tiered
formula. That is the same approach used to cut OTDS and Total AMS. Cuts
would be made to bound ad valorem tariffs, and any non-ad valorem duty
would be converted to its ad valorem equivalent (AVE) rate using the May
2005 Paris Methodology.201 For developed countries, implementation
would occur in six equal annual installments over five years, the first in-
stallment being due on the date of entry into force of any Doha Round
agreements. For developing countries, the implementation would be eleven
equal annual installments across a decade. Thus, poor countries would have
twice as long as rich ones to phase in reductions to their farm tariffs (i.e., to
protect their farmers from foreign competition).
200. Daniel Pruzin, Canada Touts Its Commitment to Global Trade Liberalization Through
Tariff Cuts, 27 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 18, at 679 (May 6, 2010).
201. December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶¶ 59–60; July 2008
Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶¶ 59–60.
The Paris Methodology is memorialized in a WTO document, Committee on Agriculture
Special Session, Draft Possible Modalities on Agriculture, TN/AG/W/3, Annex A (July 12, 2006),
available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/mod_ag_2006_e.htm.
This Methodology was agreed to in May 2005 at a meeting in Paris by the WTO Members to
compute AVEs. It uses average prices of a commodity (the specific duty on which is being trans-
formed into an AVE) during 1991–2001 as a basis for conversion. The computation also is af-
fected by recent prices, or import values, of a commodity. The dramatic rise in commodity prices
in 2008 caused agriculture importing and exporting countries to shift their positions on tariff
simplification.
For much of the Doha Round, agricultural importers such as the EU, Switzerland, and Japan
sought to limit the number of tariff lines subject to conversion. They hoped to maintain roughly
60% of their specific duties (i.e., they did not want to convert more than 40% of their specific
duties into AVEs). Conversely, agricultural exporters, like Australia, Argentina, and Uruguay de-
manded the importing countries convert a high percentage—such as 90%—of their tariff lines.
With the spike in world commodity prices, the WTO Members reversed their roles. That was
because the Paris Methodology would yield far higher AVEs than before the spike. Thus, import-
ing countries became eager to convert 90% or so of their tariff lines while exporting countries
wanted them to limit conversions to a small number of lines. See Daniel Pruzin, Ag, NAMA Chairs
Give Bleak Assessment of Prospects for Doha Round Breakthrough, 25 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA)
No. 44, at 1567–68 (Nov. 6, 2008).
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Table V: Tiered Reductions to Agricultural Tariffs in December
2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text
Category of WTO Developed Developing Countries, Older RAMs, Newer
Member Countries SVEs, Countries RAMs, and Small
entitled to SVE-like Low-Income RAMs
Tariff Band, Treatment, with Economies in
Reduction Venezuela, and Transition
Commitments, and Suriname
Implementation
Tier 1 Over 75% Over 130% Same as developing
(Highest Band of country band
Existing Bound
Agricultural Tariffs)
Cut to Bound 70% Two-thirds of the cut No cuts required of
Agricultural Tariffs required of developed newer RAMs (i.e.,
in Tier 1 countries (i.e., a 46 Macedonia, Saudi
2/3% cut). Arabia, Tonga,
SVEs may moderate Ukraine, and
cuts by a further ten Vietnam).
percentage points (i.e., No cuts required of
a 362/3% cut). small, low-income
Some countries, such RAMs with
as Bolivia, Congo, economies in
Coˆte d’Ivoire, and transition (i.e.,
Nigeria, could use the Albania, Armenia,
SVE flexibility. Georgia, Kyrgyz
Suriname would bind Republic, Moldova,
its tariffs, on a line- and Mongolia).
by-line basis, at the All other RAMs may
average figure of moderate the cuts they
countries in its region would otherwise have
after they cut their to make under the
tariffs using the tiered tiered formula used by
formula used by developing countries
developing countries. by up to eight
percentage points, and
may exempt from cuts
any bound duty equal
to or below 10%.
Tier 2 50% to 75% 80% to 130% Same as developing
(Upper Middle Tier (above 50% (above 80% but less country band
(i.e., Middle Band of but less than than or equal to
Existing Bound or equal to 130%)
Agricultural Tariffs)) 75%)
Cut to Bound 64% Two-thirds of the cut Same special rules as
Agricultural Tariffs required of developed above
in Tier 2 countries (i.e., a 42
2/3% cut).
SVEs may moderate
cuts by a further 10%
(i.e., a 362/3% cut).
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Tier 3 20% to 50% 30% to 80% Same as developing
(Lower Middle Tier (above 20% (above 30% but less country band
(i.e., Lower Middle but less than than or equal to 80%)
Band of Existing or equal to
Bound Agricultural 50%)
Tariffs))
Cut to Bound 57% Two-thirds of the cut Same special rules as
Agricultural Tariffs required of developed above
in Tier 3 countries (i.e., a 38%
cut).
SVEs may moderate
cuts by a further 10%
(i.e., a 28% cut).
Tier 4 0% to 20% 0% to 30% Same as developing
(Lowest Band of (above 0% (above 0% but less country band
Existing Bound but less than than or equal to 30%)
Agricultural Tariffs) or equal to
20%)
Cut to Bound 50% Two-thirds of the cut Same special rules as
Agricultural Tariffs required of developed above
in Tier 4 countries
(i.e., a 331/3% cut).
SVEs may moderate
cuts by a further 10%
(i.e., a 231/3% cut).
Minimum Overall 54% None None
Average Cut on
Bound Tariffs
Maximum Overall None 36% None
Average Cut on (including reductions
Bound Tariffs to tariffs on Sensitive
Products). For
Venezuela, maximum
overall average cut
would be 30%.
Implementation Equal Equal annual Not applicable to
Period annual installments over ten newer RAMs or
installments years small, low-income
over five RAMs with
years economies in
transition (because
they have no tariff
reduction
commitments).
For all other RAMs,
an additional two
years beyond the
implementation period
for developing
countries. To avoid
overlap with accession
commitments on any
farm product,
implementation of
Doha Round tariff
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cuts would begin one
year after the end of
the implementation of
their accession
commitment on that
product.
As for the tiers into which to categorize developed country tariffs,
there would be four of them: 0%–20%, 20%–50%, 50%–75%, and above
75%.202 Cuts would be made to existing bound tariff rates, with each rate
slotted into the appropriate tier. The higher the pre-reduction rate, the
higher the tier into which that rate would be slotted. In turn, steeper cuts
would apply to tariffs in the higher tiers. The reductions would be 50%,
57%, 64%, and 70%, respectively, in the four tiers, with the result that cuts
would be non-linear and lead to some degree of rough harmonization across
WTO Members. The December 2008 Text altered slightly the last figure.
The July Text specified a range of 66%–73%, and the new Text embodied
the midpoint.
Flexibilities abounded in the December 2008 Text. First, the obligation
to cut agricultural tariffs incumbent on developing countries would be two-
thirds as onerous as on developed countries.203 That would be true across
all tiers of tariffs. The tiers themselves would be defined more generously
than for developed countries; specifically, tariff tiers for developing coun-
tries would be wider in range and ascend to a higher zenith. Instead of a
minimum average cut on final bound tariffs of 54%—which would be the
rule for developed countries—there would be a maximum overall average
cut, inclusive of Sensitive Products, required of developing countries.204
That maximum (i.e., a maximum average of all reductions in farm tariffs)
for developing countries would be 36%. Put simply, rich countries would
have to cut their farm tariffs by at least 54%, but could do more. Poor
countries would have to do no more than cut their tariffs by 36%, but could
do less.
In itself, this simple distinction between exhorting developed countries
to do more and limiting the onus on developing countries was in keeping
with the broad development-oriented purpose of the Doha Round. But, the
delineation did not stop there. The December 2008 Text introduced five
202. December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 61; July 2008 Draft
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 61.
203. December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 63; July 2008 Draft
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 63.
204. December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶¶ 62, 64; July 2008
Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶¶ 62, 64. If a developed country, after cutting
all farm tariffs including on Sensitive Products and accounting for tariff escalation and tropical
products, had an overall average cut of less than 54%, then it would be obligated to make an
“additional effort . . . proportionately across all bands to reach that target [54%].” Id. ¶ 62. Con-
versely, if an SVE designated goods as “Special Products” (discussed below), then its maximum
average cut would fall to 2%. See id. ¶¶ 65, 130, 157, Annex A.
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further distinctions among developing countries; the first of which was be-
tween Venezuela and all others.205 Venezuela would have a ceiling maxi-
mum overall average cut of 30% (i.e., it would have to hit a less ambitious
target than that expected of other developing countries).
Second, small, vulnerable economies (SVEs)—about forty-five WTO
Members—would be entitled to temper cuts to their farm tariffs by a further
ten percentage points.206 That is, in comparison with developing countries,
SVEs could moderate their tariff cuts by ten ad valorem percentage points.
Some countries, while not technically SVEs, could avail themselves of
SVE-type treatment.207 Those countries would include Bolivia, Congo,
Coˆte d’Ivoire, and Nigeria. Consequently, over half of developing countries
would be eligible for smaller cuts than normally required for such countries.
Third, Suriname would be singled out for special treatment.208 That
was an innovation in the December 2008 Text, albeit one that adduced the
spreading of preferences. Instead of applying any tiered-tariff reduction
formula, Suriname would rebind its agricultural tariffs at the average bound
level of other designated countries in its region after they had applied the
relevant tiered tariff cuts. Those countries would be the CARICOM (Carib-
bean Community) states—Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Domi-
nica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint
Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago. These neighboring
countries would apply the SVE formula. Suriname would bind its tariffs, on
a line-by-line basis, at the average figure in its neighborhood.
Fourth, older RAMs would be entitled to moderate the cuts to agricul-
tural tariffs they otherwise would be obliged to make under the tiered-
formula. They would be treated like developing countries. But, they could
deviate from the cuts incumbent on those countries by up to eight percent-
age points.209 In other words, in each tariff tier, the cut for developing coun-
tries would be two-thirds that for developed countries, and the cuts for older
RAMs would be two-thirds that for developed countries minus eight ad
valorem percentage points. Older RAMs also could exempt from a tariff cut
205. See December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 64 n.10. SVEs
are WTO Members that, between 1999 and 2004, accounted for a tiny average share of global
trade, specifically, no more than (1) 0.16% of total trade, (2) 0.1% of industrial product trade, and
(3) 0.4% of world agricultural trade. See id. ¶ 157. The higher figure on farm trade reflects the
reality that most SVEs specialize in commodities, not manufactured items. See also id. ¶ 159
(noting SVE provisions are scattered about the December 2008 Text).
206. December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 65; July 2008 Draft
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 65.
207. See December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 65 n.11 (third
and fourth sentences). Paragraph 157 of the December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text set
out the SVE criteria, and Annex I listed countries satisfying these requirements. See id. (first
sentence).
208. See id. ¶ 65 n.11.
209. December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶¶ 66, 70; July 2008
Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶¶ 66, 70.
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on any existing bound tariff at or below 10%. RAMs would have an extra
two years, beyond the implementation period for developing countries, to
phase in farm tariff cuts.210 In the event that their Doha Round market ac-
cess commitment overlapped with their accession commitment on a particu-
lar farm product, they would commence the cut one year after they had
finished implementing their accession commitment.211 That way, no RAM
would be making two sets of cuts (under an accession commitment and
under the Doha Round tiered formula) simultaneously.
Fifth, for newer RAMs, no reductions to agricultural tariffs would be
required.212 That also would be true for small, low-income RAMs with
economies in transition. The December 2008 Text identified the newer
RAMs as Macedonia, Saudi Arabia, Tonga, Ukraine, and Vietnam. The
small, transitional RAMs were Albania, Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyz Repub-
lic, Moldova, and Mongolia (the last one added by the December Text).
B. Sensitive Products Designations
Every WTO Member has certain sectors they are not willing to open to
free trade. The goods from these sectors are “Sensitive Products,” and they
are “Sensitive” for an admixture of economic, political, social, and cultural
reasons. The relative proportions among the reasons vary depending on the
Member and Product. The WTO does not, and cannot, dictate what the cri-
teria must be to designate a good as a “Sensitive Product.” But, it also
cannot allow every Member to make an unlimited number of designations.
Were that to occur, the trade-liberalizing effects of subsidy and tariff cutting
obligations would be more than offset by protecting Sensitive Products
from those obligations.
Thus, a key exercise in multilateral farm trade negotiations during
much of the Doha Round concerned rules on Sensitive Products and corol-
lary provisions on enhanced market access for Sensitive Products through
expanded tariff rate quotas (TRQs). The December 2008 Text was similar,
albeit not identical, to the July 2008 Text. The predecessor drew largely on
the May 2008 Text. Hence, not much had changed on the topic in nearly
eight months. Table VI below summarizes the proposed rules.
Sensitive Product designations were the starting point. Any developed
country would have the right to designate up to 4% of its total agricultural
tariff lines as “Sensitive.”213 That was a modest change from the range of
210. December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 69; July 2008 Draft
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 69.
211. December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 68; July 2008 Draft
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 68.
212. December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 67; July 2008 Draft
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 67.
213. December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 71; July 2008 Draft
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 71.
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4% to 6% in the July Text. Developing countries would receive S & D
treatment.
Table VI: Treatment of Sensitive Products in December 2008 Draft
Agriculture Modalities Text
Sensitive Product Percentage of Deviation from the Required Expansion
Rule Total Full Tariff of In-Quota Volume
Agricultural Reduction under the Threshold on TRQ
Category of WTO Tariff Lines Tiered Formula (Access Opportunity)
Member that can be (Partial tariff cut is
designated as applied to bound
Sensitive MFN rate imposed
on above-quota
imports of the
Sensitive Product)
Developed Countries 4% Tariff cut may The greater the
(including RAMs deviate from the full deviation from the
and SVEs, if reduction by: full cut, the greater
applicable) 1/3, 1/2, or 2/3 the access
opportunity required:
One-third deviation
(imposition of two-
thirds of the full cut)
requires 3% access
opportunity;
One-half deviation
(imposition of one-
half the full cut)
requires 3.5% access
opportunity;
Two-thirds deviation
(imposition of one-
third of the full cut)
requires 4% access
opportunity;
Developed Countries 6% Same as above Same as above but
with more than 30% must increase access
of their Tariff Lines opportunities for each
in the Top Tier deviation by an
(Final Bound MFN additional 1/2% of
Rate of over 75%) domestic
consumption.
A “tariff line” is a product as it is defined in lists of tariff rates. The product can be sub-
divided, and the extent of subdivisions is reflected in the Harmonized System (HS) of product
classification. See RAJ BHALA, DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 452–53 (2008); Info.
& Media Relations Div., WTO Secretariat, Unofficial Guide to the Revised Draft Modalities—
Agriculture, WORLD TRADE ORG., 2 (Dec. 6, 2008, corr’d Dec. 9, 2008), http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop_e/agric_e/ag_modals_dec08_e.pdf.
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Developing Countries One-third Same as above Obligation to expand
(including RAMs more than access opportunity is
and SVEs, if developed 2/3 the amount as for
applicable) countries (i.e., developed countries
5.33%) (above).
Domestic
consumption used to
estimate in-quota
TRQ threshold
excludes consumption
by subsistence
farmers of their own
produce.
Alternative complex
options whereby less-
than-formula tariff
cuts are made with
no corresponding
access opportunity
required.
Developing Countries One-third Same as above Same as above for
with more than 30% more than developing countries
of their Tariff Lines developed
in the Top Tier countries (i.e.,
(Final Bound MFN 7.33%)
Rate of over 130%)
(including RAMs
and SVEs, if
applicable)
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\9-1\UST102.txt unknown Seq: 84  1-OCT-12 14:33
88 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 9:1
With remarkable candor, the December Text and April 2011 Agricul-
ture Document hastened to add explicitly that Canada and Japan did not
agree to the 4% limitation.214 Canada demanded a limit of 6%, and Japan
8%.215 Canada was concerned about its supply management system, which
meant it had dairy and poultry products it sought to designate as Sensitive
that would exceed the 4% limit.216 Japan made a similar calculation in re-
spect of its sensitivities, such as cereals, grain, and rice.217 Japan hardened
its position in December 2010, when it made an otherwise obligatory 75%
in its OTDS conditional on permission for it to pick an additional 2% of its
agricultural tariff lines (i.e., 8% of them) as Sensitive.218
Evidently, neither Canada nor Japan was satisfied with a dispensation
designed to placate them.219 That dispensation was WTO Members with
high farm tariffs, i.e., countries with more than 30% of their tariffs in the
top tier of 75% ad valorem or more, could designate an additional 2 per-
centage points of their farm tariff lines as Sensitive—in effect, 6% (or so it
appeared from the December Text). But, they would have to expand TRQs
by an additional 0.5% of domestic consumption beyond the required access
opportunity amounts (explained below).220
To the surprise of many Members, in October 2009, the U.S. signaled
a possible change in its position on the number of agricultural tariff lines
214. See April 2011 Agriculture Document, supra note 90, ¶¶ 12–13; December 2008 Draft
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 71 n.*.
215. See World Trade Organization, Committee on Agriculture, Special Session, Revised
Draft Modalities for Agriculture Sensitive Products: Designation, TN/AG/W/5 ¶ 4 (Dec. 6, 2008).
216. See Press Release, Market Wire, Minister Ritz Takes Strong Stand on WTO Agriculture
Negotiations (Dec. 7, 2008), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/12/07/idUS85756+
07-Dec-2008+MW20081207.
217. See Toshio Aritake, WTO: WTO Chief Lamy Urges Japan’s Officials to Contribute to
Doha Round’s Completion, 26  Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 9, at 282 (Feb. 26, 2009).
218. See Daniel Pruzin, Japan Slammed at WTO Attempt to Dodge Subsidy Reduction Com-
mitment, 27 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 50, at 1969 (Dec. 23, 2010).
219. Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶¶ 71 (sec-
ond sentence), 75, with July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶¶ 71 (sec-
ond sentence), 75.
The 2% flexibility also applied to another category of developed countries: if they were
disproportionately constrained in making Sensitive designations (specifically, in respect of the
number of tariff lines they could select, because they were scheduling them at the six-digit level of
Harmonized System (HS) classification), then they could increase their entitlement by 2%. See id.
220. Chairman Falconer proposed yet more flexibility for Canada—and presumably Japan—
to consider in his Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture Sensitive Products: Designation. Es-
sentially, it was an option for Canada to designate more than 4% of its tariff lines as Sensitive if it
expanded its TRQs by more than 4% of domestic consumption. See World Trade Organization,
Committee on Agriculture, Special Session, Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture Sensitive
Products: Designation, ¶ 6, TN/AG/W/5  (Dec. 6, 2008). Specifically, each Sensitive line above
the 4% threshold would require a TRQ increase of 5.5% of domestic consumption, and all of the
Sensitive lines under the 4% limit would require an additional 0.5% increase, to 4.5%. The other
option would be a TRQ expansion of 5% on all lines Canada designated Sensitive. However, the
Chairman conceded that the option would not be acceptable to Japan. See id. ¶ 7.
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that a developed country could designate as Sensitive.221 Traditionally, the
Americans championed the argument to limit the number of such lines. But,
perhaps under pressure from domestic agricultural constituencies that
viewed the December 2008 Draft Text as more “give” than “got,” the U.S.
indicated it might seek to expand the key number to 6%. That is, it might
insist that any developed country have the right to designate up to 6% of
farm tariff lines as Sensitive. Whether the U.S. actually would designate 6%
of its lines would depend on a cost-benefit analysis: was the benefit of the
designation worth the cost of expanding TRQs on those lines? While the
likes of the EU, Japan, and Korea welcomed the idea, Australia, Brazil, and
Uruguay were deeply troubled by it.
Setting aside the disagreement on the percentage of farm tariff lines
that may be designated as Sensitive, the next step concerned agreement on
the appropriate tariff cuts to Sensitive Products. These Products would be
subject to the tiered reduction formula, like any other agricultural good.
However, they would be shielded from the full force of the cuts under that
formula. All WTO Members would be entitled to deviate from the formula,
for Sensitive Products, by one-third, one-half, or two-thirds.222 That is, in
reverse order, respectively, their obligation to cut tariffs on Sensitive Prod-
ucts would be only one-third, one-half, or two-thirds that of the normal cut:
(1) The smallest deviation from the formula, one-third, would
mean imposing a tariff reduction that is two-thirds as severe
as called for by the formula. (Hence, the access opportunity,
discussed below, is the least onerous—3%.)
(2) The medium deviation from the formula, one-half, would
mean imposing a tariff reduction that is one-half as severe as
called for by the formula. (Hence, the access opportunity, dis-
cussed below, is moderate—3.5%.)
(3) The largest deviation from the formula, two-thirds, would
mean imposing a tariff reduction that is only one-third as se-
vere as called for by the formula. (Hence, the access opportu-
nity, discussed below, is the most onerous—4%.)
In contrast to the July Text, the December Text made clear each Mem-
ber would be free to choose the degree of deviation but would have to apply
that degree to all of its Sensitive Products (or, at least to all of them within a
broad category).223 It could not, for example, derogate by one-third for
some Sensitive Products yet by two-thirds for others.
221. See Daniel Pruzin, Senior WTO Negotiators Downbeat After Week of Talks on Doha
Round, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 43, at 1457 (Oct. 29, 2009); Daniel Pruzin, Agriculture:
Trading Partners Concerned by U.S. Shift on Sensitive Products in Doha Farm Talks, 26 Int’l
Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 42, at 1413 (Oct. 22, 2009).
222. December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 73; July 2008 Draft
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 73.
223. Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 73 (last
sentence), with July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 73.
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C. Sensitive Products and Access Opportunities Through TRQ
Expansion
To compensate exporters of products designated Sensitive by import-
ing countries, the importing countries—having availed themselves of the
entitlement to derogate from the full agreed-upon cuts—would have to
yield something. That “something” proved to be a monstrously complicat-
ing factor in Doha Round negotiations. Essentially, Members agreed the
compensation would take the form of a required minimum imported quan-
tity of the Sensitive Product, defined in terms of an in-quota TRQ volume
threshold, and technically called an “access opportunity.” That is because,
typically, imports under a TRQ are duty-free, or face only a low duty, if
they fall within the in-quota threshold. Raising that threshold would mean a
larger volume of merchandise would enter the importing country with little
or no duty. Above-quota (i.e., over- or out-of-quota) imports would con-
tinue to face a high rate of duty. However, the normally-applicable tiered
tariff cuts, as modified by partial shielding through a Sensitive Product des-
ignation, would apply to the out-of-quota rate.
The essence of the trade-off in the December 2008 Text would be a
lower cut to the bound MFN tariff on a Sensitive Product than otherwise
required under the Doha Round tiered reduction formula. That partially-
reduced tariff would affect the over-quota levy on Sensitive Product im-
ports. But, there would be an appropriate increase in the in-quota threshold.
Imports under this raised threshold would get zero or low-duty treatment,
which of course is part and parcel of a TRQ. In sum, two movements would
occur in respect of a Sensitive Product:
(1) The in-quota threshold would be raised, but the low or zero-
duty treatment would remain unchanged.
(2) The tariff cuts would be applied to the out-of-quota bound
MFN rate, albeit with less than full force.
The movements would be coordinated, indeed directly related to one
another. Greater access opportunity (by virtue of the in-quota threshold in-
creases) would be the requisite compensation for greater tariff cut deroga-
tion (in respect of the duty applicable to out-of-quota shipments). Therein
lay the trade-off.
Thus, the ostensibly simple compensatory arrangement was a propor-
tionate percentage TRQ expansion.224 Specifically, in exchange for shield-
ing 4% of its tariff lines from full tariff cuts, a developed country that—
(1) Selected the maximum deviation of two-thirds would have to
expand the in-quota volume threshold for Sensitive Product
imports by 4% of domestic consumption.
224. December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 74; July 2008 Draft
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 74.
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(2) Selected the minimum deviation of one-third would have to
expand the in-quota volume threshold for Sensitive Product
imports by 3% of domestic consumption.
(3) Selected the middle degree of deviation of one-half would
have to expand the in-quota volume threshold for Sensitive
Product imports by 3.5% of domestic consumption.
There would be a direct relationship between deviation from agreed-
upon tariff reductions and in-quota TRQ volume expansion for Sensitive
Products: The greater the deviation, the greater the expansion.
Stated differently, TRQ expansion would be akin to a sliding scale.
Members would pick the point on the scale they wished to sit based on the
extent to which they protected Sensitive Products from the full force of
Doha Round cuts to farm tariffs. A Member against cutting tariffs fully on a
Sensitive Product would have a great onus to expand the quota threshold on
that product. Conversely, a Member willing to reduce tariffs nearly fully on
a Sensitive Product would have less of an obligation to expand the corre-
sponding quota threshold. The TRQ expansions would apply on an MFN
basis, and would be phased in, essentially across a three-year period.225
What if a WTO Member designates a good as Sensitive but does not
have a TRQ established for it? Typically, Sensitive Products are protected
by TRQs, but would a Member be barred from designating a new good as
Sensitive, and creating a TRQ for it? Like its predecessor, the December
2008 Text left that question unanswered. It laid out the options. Either,
(1) No tariff line could be designated as Sensitive unless it al-
ready was subject to a TRQ before the Round commenced in
November 2001; or
(2) Any product could be designated as such, regardless of its
pre-Round status.226
The two basic alternatives were radically different. The first option
inclines Members toward free trade. By disallowing Sensitive designations
225. December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 82; July 2008 Draft
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 79.
The precise details of the phase-in would be as follows. The first installment of a TRQ
expansion would occur on the first day of implementation of any Doha Round agreement. It
would have to be an expansion at least equal to one quarter of total domestic consumption. The
subsequent three-quarters of that total would be added to the in-quota TRQ threshold in three steps
at the end of each subsequent twelve-month period. See id. (second and third sentences).
In the event normal imports are comparatively large, a developed country could provide a
reduced access opportunity. Specifically, if the existing bound TRQ volume already represents 10
percent or more of domestic consumption, then the access opportunity obligations would be re-
duced by 0.5 percent for each deviation. If that volume is more than 30 percent of domestic
consumption, then the obligation to expand TRQ volumes would be lowered by 1 percent for each
deviation. See id. ¶ 77.
226. December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 83; July 2008 Draft
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 80.
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but for the existence of a TRQ, the first option restricts drastically farm
goods the Members could designate as Sensitive.
In contrast, the second option creates much more policy space for pro-
tection. Establishing new TRQs is the way to create this space. A new TRQ
would embody the familiar trade-off on a newly-designated Sensitive Prod-
uct between (1) a lower duty imposed on in-quota shipments, and (2) a
smaller tariff cut on the bound duty for out-of-quota shipments.
Unsurprisingly, the options reflected sharp battle lines between the
U.S. and other major powers, which favored the first option, and China,
India, and other developing countries, which favored the second option. On
this issue, as a major exporting power, Brazil sided with the first group.
Brazil argued the TRQ provisions should not permit WTO Members to es-
tablish new TRQs on farm products that they had not protected during the
Uruguay Round. This opportunity could be a “black box in which any prod-
uct could get in, with serious consequences for our interests in the markets
of the rich nations.”227 Brazil was particularly concerned developed coun-
tries might create TRQs for ethanol, of which it is the world’s largest
exporter.228
The December 2008 Text contained nearly the same S & D treatment
rule for developing countries as set out in the July Text. They could desig-
nate up to one-third more tariff lines, i.e., 5.33% of their lines, as Sensitive
than developed countries.229 (A developing country that had more than 30%
of its products in the top tier of the tariff cutting formula, i.e., above 130%,
could designate an extra 2 percentage points of its tariff lines as Sensitive,
for a total entitlement of roughly 7.33%.) The deviations that developing
countries could take from the tiered tariff cuts would be the same as for
developed countries. That is, developing countries could apply a cut that is
one-third, one-half, or two-thirds as severe as otherwise would be required
under the formula.
Expansion of in-quota TRQ volumes for developing countries would
be two-thirds as great as developed countries.230 (Numerically, the expan-
sion figures for developing countries would be 2.67%, 2.33%, and 2%, re-
spectively, for the maximum, moderate, and minimum deviation choices on
the sliding scale.) The end result would mean foreign farm products would
hit the quota ceiling more quickly, and exhaust the duty-free or low-duty
allotment faster, in a developing country than in a developed country
227. David Haskel & Ed Taylor, NAMA Final Draft Text Still Inadequate After Changes,
Argentina Tells MERCOSUR, 25 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 29, at 1047, 1047–48 (July 17,
2008) (quoting Brazilian Foreign Minister Celsio Amorim). The Foreign Minister holds the se-
nior-most trade portfolio in the Brazilian government.
228. See id.
229. Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶¶ 72, 78,
with July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶¶ 72, 78.
230. December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶¶ 72, 78; July 2008
Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶¶ 72, 78.
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(ceteris paribus, i.e., assuming all other factors were equal). Domestic con-
sumption data on which that expansion would be based would exclude con-
sumption by subsistence farmers of their own produce. Developing
countries would get longer phase-in periods.231
Neither of the two extreme options garnered a consensus. Hence, some
kind of compromise between them was needed. A possibility sketched out
by Chairman Falconer in December 2008 was that a limited number of
tariff lines not currently subject to TRQs could be declared Sensitive, and
subject to a TRQ. But, the limits would have to be fairly tight:232
(1) The number of such lines could not exceed one percent of the
farm tariff lines of the Member concerned.
(2) The 1% would be deducted from the maximum entitlement of
Sensitive Product tariff lines to which the Member was enti-
tled (i.e., if the limit on Sensitive Product designations were
4%, then the remaining entitlement would be 3%).
(3) The above-quota volume threshold (i.e., the access opportu-
nity) for a newly created TRQ would have to be raised by an
additional 2% of domestic consumption beyond the otherwise
obligatory expansion.233
(4) The in-quota tariff rate of the newly designated Sensitive
Product would have to be zero.
(5) The TRQ on the new and indeed all Sensitive Products must
be applied on an MFN basis.
Norway managed to obtain S & D treatment for itself in the proposal.
For three product categories, Norway designates as Sensitive at the HS 7-
digit level, Norway could provide an additional access opportunity of just
231. The December 2008 Text endeavored to clarify an alternative preferential rule for devel-
oping countries. Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶¶
78–81, with July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 78. The alternative
consisted of three complicated options on Sensitive Products. Instead of following the scheme of
taking on obligations two-thirds as onerous as for developed countries, a developing country could
forgo TRQ expansion and simply impose a less severe tariff cut on Sensitive Products than other-
wise would be required of them under the tiered formula, with an extended period for implement-
ing the cuts. The three options concerned the degree of deviation from full tariff reductions under
the tiered formula, and the implementation period to make the cuts. Briefly put, under the alterna-
tive three options, developing countries could specify a good as Sensitive without granting it any
TRQ access, so long as they imposed the full tariff cut on that good over an implementation
period 3 years longer than normal (or made one-quarter of the normal tariff cut, but in a period 2
years shorter than normal).
232. See World Trade Organization, Committee on Agriculture, Special Session, Revised
Draft Modalities for Agriculture Sensitive Products: Tariff Quota Creation, TN/AG/W/6 (Dec. 6,
2008), ¶¶ 1–5. Adjustments to these limits might be made if there has been significant historical
trade in the Sensitive Product at issue such that trade in that Product would be “manifestly and
artificially restrain[ed]” Id. ¶ 6. Essentially, the access opportunity would be added to the histori-
cal trade figure for the Product concerned. If that adjustment did not work, then a sui generis
solution would have to be devised. See id. ¶¶ 6–7.
233. See World Trade Organization, Committee on Agriculture, Special Session, Revised
Draft Modalities for Agriculture Sensitive Products: Tariff Quota Creation, TN/AG/W/6  (Dec. 6,
2008), ¶¶ 1–5; December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 74.
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0.5%, rather than 2%, of domestic consumption for the entire TRQ gov-
erning the three products.234 What the categories were was not evident from
the relevant document, Attachment Ai, Part G.
Even this proposal did not garner a consensus. Thus, the April 2011
Agriculture Document stated that “views remain divided on whether such
flexibility should be afforded.” That is, there was no agreement on whether
a WTO Member could designate a new product as Sensitive if it had no
TRQ in place for the product.235
D. Disaggregation of Sensitive Products and Data to Measure TRQ
Expansion
A critical but technical question concerned the extent to which WTO
Members could disaggregate product categories in making their Sensitive
Product designations. For example, could a Member identify cheese as Sen-
sitive, or must it be more precise and designate sub-categories like cheddar
cheese, or perhaps hard cheese? Likewise, should it be allowed to designate
wheat, or must it pick durum wheat?
On the one hand, the more detailed the designation, the more focused
the protection to the Sensitive Product and the less the risk other products
will be shielded in part from full tariff reductions. On the other hand, the
more detailed the designation, the more difficult it is to get domestic con-
sumption data.236 These data are essential to gauge the new or expanded
TRQs.
All Members are supposed to maintain data at the 6-digit level under
the Harmonized System (HS) of tariff classification maintained by the
World Customs Organization (WCO). (That is, HS codes are harmonized
among all Members at the 4- and 6-digit level, but not the 8- or 10-digit
level.) More precise Sensitive Product designations would require data at
the 8-digit level (e.g., cheddar or hard cheese, or durum wheat), which
many countries—even as large as Brazil—do not have. When data on do-
mestic consumption in a product sub-category are unavailable, then a proxy
must be found. One controversial proxy is to estimate domestic consump-
tion using trade figures, specifically, import data. A related problem is that
234. See World Trade Organization, Committee on Agriculture, Special Session, Revised
Draft Modalities for Agriculture Sensitive Products: Tariff Quota Creation, TN/AG/W/6 (Dec. 6,
2008), ¶ 8.
235. See April 2011 Agriculture Document, supra note 90, ¶ 18.
236. In the fall of 2009, WTO Members spent an enormous amount of time and effort compil-
ing and checking these data, as well as data on values of production, which are necessary to
calculate and implement rules on domestic support reductions. See, e.g., World Trade Organiza-
tion, Negotiators Focus on Data Gaps in Farm Trade Talks (Nov. 20, 2009), available at http://
www.wto.org/english/news_e/news09_e/agng_16nov09_e.htm. Their investment adduces what
should be an obvious point: the more technically complex a trade rule is, the more likely it will
require time and effort to marshal data to ensure that rule is properly followed. This point miti-
gates in favor of simpler rules.
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products in close sub-categories may be substituted. Cheddar and hard
cheese may compete with one another.
Thus, the bottom-line question is how domestic consumption should
be estimated when Sensitive Products are designated with great precision.
The December 2008 Text, like its predecessor in July, addressed this ques-
tion through Annex C, accompanied by an “Attachment A” and “Attach-
ment Ai.” Even to the most seasoned international trade professionals, these
documents contained monstrous complexities of TRQ expansion calcula-
tions. These nearly unfathomable details represented a so-called Consensus
Approach worked out in April 2008 and left largely unchanged thereafter.
Attachment A concerns Sensitive Product categories. This Attachment
identifies the agricultural product categories WTO Members intend to des-
ignate as Sensitive. Attachment Ai—called “Partial Designation Modalities
for Sensitive Products” and occupying 16 pages—addresses the problem of
estimating domestic consumption for such Products. Unhelpfully, however,
Attachment Ai was scarcely more comprehensible in the December 2008
Text than in the July Text.
As before, both Attachments presumed domestic consumption would
be the yardstick to determine the extent to which quota sizes for Sensitive
Products would need to be expanded. Generally, for a good declared Sensi-
tive at the detailed HS 8-digit level, the expansion would depend on esti-
mated consumption of the broader HS 6-digit level category in which that
Sensitive Product is classified. The thrust of Attachment A and Ai was to
explain how domestic consumption would be calculated for Sensitive Prod-
ucts, particularly in light of the fact consumption would have to be esti-
mated using a proxy, namely, trade figures.
Attachment A laid out, at the 6-digit level, the product categories that
could be designated as Sensitive. Two other Attachments (B and D) ex-
plained precisely how to calculate domestic consumption for each Sensitive
Product category. The methodology consisted of two steps. Every product
category that a Member could designate as Sensitive would have some
“Core” Products and some “Non-Core” Products. Core Sensitive Products
would be raw or basic farm goods. Non-Core Products would consist of (1)
farm products that have a low amount of processing, and (2) farm products
that are highly processed. For instance, the broad product category of wheat
has twenty-eight products at the HS 6-digit level, including two basic grains
that are Core, some products that have undergone modest processing, like
wheat flour, and still other products that are highly processed, such as bread
and pasta.237
237. See World Trade Organization, Unofficial Guide to the Revised Draft Modalities-Agri-
culture, (Dec. 6, 2008 corr’d Dec. 9, 2008) at 12, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_
e/agric_e/ag_modals_dec08_e.pdf.
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Reading Attachments A and Ai shows how trade negotiations devolve
from high-minded, well-intentioned free trade aspirations to stunningly ab-
struse, product-by-product protectionism. The Attachments speak of a “two
step partial designation methodology.” Yet, nowhere do they clearly indi-
cate “Step 1” or “Step 2.” They continue with special rules for TRQ expan-
sion for dairy products that are all but impenetrable, except (perhaps) to
their drafter and Canada, the Member especially eager to protect its supply
management system from the full-force of any Doha Round tariff cuts. That
said, the basic goal of the two steps, respectively, would be to calculate
domestic consumption for each broad category (e.g., wheat) and then esti-
mate consumption of products at a detailed sub-category level (e.g., wheat
flour).
Accordingly, in Step 1, consumption would be estimated at the HS 6-
digit level. That is, for each detailed Sensitive Product type, consumption
would be a percentage of consumption in the relevant broad product cate-
gory. The percentage would depend on the share of trade of the detailed
product in the broad category. That percentage would be adjusted to give a
higher weighting to Core Products (e.g., 67%) than to Non-Core Products
(e.g., 23%). This adjustment would ensure Core Products, which are more
heavily traded than Non-Core Products, would account for at least 90% of
each HS 6-digit category. In Step 2, consumption would be estimated at the
HS 8-digit level. The percentage of consumption at the 6-digit level would
be adjusted, using the import data of the WTO Member in question, at the
8-digit level.
The end result would be a percentage figure for domestic consumption
of a detailed Sensitive Product. In other words, for every detailed product
sub-category (8-digit level), consumption would be some percentage of
consumption of the broad product category (6-digit level) in which the de-
tailed product appears. The percentage would depend on the share of the
sub-product in the broad product category. That percentage would be ad-
justed to ensure Core Products account for 90% or more of the consumption
in the broad category. That is because they are the most heavily traded kind
of agricultural good.
In turn, the estimate of domestic consumption of a Sensitive Product
sub-category would be used to set the expansion of the in-quota threshold
of a TRQ for that Product. That is, this estimate would establish the quota
size—the access opportunity—whenever a Member designates a sub-cate-
gory as a Sensitive.
However, to make matters yet more complicated, special variations on
these two steps would apply to certain Sensitive Products, particularly dairy
(eggs and milk), fruit, and vegetables. Moreover, special rules—set out in
Annex C and Attachment Ai to the December 2008 Text—deal with the
possibility that estimates of domestic consumption might result in an in-
quota TRQ threshold that is too small. These rules establish a minimum
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quota size, or floor, in the event the trade data used as a proxy for domestic
consumption consists of unusually low figures.
Not surprisingly, how the aforementioned criteria would operate in
practice remained a mystery to most Members, even after months of study
and contemplation. The April 2011 Agriculture Document acknowledged
the mass confusion, albeit in the tortured language of Geneva bureaucrats:
“There is a sense that the operability of criteria . . . is difficult to conceive in
the abstract,” and “further factual clarification,” including on products for
which consumption data is used as a proxy for trade volumes was
needed.238
E. Maximum Tariff Levels (Caps)
Like the July 2008 Text, the December 2008 Text dealt with an issue
related to Sensitive Products and TRQ expansion, namely, the maximum
bound MFN tariff level a WTO Member could maintain on a Sensitive
Product. Ought there to be a tariff cap on high-tariff developed countries
(specifically, on rates charged on above-quota shipments of the Product)?
The answer on which most Members settled was “yes.” They also agreed a
high-tariff country should make a so-called extra payment. But, countries
with high farm tariffs, like Japan and Switzerland, disagreed.239 The high-
tariff Members, which banded together in the Group of 10 (G-10), opposed
a tariff cap and, if there had to be one, likely wanted a broad exemption to
it.240
Suppose after applying all of its Doha Round tariff cut obligations to
agriculture products under the tiered tariff formula, including any devia-
tions for Sensitive Products, a developed country still sought to keep some
of its Sensitive Product tariff lines bound at ad valorem rates of over 100%.
To be sure, the number of such lines would not exceed 4%—the total num-
ber of lines that a developed country could designate as Sensitive. And, the
100%-plus duty would be the over-quota rate for a TRQ on a Sensitive
Product. The developed country would have to apply to all of its Sensitive
Products an additional TRQ expansion of 0.5% of domestic consumption.
That one-half percent would be the extra payment, in exchange for keeping
such high duty rates.241
The extra payment reflected the aspirations of poor countries. They
argued no developed country should have an agricultural duty rate above
100%. However, if they could not push through a lower cap, then at least
they could urge an extra payment. The trade-off, in other words, was that a
238. See April 2011 Agriculture Document, supra note 90, ¶ 19.
239. See Daniel Pruzin, Week of WTO “Crunch” Ag Talks Ends with No Decision on Next
Step, 25 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 48, at 1707 (Dec. 4, 2008).
240. See Pruzin, supra note 221, at 1457.
241. December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 76; July 2008 Draft
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 76.
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\9-1\UST102.txt unknown Seq: 94  1-OCT-12 14:33
98 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 9:1
developed country could maintain an above-quota duty rate in excess of
100% on a good it designated as Sensitive if it applied to that good a TRQ
expansion of 0.5% greater than the expansion requirement for Sensitive
Products with duty rates below 100%. Put simply, a rich country could ex-
ceed a 100% tariff rate, albeit with a supra-generous increase in quota vol-
ume. Precisely whether that generosity would matter, when the above-quota
rate was stuck above 100%, was uncertain.
As for a duty rate over 100% on a non-Sensitive Product, the general
rule proposed was that such instances would be limited to no more than 1%
of tariff lines beyond the usual entitlement for Sensitive items. (That is, if a
developed country were entitled to designate up to 4% of lines as Sensitive,
then it could not have duty rates in excess of 100% on more than 5% of its
non-Sensitive lines. The December 2008 Text eliminated the range of 1–2%
set out in the July Text.)242 Members affected—Iceland, Japan, Norway,
and Switzerland243—would have to pay compensation to the rest of the
Membership for the privilege of maintaining a tariff rate above 100% on a
non-Sensitive Product. That compensation would consist of:
(1) Expansion of the TRQs on all their Sensitive Products by an
additional 0.5% of domestic consumption, or
(2) Acceleration of tariff reductions by two years faster than the
normal implementation, or
(3) Addition of ten percentage points to the tariff cuts it is
obliged to make. (The December Text boosted this figure
from five, which the July Text contained.)244
Briefly put, the December 2008 Text retained (and modestly strength-
ened) incentives to eradicate tariffs above 100%.
Yet, that Text did not require their elimination. On this point, the fun-
damental question of whether any Member should be allowed to maintain a
tariff in excess of 100% ad valorem, there was no agreement. So, the April
2011 Agriculture Document characterized the views of the WTO Members
as “remain[ing] sharply divided.”245
What about developing countries—would they have a tariff cap? The
December 2008 Text contained the same answer as its predecessor. Devel-
oping countries would have a cap of 150%, which was one-third more than
the developed country limit.246 Presumably, they would also make an extra
payment, albeit a less onerous one than required of developed countries.
242. Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 76, with
July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 76.
243. See December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 76 n.15.
244. Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 76 (last
sentence), with July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 76 (last sentence).
245. See April 2011 Agriculture Document, supra note 90, ¶ 16.
246. Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, at ¶ 76 n.14,
with July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, at ¶ 76 n.12.
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F. Tariff Escalation
On how to reduce tariff escalation, the December 2008 Text was a
verbatim repetition of the July Text. The July Text was premised on Texts
from February and May 2008 and a January 2008 Working Paper on Tariff
Escalation. Not much had occurred in negotiations during 2008. Like its
predecessor, the December 2008 Text included special provisions for com-
modity-dependent producing countries in the event the adverse effects of
tariff escalation were not mitigated by the agreed-upon tiered tariff cutting
formula247 and a provisional list of products (in Annex D) vulnerable to
tariff escalation.248
Tariff escalation occurs if a processed product has imposed on it a duty
rate significantly above the unprocessed product. “Significance” is defined
as an escalation of more than five percentage points (i.e., the tariff rate on a
processed product is more than five ad valorem percentage points than on
the primary product related to it).249 The effect of tariff escalation is to
protect processing operations, typically in rich countries, against providers
of raw materials and intermediate goods, which usually are in poor coun-
tries. Tariff escalation discourages the establishment of vertically integrated
industries in poor countries, leaving them dependent on rich countries for
finished products.
The December 2008 Text contained a reasonably straightforward strat-
egy to combat tariff escalation.250 It would apply to all developed countries
and—on a voluntary basis—any developing country that happened to have
escalated tariffs. The strategy would not apply to any Sensitive Products.
Instead of imposing the tariff reduction to the final bound MFN rate in
the band in which a processed product (benefitting from tariff escalation)
247. Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶¶ 91–102,
with July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶¶ 88–99. In brief, these provi-
sions covered (1) the methodology to help commodity-producing countries deal with tariff escala-
tion on items of interest to them, including appropriate tariff escalation reductions, (2) elimination
of non-tariff measures affecting trade in commodities, (3) joint action under GATT Article
XXXVIII (which concerns such action) by WTO Members to help these producing countries,
including the adoption of inter-governmental commodity agreements, (4) the relationship of
GATT Article XX(h) (which exempts those arrangements from normal GATT obligations) to
arrangements by commodity-dependent producing countries, and (5) technical assistance to im-
prove world markets for commodities and the adoption and implementation of inter-governmental
commodity agreements.
248. Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 84, with
July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 81.
249. Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 87, with
July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 84.
250. Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶¶ 85–90,
Annex D, with July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶¶ 82–87, Annex D.
If the tariff reduction on a tropical product (discussed below) were larger than the tariff cut under
the escalation rules, then the tropical reduction cut would be applied. See December 2008 Draft
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶¶ 85–90, Annex D; July 2008 Draft Agriculture
Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶¶ 82–87, Annex D.
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belongs, that escalated processed product would be subject to the cut of the
next highest tier from the tier it is in. Thus, suppose an escalated product
attracts a 60% tariff. It is in the second-highest tier (tariffs between
50–75%), and the tariff is cut by 64%. However, as an escalated product, it
is re-classified—bumped up—into the highest tier (tariffs over 75%). The
consequent tariff cut is 70%. What if the escalated product already is in the
highest tier? Then, the tariff cut would be an additional six percentage
points (i.e., a cut of 76% to the tariff).
Interestingly, the above strategy would not apply in full if doing so
would reduce the tariff of the processed product to below the primary prod-
uct.251 Consequently, the strategy would mitigate tariff escalation but not
create tariff inversion (the occurrence of a higher tariff on the primary than
on the processed good). If tariff inversion were to occur by applying the
strategy, then the cut would be moderated so as to produce tariff equiva-
lence (the same duty rate on the primary and processed good).252
G. Tariff Simplification
Tariff simplification provisions in the December 2008 Text were
nearly identical to the contents of the July Text. Both texts laid out the
obvious prohibition against binding a tariff in a form that is more complex
than its current one.253 However, the December Text created two stark op-
tions for WTO Members.254 As indicated in the April 2011 Agriculture
Document, the Members had yet to choose between these options.255
First, Members could agree all bound MFN tariffs must be expressed
as simple, ad valorem tariffs. In other words, “tariff simplification” would
apply to 100% of the bound tariff lines in the schedules of every Member.
Second, Members could decide that simplification should apply to at least
90% of the bound rates in the schedules of a developed country. For the
residual unconverted tariff lines, a developed country would have a year
251. Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 88, with
July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 85.
252. A development in the Doha Round negotiations that occurred in December 2009 illus-
trates the complexity of many issues at stake in the Round. The EU said it would revise its
“Meursing Table.” The EU uses this Table to determine the customs duty owed on certain
processed agricultural products, such as biscuits, cakes, and confectionaries. That duty is based on
the composition of the products, with tariffs being defined according to the level of milk fat,
protein, starch, and sugar in the processed product. Stunningly, under the Table, there are 27,720
possible combinations of tariffs. The EU offered to reduce that figure to under 300—still a large
matrix of possibilities, but a 90 percent cut from an outrageous number. See Chair Plans Fort-
nights on Substance in Early 2010, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Dec. 11, 2009), http://www.wto.org/
english/news_e/news09_e/agng_07dec09_e.htm.
253. Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 103, with
July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 100.
254. Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶¶ 104–08,
Annex N, with July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶¶ 101–04, Annex N.
255. See April 2011 Agriculture Document, supra note 90, ¶¶ 21–25.
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after implementation of any Doha Round agreement to decide on how to
achieve simplification and reach 100% coverage. The EU managed to retain
special dispensation. The EU would need to have only 85% of its tariff lines
expressed as ad valorem rates within five years of implementation and
could keep 5% of its lines as compound tariffs (i.e., a hybrid of a specific
duty, which is a levy on a per unit basis, and an ad valorem tariff).
Under either alternative, Members would use the May 2005 Paris
Methodology to convert non-ad valorem tariffs into their AVEs. An imple-
mentation period had yet to be set but presumably would be upon, or within
a year or so after, the entry into force of any Doha Round accords. Also
under both options, any developing country simplifying its tariff schedule
would have an additional two years to complete the process. No tariff sim-
plification obligations would be imposed on least developed countries. Crit-
ically, under either option all simplified bound tariffs must not increase the
level of protection over their original complex form.
H. Tariff Quotas
TRQs are used in more contexts than just the protection of Sensitive
Products. Yet, in all contexts, TRQs provide protection that can be greater
than a simple ad valorem tariff. An ad valorem tariff, unless it is set at a
prohibitively high level, does not block imports. A TRQ can have that ef-
fect if the in-quota threshold is low, the above-quota duty is high, and the
administration of the scheme is not transparent. Accordingly, the reduction
of duties associated with TRQ, and the improvement of TRQ administra-
tion, were topics addressed in the December 2008 Text.
The relevant provisions in the December Text were nearly identical to
their counterparts in the July Text, with modest substantive and stylistic
changes. The provisions applied to all TRQs, whether or not they protected
a Sensitive Product. The new Text set out eight basic rules.
First, all developed countries must slash their bound in-quota MFN
tariffs by 50%, or to a rate of 10%. (So, 10% would be the ceiling in-quota
tariff on any TRQ.) That would be true for all TRQs, whether or not they
protected a Sensitive Product. The July Text had listed a range of 50–70%,
and a rate of 0–15%.256 Thus, the December Text chose the low end of the
range and a high end for the rate—both less ambitious choices from the
perspective of free trade. The bindings would be in ad valorem form. The
new Text provided greater provision than its predecessor on implementation
of the cuts: reductions to in-quota tariffs on all TRQs would be phased in on
the same schedule as expansions of in-quota volume thresholds for TRQs
256. Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶¶ 109, 114,
with July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 105. If a TRQ covered two or
more tariff lines that were Sensitive Products, and thereby subject to expansion requirements
under the rules for those Products, then the reduction would commence with the lowest of the
bound in-quota rates applicable to the lines under the single TRQ.
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on Sensitive Products. The maximum in-quota tariff on the first day of im-
plementation would have to be 17.5%. Notably, reductions of in-quota tar-
iffs would not count for the purposes of calculating average farm tariff cuts
under the tiered tariff reduction formula.
Second, for all developed countries, low in-quota rates would have to
be eliminated. Specifically, if the in-quota MFN rate already was bound at
or below 5%, then a developed country would have to reduce it to zero. The
developed country would have to do so by the end of the first year of
implementation.
Third, Switzerland—obviously a developed country—would get S &
D treatment in two respects.257 It would not be obligated to reduce to 10%
the bound in-quota tariffs on two lines of bread cereals. It also would not be
obligated to cut to zero its in-quota tariff for two specific tariff lines cover-
ing wine. However, to compensate bread and wine cereal exporters, Swit-
zerland would have to provide new market access opportunities equal to 1%
of domestic consumption. The sui generis rules for Switzerland were in the
December, but not July, Text, implying it had lobbied effectively in the fall
of 2008 on behalf of the interested domestic industries.
Fourth, developing countries would get S & D treatment.258 They
would have to reduce their bound in-quota MFN tariffs by 15%, which es-
sentially represented an obligation one-third as onerous as on developed
countries. However, developing countries would not have to reduce their
tariffs to a set rate, even if that would produce a lower duty rate, nor would
they have to cut to zero rates that already were at or below 5%. There would
be no cap on the level of their in-quota rates. Similarly, as an innovation in
the December 2008 Text, if a tariff line protected by a TRQ is a Special
Product (discussed below) designated by a developing country for no tariff
cut, then the country would not have to cut its in-quota rate at all.259
Fifth, SVEs would get even more generous S & D treatment than de-
veloping countries. They would be treated like developing countries (as
above). But, they would be obliged to reduce their bound in-quota MFN
tariffs by just 7.5%. There would be no cap on the level of their in-quota
rates. Similarly, as an innovation in the December 2008 Text, SVEs would
not have to reduce the in-quota tariff on any Special Product, regardless of
whether they had slated that Product for a zero tariff cut.260 Venezuela
would be treated as an SVE for these purposes.
257. See December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 109 n.19.
258. Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 111, with
July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 105.
259. Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 111 (last
sentence), with July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 105.
260. Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 112, with
July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 105.
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Sixth, RAMs also would get enhanced S & D treatment.261 Older
RAMs would be entitled to reduce their bound in-quota MFN tariffs by
one-third of the percentage of the cut required of developing countries.
They would not need to reduce any in-quota rate at or below 15%. The July
Text set that threshold at 10%. Hence, the December Text moved in favor
of the RAMs and away from trade liberalization. Newer RAMs—Macedo-
nia, Saudi Arabia, Tonga, Ukraine, and Vietnam—would have no reduction
obligations. For this purpose, it appears Venezuela was treated as a newer
RAM. Likewise, small, low income RAMs with economies in transition—
Albania, Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, and Mongolia—
would have no such obligations.
Seventh, if a TRQ is not operational, then a WTO Member—whether
it is a developed or developing country—should consider eliminating that
TRQ.262 This provision was an innovation in the December 2008 Text.
“Non-operational” means the bound MFN in-quota rate equals or exceeds
the above-quota rate. A Member that agreed to eradicate non-operational
TRQs would be rewarded by a less onerous obligation to cut tariffs on its
remaining operational TRQs. Specifically, it would be permitted to cut the
in-quota rates by 50%, or to a threshold of 8% (2 percentage points less
than the normal 10%).
And finally, the December Text contained the identical proposed rules
on TRQ administration set out in the July Text.263 They explained that this
administration would be deemed an instance of import licensing under the
WTO Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures.264 They also laid out
requirements on publication of information about TRQs, processing appli-
cations for licensing to import under a TRQ, TRQ fill rates, and ways to
improve market access if the volume of imports persistently is less than the
quota (i.e., the TRQ under-fill problem where there is less than full utiliza-
tion of the in-quota threshold).
I. SSGs
The general safeguard remedy against fair foreign trade, first estab-
lished in GATT Article XIX and refined in the WTO Agreement on Safe-
guards, has a long history and plenty of underlying justifications.265 Newer,
261. Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 113, with
July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 105.
262. Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 110, with
July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 105.
263. See December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶¶ 115–25; July
2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶¶ 106–16. In both Drafts, Annex E
contained details about a proposed TRQ underfill mechanism.
264. This Agreement is reprinted in a variety of sources, including BHALA, supra note 1,
Supp., Document 26, at 423–30.
265. Those justifications are set out in BHALA, supra note 1, ch. 37, and BHALA, supra note
138, at 939–52.
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and perhaps more obviously protectionist, are special safeguards (SSGs)
targeted at specific kinds of products. Article 5 of the WTO Agreement on
Agriculture introduced this remedy for farm products. However, not all
WTO Members were able or in a position to take advantage of it. The dis-
advantaged Members—largely poor countries with little legal capacity dur-
ing the Uruguay Round, when the Agreement on Agriculture was
negotiated—clamored for its removal.
Specifically, the December 2008 Text dealt with the problem many
developing countries face; namely, in the Uruguay Round, they gave up
their right to use the SSG remedy under Article 5 of the WTO Agreement
on Agriculture. They are ineligible for use of the SSG. That is because the
remedy applies only to products that have been tariffed (i.e., farm goods
that before the Uruguay Round had been protected by non-tariff barriers
(e.g., discretionary import licensing, import bans, quotas, or variable duties)
but subsequently by tariffs because of conversion from non-tariff barriers to
duty rates). On several products, many developing countries elected to es-
tablish a ceiling binding on their levels of non-tariff barrier protection but
not convert that protection to a tariff. For such products, the SSG techni-
cally was inapplicable.
Accordingly, for both rich and poor countries, the December 2008
Text modified the SSG proposals that the July Text had set out.266 In the
earlier Text, the choices were that developed countries would (1) have to
cease using the SSG or (2) reduce the number of products to which they
could apply this remedy to 1.5% of tariff lines. The new Text combined the
options. Developed countries would have to reduce to 1% of their tariff
lines the number of lines eligible for an SSG. They would have to do so as
soon as any Doha Round accords entered into force. Critically, at the end of
the seventh year of implementation of the accords, developed countries
would have to eliminate all SSG designations. That is, the SSG remedy
would sunset in seven years. Further, no SSG could lead to a remedial duty
in excess of the pre-Round bound tariff level.
The December Text also changed the provisions from the July Text on
developing country entitlement and usage of SSGs.267 Any developing
country could use an SSG, but the product lines to which they might apply
an SSG could not exceed 2.5% of their total tariff lines. The July Text set a
coverage threshold of 3%. Obviously, the higher the threshold, the greater
the risk to agricultural exporters that the farm products they ship might get
whacked with an SSG. Thus, the slight reduction was a step in the direction
of free trade. If a developing country already has designated more than that
threshold, then it would have to reduce the coverage to 2.5% of tariff lines
266. Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 126, with
July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 117.
267. Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 127, with
July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 118.
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as soon as any Doha Round accords took effect. For SVEs, that coverage
threshold would be higher—5% of tariff lines could be subject to an SSG.
The SVEs would have twelve years to reach this target.
VI. RESTRICTING AGRICULTURAL MARKET ACCESS
THROUGH S & D TREATMENT
A. Special Products
The invention of fine distinctions, such as between “Special” and
“Sensitive” merchandise, is one reason why the world of international trade
law sometimes is a strange one, at least to everyday commercial market
participants. The designation of an agricultural good as a “Special Product”
is another form of S & D treatment for poor countries, but another restric-
tion on market access. For much of the Doha Round, developing countries,
led by China and India, had insisted on the right to identify some of the
farm goods they produce as Special and thereby exempt them—partially, or
even entirely—from any tariff cut under the tiered tariff formula. This right
would not be conferred on developed countries. And, it was in addition to
the right of all WTO Members, whether developing or developed, to desig-
nate Sensitive Products.
The December 2008 Text largely replicated the proposed rules on Spe-
cial Products contained in the July Text. Thus, the new Text dealt with four
key issues:
(1) What criteria should govern the designation of a good as
Special?
(2) How many goods could receive the Special Product
designation?
(3) How many Special Products could be exempt from any tariff
cut as so-called Super Special Products?
(4) What should the average tariff cut on Special Products be?
The proposed rules endeavored to balance a free trade outcome in
which Special Product designations would be tightly restricted; none would
be shielded entirely from tariff cuts, and average cuts would be steep; and a
protectionist result in which developing countries would have plenty of pol-
icy space in these areas.
On the first issue, the December 2008 Text reaffirmed the right of
developing countries to self-designate a good as Special.268 These countries
would have to apply three criteria: food security, livelihood security, and
rural development. In other words, the designation could not be for the pur-
pose of protecting a politically favored domestic farm sector but rather had
to advance some fundamental purpose. Annex F to the Text contained spe-
cific indicators under each of these three criteria.
268. Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 129, An-
nex F, with July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 120, Annex F.
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On the second issue, the December 2008 Text altered the key figure
from what the July Text stated. The July Text said the minimum and maxi-
mum entitlement for Special Product designations would be between 10%
and 18% of all agricultural tariff lines, respectively. The December Text set
the entitlement at 12%. Without doubt, that number was too low for China,
India, the Philippines, and other members of the Group of 33 (G-33) devel-
oping countries.269 They continued to press for the right to designate at least
20% of their farm tariff lines as Special.270 However, the April 2011 Agri-
culture Document indicated no consensus existed on these key numbers.271
On the third issue, the December 2008 Text embodied the same two-
tier system for Special Products, but again altered the key figures. Super
Special Products would be entitled to immunity from tariff cuts. But, no
more than 5% of agricultural tariff lines could fall into this tier. The July
Text had specified 6%. Hence, the new Text was a small step toward trade
liberalization. Yet, again, the April 2011 Agriculture Document showed no
agreement on these important figures.272
As to the fourth issue, the December Text called for an overall average
tariff cut on Special Products of 11%. The July Text identified a range of
10–14%; thus the new Text chose the more trade-liberalizing end of that
range.273 However, on the 11% target, and indeed on the limitation of Spe-
cial Product designations to 12% of agricultural tariff lines and Super Spe-
cial Products to 5% of the lines, many poor countries objected. The
December Text, with remarkable candor, noted that they disagreed with
these figures, and a resolution suitable to them would depend on outcomes
of other agricultural trade issues.
Finally, the December Text retained essentially the same S & D treat-
ment for RAMs and SVEs that the July Text had set out.274 RAMs would
have the ability to identify up to 13% of their agricultural tariff lines as
Special Products (whereas the July Text had specified one-tenth more than
developing countries). The new Text also said RAMs would be obliged to
reach an overall average tariff cut on Special Products of 10%. SVEs would
269. The G-33 actually has 46 WTO Members in it: Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize,
Benin, Botswana, Bolivia, China, Congo, Coˆte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El
Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, Ko-
rea, Madagascar, Mongolia, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Peru,
Philippines, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Senegal, Sri
Lanka, Suriname, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Uganda, Venezuela, Zambia, and
Zimbabwe.
270. See Hopes High that Doha Round to Move Anew, BUS. MIRROR (Dec. 7, 2008), available
at http://businessmirror.com.ph.
271. See April 2011 Agriculture Document, supra note 90, ¶¶ 26–28.
272. See id.
273. See December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 129; July 2008
Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 120.
274. Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶¶ 130–31,
with July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶¶ 121–22.
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have the option of following the same rules on Special Products as for de-
veloping countries, along with moderated reductions under the tiered tariff
formula cuts. Alternatively, they could eschew application of the tiered
tariff formula to Special Products and reach an overall average tariff cut of
24% on as many tariff lines as they sought to designate as Special.
B. SSMs
Disputes over the Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM) had been the
proximate cause of the collapse of the July 2008 Ministerial meeting at the
WTO. The basic idea of an SSM was to allow a developing country to raise
tariffs on agricultural imports, on a temporary basis, to protect its vulnera-
ble domestic farmers producing a like product from a sudden, disruptive
surge of those imports. That surge would occur, if at all, because of lower
tariffs the developing country was obliged to maintain as a result of a Doha
Round agreement. This idea, simple as it sounded, proved notoriously
contentious.
America was deeply suspicious of the SSM, fearing its use by the likes
of Brazil, China, and India would erode any market access gains the United
States had won through general formulaic tariff cuts.275 Islam Siddiqui, the
Chief American Agriculture Negotiator for the Obama Administration, out-
lined the basic differences in October 2010 at which point serious differ-
ences on the issue continued:
On the one hand, you have countries like China that continue to
want a “simple and easy to use” SSM that would allow China to
walk back on its previously bound tariff commitments and raise
its duties on soybeans, pork, processed products, and other goods
through the use of a newly created SSM. Our concerns, shared by
other developed- and developing-country agricultural exporters,
are that such an “easy-to-use” SSM—one without reasonable cri-
teria defining its use—would be “easy to abuse.”276
In his April 2011 Agriculture Document, Chairman Walker recounted
that in October 2010, he:
advised the Negotiating Group . . . that the stage of useful analyti-
cal discussion [on topics such as price trigger criteria, price and
volume cross-checks, seasonality, flexibilities for SVEs, and pro-
ration] appeared to have been exhausted. What was needed be-
yond that was “problem solving” engagement among Members to
design a [special safeguard] mechanism capable of being used to
address cases of disruptive import surges while not disrupting de-
mand-induced trade.277
275. See Daniel Pruzin, Latest Round of WTO Farm Talks Reveals Mixed Progress on SSM,
Special Products, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 47, at 1602 (Nov. 26, 2009).
276. Pruzin, supra note 121, at 1542.
277. See April 2011 Agriculture Document, ¶ 35; see also id. ¶¶ 29–30.
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The need for “problem solving” persisted, with “no compromise op-
tions” even being offered for consideration following his admonition.278
The United States’ concern was not without cause. China (in 2010)
became the top destination for American agricultural exports (generating
$17.5 billion in export sales out of total American farm exports of $115.8
billion), importing 58% of American soybean exports (the single largest
product) and 20% of both U.S. cotton and vegetable oil.279 The United
States wanted to secure, and expand, this robust market.280 Notably, every
$1 billion in agricultural exports supports 8,000 jobs in the United States.281
Hence, China’s purchases accounted for about 140,000 jobs.
Manifestly, the United States was not alone in its concern. Even some
developing countries, with major exporting interests such as Costa Rica,
Malaysia, and Thailand, did not like the idea of an SSM. But, Brazil, China,
and India regarded inclusion of an SSM as a non-negotiable matter. Thus,
negotiations during fall 2008 on the issue produced no breakthrough. Not
surprisingly, the December 2008 Text was a verbatim repetition of the July
2008 Text (i.e., the same proposed rules that led to the Ministerial failure
reappeared).
About 100 developing countries, led by China and India, continued to
demand an SSM remedy they could use with reasonable ease so as to pro-
tect the livelihood of subsistence farmers—upwards of 700 million of them
in China and 600 million in India.282 China and India were concerned not
only about surges of agricultural products from developed (and even some
developing) countries but also with surges of farm goods subsidized by the
United States and EU. Developed countries led by the United States re-
jected that position as an opportunity to scupper all market access gains
won through other rules. They also saw the SSM as a device to impede
normal trade growth by mischaracterizing such growth as a surge. In other
words, the two sides had entirely different views of what the SSM was all
about. Most developing countries saw it as an operationally simple and ef-
fective device to mitigate a sudden surge in imports in a timely fashion, not
278. See id. ¶ 36.
279. Vilsack Says China Top Market for U.S. Agriculture Exports in 2010, 28 Int’l Trade Rep.
(BNA) No. 9, at 352, 352 (Mar. 3, 2011) [hereinafter Vilsack Says].
280. See id. Canada is the second largest market for American agricultural exports. In 2000,
the year before China joined the WTO, it accounted for 19% of the total U.S. soybean export
market. Id. See also Liz White, 2011 Crop Stocks Still Tight as Prices Climb, Affects ‘12 Farm
Bill, Agriculture Leaders Say, 28 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 9, at 351, 351 (Mar. 3, 2011)
(containing some of the above-referenced figures).
281. Vilsack Says, supra note 279, at 352.
282. See WTO May Call Meeting on Doha Pact, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Dec. 8, 2008, http://
www.truthabouttrade.org/2008/12/10/wto-may-call-meeting-on-doha-pact/; Arun S., Differences
in Revised WTO Texts Will Lead to Doha Round Failure, FIN. EXPRESS, Dec. 8, 2008, http://www.
financialexpress.com/news/differences-in-revised-wto-texts-will-lead-to-doha-round-failure/
395483/#.
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as an impediment to market access.283 Developed countries viewed the
SSM as a burden on, and potentially a closure of, market access.
Helpfully, Chairman Falconer issued a three-page document—Revised
Draft Modalities for Agriculture Special Safeguard Mechanism—that sug-
gested elements of convergence. First, the SSM would be a remedy availa-
ble only to developing countries.284 That remedy would be a tariff
calculated on the basis of the post-Doha Round bound MFN rate (even if
the applied rate were below the bound rate). Thus, there was a kind of
symmetry proposed: just as Sensitive Product designations would be availa-
ble to all WTO Members, but Special Product designations only to develop-
ing countries, the SSG would be available to all Members, but the SSM
only to developing countries. The July 2008 Text removed an important
limitation from the May 2008 Text concerning the scope of SSMs when
invoked by a developing country.285
Unlike an SSG, however, an SSM could be used on any product—
there would be no a priori product limitations. Also unlike the SSG, an
SSM would be invoked on the basis of either a price or volume trigger. So
as to avoid multiple layers of remedial trade measures, a developing coun-
try could not invoke an SSM if it had an SSG, or a general safeguard under
GATT Article XIX and the Agreement on Safeguards, in place on the same
product.286 Similarly, the same product could not be subject simultaneously
to a price and volume based SSM. In brief, “one remedy at a time” would
be the rule.
Would SVEs be included in the grouping of developing countries? The
December 2008 Text did not resolve the question. Following the pattern of
a metastasizing of S & D treatment into ever-finer gradations of Members,
in February 2009, the G-33 developing countries called for extra flexibility
for SVEs. Because of their status, surely it ought to be easier for SVEs to
invoke an SSM more easily, and with greater protective effect, than for a
normal developing country.287 Thus, the G-33 proposal called for lower
price and volume triggers, and perhaps also a stronger remedy, under the
SSM. That proposal seemed likely to meet with resistance from the United
States or other developed countries.
283. See Daniel Pruzin & Gary G. Yerkey, U.S. Sought to Water Down Proposal for “Stock-
Taking” Meeting on Doha, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 48, at 1673, 1674 (Dec. 3, 2009).
284. See December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 132; July 2008
Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 123.
285. Compare Committee on Agriculture, Special Session, Revised Draft Modalities for Agri-
culture, ¶ 121, TN/AG/W/4/Rev.2 (May 19, 2008) (last sentence), with July 2008 Draft Agricul-
ture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 123.
286. This Agreement is reprinted in a variety of sources, including BHALA, supra note 1,
Supp., Document 28, at 479–88.
287. See Fratini Vergano, The EC Prepares Countervailing Measures Against Exports
of Biodiesel from the US, TRADE PERSP. (Feb. 27, 2009), http://www.fratinivergano.eu/Trade
Perspectives/Issue 4_27_02_09.html.
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Second, the July 2008 Text restricted the use of an SSM to no more
than between three and eight products in any twelve-month period. The July
Text said the SSM, in principle, could be invoked on all tariff lines. Mani-
festly, that statement vastly expanded the scope of the remedy, though the
twelve-month limit remained in the new Text (and the same six-month limit
for seasonal products). No developing country could apply an SSM consec-
utively to the same imported farm good for more than two periods.
As for the volume-based trigger, the essential idea would be the
greater the import volume surge over a defined threshold, the more severe
the protective remedy allowed, with the range being additional tariffs
(above the normal MFN rate) of 25–50%. However, a surge must be distin-
guished from a normal increase in trade volume. Consequently, the Decem-
ber 2008 Text set three tiers of trigger surges and correlative remedies.
Table VII summarizes them.288
Table VII: Volume-Based Trigger for SSM Remedy in December
2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text
Tier Import Volume— SSM Remedy—
Actual Imports in Any Maximum Permissible
Year Measured Against Additional Duty
Base Imports (on top of Applied Rate)
(rolling average of
imports in preceding
three-year period)
Lowest Actual import volume 25% of the current bound
exceeds 110%, but not MFN tariff, or twenty-five
115%, of Base Imports percentage points,
whichever is higher
Middle Actual import volume 40% of the current bound
exceeds 115%, but not MFN tariff, or forty
135%, of Base Imports percentage points,
whichever is higher
Highest Actual import volume 50% of the current bound
exceeds 135% of Base MFN tariff, or fifty
Imports percentage points,
whichever is higher
The import volume triggers supposedly synthesized calls by the G-33,
which proposed allowing an SSM when imports are as little as 5% over the
288. Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶¶ 133, 138,
141, with July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶¶ 124, 129, 132. In
checking whether a volume trigger was met, a developing country could count imports under an
obligatory TRQ increase, unless the volume increase under that TRQ was attributable solely to a
scheduled access opportunity for a Sensitive Product. But, no SSM remedy could be imposed on
imports within that increase. In other words, an importing country could not take away the en-
hanced market access from a scheduled TRQ expansion by slapping an SSM on the farm products
imported under the higher in-quota threshold. See December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities
Text, supra note 74, ¶ 134.
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average of the preceding three years, and MERCOSUR, which sought to
limit the remedy to a maximum additional duty of between 20% and 30%.
As Table VII indicates, import volume would be calculated from data
in the relevant preceding three-year period. (The technical details of how to
calculate this base period, as well as that for the price trigger SSM, were not
spelled out in the December 2008 Draft and were the subject of debate.)289
The average during that period would be the Base Level against which to
measure current imports during any year. If current imports exceeded the
Base Level trigger, then the prescribed remedy could be applied. A de
minimis exception existed: if a volume trigger is satisfied but the absolute
level of imports is “manifestly negligible” relative to domestic production
and consumption, then a developing country would not be permitted to take
action.290 There was no numerical definition of “manifestly negligible”;
hence the exception remained ambiguous.
The price trigger SSM would be fairly straightforward. There would
have to be a 15% drop in the actual import price of a shipment of the farm
product in question before a developing country could apply an SSM.291
That import price would be judged against a benchmark—namely, the trig-
ger price. The trigger price would be the monthly average CIF (cost, insur-
ance, and freight) import price during the most recent three-year period.
Thus, if the import price of the farm product in question fell below 85% of
the average monthly price in the preceding three years, then the price-trig-
ger SSM could be invoked. The comparison of actual import prices against
the benchmark would be made, and any price-trigger SSM applied, on a
shipment-by-shipment basis. As for the remedy with a price-based SSM, it
would be an additional duty not to exceed 85% of the difference between
the import price of the shipment concerned and the trigger price.292
All price data would be converted (if necessary) into the domestic cur-
rency of the importing developing country. If that currency had depreciated
by 10% or more during the previous year relative to the international cur-
rency or currencies against which it is normally measured, then the actual
import price would be computed and converted using an average exchange
rate of the currency vis-a`-vis the international currency or currencies. This
proviso would help ensure a large depreciation, which would exacerbate the
gap between actual and target prices, and would not be the cause for apply-
289. See Pruzin, supra note 275, at 1602.
290. Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 133(d),
with July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 124(d).
291. Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶¶ 135–36,
138, 141, with July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶¶ 126–27, 129, 132.
292. An SSM remedy, whether price- or volume-based, would not apply to shipments of the
product in question that had been contracted for, and were en route, before the effective date of the
remedy. In other words, the SSM would not apply retrospectively. See December 2008 Draft
Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 139; July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text,
supra note 128, ¶ 130.
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ing an SSM. Moreover, a developing country would not normally be al-
lowed to apply a price-triggered SSM if the volume of imports in question
in the current year was “manifestly declining” or was at a “manifestly negli-
gible level incapable of undermining the domestic price level.”293 A cross-
check mechanism existed: a developing country could not invoke a price-
triggered SSM if prices fell but import volumes did not rise.
The volume-based SSM remedy would be constrained in duration. No
volume-triggered SSM could be maintained for longer than twelve
months.294 For a seasonal agricultural product, the maximum period would
be the longer of (1) six months and (2) the period of seasonality. No farm
product could be subject to a volume-based trigger consecutively for more
than two periods. If a developing country used the remedy for two consecu-
tive periods, then it would be obliged to respect a mandatory holiday—
namely, not resort to the remedy again on the same product until another
two periods had elapsed. Oddly, perhaps, this limitation did not apply ex-
pressly to the price-based SSM remedy; to adapt the calculation for trigger-
ing the safeguard so that it takes into account the possibility that imports in
an earlier period, when a safeguard was being used, might be lower than the
general trend and therefore might exaggerate an import surge in a subse-
quent year, triggering the use of the safeguard again.
A related problem, known as “pro-ration,” bedeviled the negotia-
tors.295 If an SSM remedy is applied, then it obviously will dampen im-
ports. That decline could make it easier to impose an SSM on the same
product in the future. Why? Because measuring volume from the most re-
cent three-year period as a base would show a low level of import volume
on account of the SSM. In turn, it would be easier to find a surge, owing to
that lower base. Thus, negotiators needed to find a way to calculate an SSM
volume trigger that would account for the possibility that during an earlier
period, when an SSM was in place, imports were lower than the general
trend, and thus an import surge in a subsequent year would be exaggerated.
Failure to do so would mean the volume trigger could be reached errone-
ously, as it were.
Could an SSM remedy lead to a tariff imposed on the farm product in
question in excess of the bound MFN tariff rate as set before the Doha
Round? The question was one of the most controversial topics debated
among WTO Members in 2008, pitting China and India on one side and the
United States on the other side. The general answer would be “no,” said the
December 2008 Text, like its predecessor. That is, no SSM remedy, either
volume- or price-based, could lead to a duty rate that exceeded the pre-
293. Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 137, with
July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 128.
294. Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 140, with
July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 131.
295. See Pruzin, supra note 275, at 1602.
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Round bound tariff level.296 The rate a developing country had before the
Round would be the upper boundary of the SSM remedy.
However, there would be three exceptions:
(1) Least developed countries could breach their pre-Doha Round
bound rate, but not by more than 40 ad valorem percentage
points, or 40% of their bound rate, whichever proved
higher.297
(2) On up to 10–15% of their tariff lines, SVEs, along with Bo-
livia, Congo, Coˆte d’Ivoire, and Nigeria (and possibly other
Members), could exceed their pre-Doha bound rates by up to
20 ad valorem percentage points, or 20% of their bound rate,
whichever is higher.298
(3) Some developing countries, other than SVEs, would be able
to apply a maximum SSM remedy above the pre-Round level
on between 2–6% of their tariff lines.299 They could not ex-
ceed the higher of 15 ad valorem percentage points above
that level, or 15%, of the bound rate.
In sum, the general constraint would ensure that a post-Round MFN
tariff binding, plus an SSM remedy, would not put affected exporting coun-
tries worse off than they had been before the Doha Round. But, the S & D
treatment afforded to least developed countries, SVEs, and certain develop-
ing countries meant exporters of targeted farm goods indeed could be worse
off than before.
As for the document from Chairman Falconer on Revised Draft SSM
Modalities, it tried to bridge the gap between the likes of China and India,
on one side, and the United States, on the other side. This document offered
rules, some as alternatives, some as complements, to the December 2008
Text provisions on SSM.
(1) A so-called double volume-based SSM trigger could lead to a
remedy above the bound rate. First, if the import surge ex-
ceeded 120%, but was less than 140%, of the base import
level (calculated as an average of imports in the three preced-
ing years), then the maximum additional duty could not ex-
ceed the higher of one third of the bound tariff, or 8
percentage points. Second, if the surge were greater than
140% of the bound level, then the SSM remedy could lead to
an additional duty not in excess of the higher of one-half the
bound rate, or 12 percentage points. In brief, the greater the
296. Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 142, with
July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 133.
297. Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 143, with
July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 134.
298. Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 144, with
July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 135.
299. Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 145, with
July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 136.
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surge, the greater the permissible remedial duty in excess of
the pre-Round bound rate.
(2) Absent exceptional circumstances (namely, an imminently
foreseeable price decline based on reliable price data), a vol-
ume-based SSM could not be invoked unless domestic prices
of the protected product were falling (and then only subject to
review, if requested, by a standing panel of experts). In other
words, there was a cross-check mechanism on the volume-
based SSM: a developing country could not invoke a volume-
triggered SSM if import volumes rose but prices did not
decline.
(3) The volume-based SSM could be applied for a maximum of
four to eight months, and not re-applied until a further
equivalent number of months had elapsed. There would be an
overall cap on applying the volume-based SSM—it could not
be used against more than 2.5% of tariff lines in any twelve-
month period.
(4) On seasonable perishable products, an SSM could be paused,
so that it could apply for a few months in one twelve-month
period, and then a few months in the next twelve-month pe-
riod. But, it could not spill over into a third twelve-month
period. The months in which the remedy would be applied
would be the peak periods in which domestic producers in the
importing country faced the greatest amount of competition
from abroad.
(5) Least developed countries and SVEs would have greater flex-
ibility than regular developing countries on the aforemen-
tioned points, as determined by subsequent negotiations.
Whether any of these suggestions would bridge the gap was unclear.
Yet two points were obvious. First, the integrity of the Uruguay Round
tariff bindings would be seriously compromised by exceptions to the gen-
eral constraint and the double-volume based trigger. Second, the entire area
of SSMs was littered with mind-numbing technical hoops through which a
developing country would have to jump before invoking the remedy. The
first point entailed a clear deviation from free trade principles. The second
point manifests a deviation from clarity itself.
The Chief Spokesman for the WTO, Keith Rockwell, later tried to put
a brave face on the SSM conflict:
“If the question is: do we need something in place to protect poor
farmers? Then the answer is yes, by consensus. If the question is:
do we want to ensure that a tariff mechanism is not abused and
that normal trade flow is not disrupted? Then the answer is also
yes, by consensus.” This reduces the debate to numbers, such as
thresholds, duration periods, and flexibilities. While admittedly
complicated, these provide a more concrete negotiation currency
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than plain rhetoric. “If you look at it this way, the likelihood of
reaching an agreement increases,” Mr. Rockwell says.300
The skeptical response about that likelihood is “not necessarily.” The
proposition in the passage is that there is a consensus among WTO Mem-
bers on a SSM to protect poor farmers that, on the one hand, is a substan-
tively useful remedy but, on the other hand, is subject to strict disciplines so
that the remedy is not abused for protectionist purposes. That proposition is
milk toast (i.e., it is so bland that nearly any Member can agree to it). It is
akin to the statement often heard from Members and their political leaders
that they want free trade, but it must be fair trade, too. After all, if the level
of generality of a proposition is sufficiently high, then of course consensus
can be reached.
That there was indeed no consensus was apparent from a January 2010
communication circulated by the G-33 developing countries to the Mem-
bers.301 They belittled the argument of the United States and certain other
Members that the SSM would disrupt normal trade flows, observing that the
concept of “normal trade” had never been defined in GATT-WTO history.
No less significantly, the G-33 all but called the United States and devel-
oped countries “hypocrites.” The G-33 pointed out that with respect to the
Uruguay Round SSG, 2,433 safeguard measures were notified to the WTO
between 1995 and 2008. Which Members accounted for most of them? The
answer was developed countries—they invoked 78% of the measures, sug-
gesting that the developed country argument that developing countries
would be “trigger happy” on the SSM was poppycock. Lest there be any
doubt, the SSM was riddled with restrictions that made it difficult to in-
voke, especially strict trigger volumes and prices, restrictions on exceeding
bound tariff rates, pro-ration rules, and cross-check mechanisms. Thus, the
G-33 intoned:
It is remarkable that an instrument meant to address the develop-
ment concerns of most developing country members is sought to
be burdened with conditions far more restrictive than those on the
SSG, which is mainly being used by developed countries.302
Not surprisingly and in diametric contrast to the American position,
the G-33 demanded amendment or removal of the limitations on the pro-
posed SSM that would render it a remedy nearly impossible to invoke. For
instance, in April 2011, one G-33 country, the Philippines, circulated a pro-
posal that would provide extra S & D treatment for countries that have a
low average bound tariff rate, which the Philippines defined at 40% or be-
300. See Sudeep Doshi, Leading the Way to a Trade Deal, FAR E. ECON. REV., Sept. 14, 2009,
www.feer.com (quoting Mr. Rockwell).
301. See Daniel Pruzin, G-33 Defends SSM in Agriculture, Stresses Need to Simplify Mecha-
nism, 27 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 5, at 153 (Feb. 4, 2010).
302. Id.
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low.303 Such countries, it argued, should be allowed to invoke the SSM, and
thereby raise tariffs as a safeguard under either a volume or price trigger,
more easily than other countries. SVEs, which also sought additional flexi-
bility on the SSM, supported the idea. Predictably, agriculture exporting
countries opposed it.
Evidently, the devil truly is in the details of turning a general proposi-
tion into a legal and operational reality. The numbers, thresholds, duration
periods, and flexibilities are all-important in determining whether an SSM
is substantively useful to help poor farmers or whether it is susceptible to
misuse by favored domestic agricultural interests in poor countries. Insofar
as the Doha Round supposedly is about development—that middle “D” in
the “DDA” acronym—the key SSM numbers should favor poor countries.
That is, while endeavoring to steer a middle course, the Members should
not hesitate to reach a consensus around numbers that might, on occasion,
err in favor of developing country interests. That means, in the end, if a
choice must be made, then helping poor farmers should take precedence
over avoiding disruption to normal trade flows. It is precisely this choice on
which there was no consensus.
C. Tropical Products and Preference Erosion
The problem of preference erosion in respect of agricultural products
is conceptually no different from that of industrial products. The basic issue
is the decline in the margin of preference—the difference between MFN
duty rates and the preferential duty rate (which typically is zero)—as MFN
rates fall through the implementation of successive multilateral trade round
cuts. Preference granting countries, almost exclusively rich nations such as
the United States and EU, are obliged to implement the cuts. Preference
beneficiary countries invariably are a select group of poor countries (se-
lected, of course, by the grantors according to criteria they set). The benefi-
ciaries argue for delayed implementation of those cuts. That is because they
fear export competition from like or substitutable products originating in
third countries, both rich and poor, in the markets of the preference grant-
ors. Why not urge the beneficiaries and phase in agricultural tariff cuts,
especially on tropical products, which are of keen export interest to them,
over an extended period of time? Because, reply third countries, every extra
day of implementation beyond the normal period is a day their products do
not benefit from agreed-upon tariff cuts.
In brief, the debate about preference erosion pits (inter alia) some poor
countries against others in a zero-sum game. One side seeks to string out
the maximum margin of preference for as long as possible. The other side
303. See Farm Talks’ Chair Prepares ‘Contribution’, Next Steps to Be Discussed After 29
April, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Apr. 15, 2011), http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news11_e/agng_
15apr11_e.htm [hereinafter Farm Talks’ Chair].
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wants a playing field leveled by MFN rates as quickly as possible. The
game typically involves tropical products. That is because they are the ar-
chetypical kind of agricultural commodity eligible for a preference, given
that the grantors tend to be former colonial powers, and the beneficiaries
(and, ironically, several third countries, too) are their poor former colonies.
Ironically, given that the middle “D” in the DDA is for development, this
zero-sum game was endemic in the Round since its November 2001 launch.
That is because the Agenda calls both for the fullest liberalization of trade
on tropical products, meaning cuts in tariffs on them above and beyond the
reductions under the general tariff-cutting formula for other agricultural
goods. Yet, the Agenda also asks that erosion of long-standing tariff prefer-
ences be addressed.
Not surprisingly, the December 2008 Text failed to resolve the zero-
sum game, a failure intimated in the April 2011 Agriculture Document,
despite “significant developments” in December 2009 in respect of prefer-
ence erosion and a settlement to the infamous Bananas War.304 On tropical
products and preference erosion, the December 2008 Text was the verbatim
equivalent of the July 2008 Text.305 Tariffs on tropical products currently
above 25% ad valorem would be cut by 85%. Tariffs at or below the 25%
threshold would be put to zero. As on other farm issues, the identical nature
of the Texts did not intimate consensus.
The first problem was to agree to the list of products that would count
as “tropical” and, therefore, be subject to tariff cuts that would (depending
on the steepness of the reduction) erode a preference. Negotiations focused
on a list of approximately forty-two products. This problem appeared re-
solved via an agreement to defer to the African, Caribbean, and Pacific
(ACP) interest to preserve preferential access to the EU market on bananas,
pineapples, rum, and sugar by excluding these products from the list.306
But, that resolution was not broad, deep, or conclusive.
304. See April 2011 Agriculture Document, supra note 90, ¶¶ 38–39, 43.
305. Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶¶ 147–50,
Annexes G–H, with July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶¶ 138–41,
Annexes G–H.
Annex G to the July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text expanded the list of tropical
products to include a wide array of fruit and vegetable items, coffee and tea, cigarettes and cigars,
and rum. It may be observed that the inclusion for any trade liberalization benefits of tobacco and
tobacco-related products, as tropical products, is ludicrous, in light of their well-known health
risks.
306. See Progress on EU-Latin American Banana Deal Made Before Collapse of Doha Round
Talks, 25 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 32, at 1160, 1160–61 (Aug. 7, 2008). In respect to prefer-
ence erosion, pineapples appear not to have been a source of great controversy between ACP and
Latin American exporters of the fruit, because the latter group enjoys preferential access to the EU
market through the EU Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). See id. Other such products
include arrowroot, cut flowers, and tobacco. See Jonathan Lynn, Update 1—EU Says Banana
Deal Near, Some Producers Unhappy, REUTERS, Dec. 2, 2009, available at http://af.reuters.com/
article/commoditiesNews/idAFGEE5B11Z620091202?sp=true.
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As negotiations dragged on, both before and after December 2008, it
became clear a significant and controversial link existed between settlement
of the Bananas War, on the one hand, and the problem of tropical products
and preference erosion, on the other hand. (This settlement is discussed in
section X below.) Notably, under the terms of the 15 December 2009 deal
that ended the War, the signatories agreed to significant reductions in tariffs
on certain tropical products in exchange for longer time periods for the EU
to implement cuts on products of key export interest to ACP countries.307
That is, part of the Bananas War settlement was a deal on tropical products
and preference erosion, which would (it was hoped) enter into a final Doha
Round agreement on agriculture. Accordingly, the parties to this deal iden-
tified a list of goods that would qualify as “tropical products.” And, the EU
agreed to trim the margin of preference enjoyed by ACP producer-exporters
on such tropical products, and likewise for the United States in respect of its
preference schemes, in exchange for an extended phase out of tariffs on
those products via the Round.
The “preference erosion list,” which was drafted by the EU and agreed
to by ACP and Latin American countries, contained sixty-two tropical
lines.308 This list was not made public. Reportedly, the lines excluded ba-
nanas; included bona fide tropical products such as pineapples, palm oil,
sugar, and rice; and included some products that arguably are not tropical
ones—citrus fruits, fresh cut flowers, fresh fruit (with some exceptions),
fresh or chilled vegetables (with some exceptions), meats (such as beef),
orange (and certain other fruit) juice, peas, roasted coffee, rum, table
grapes, tobacco, and tomatoes.
Additionally, the United States had a list of eighteen tariff lines cover-
ing tropical products, the tariffs on which would be subject to longer phase
out periods. The U.S. list included:309
– Avocados;
– Beverages, spirits, and vinegar;
– Cigars, cheroots, and cigarillos;
– Fresh or dried guavas, mangoes, and mangosteens;
– Fruits and nuts;
– Frozen orange juice;
– Ground-nut oil;
307. The signatories to the tropical products-preference erosion portion of the settlement were
the EU, ACP countries, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama,
and Peru. The U.S. was not a formal signatory. See Daniel Pruzin, EU, ACP Compromise on
Tropical Products, Gives U.S., EU 10 Years to Make Tariff Cuts, 27 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No.
1, at 7 (Jan. 7, 2010). Nevertheless, the U.S. was a contributor to the deal, and apparently agreed
to adhere to its terms.
308. See id.; Daniel Pruzin, India, Pakistan Issue Warning on Doha Tropical Products/Prefer-
ence Erosion Deal, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 51, at 1761 (Dec. 24, 2009) [hereinafter
Pruzin, India Pakistan].
309. See Pruzin, supra note 308, at 7.
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– Roots and tubers of arrowroot, salep, Jerusalem ar-
tichokes, and similar roots;
– Rum and tafia;
– Sauces;
– Three tariff lines for fresh cut flowers;
– Two tariff lines for cane sugar; and
– Two tariff lines for tobacco.
This U.S. list included many items covered under American preference
schemes such as the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and Cen-
tral American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA–DR). Thus, not surprisingly,
the United States agreed with ACP and Latin American countries on its list.
Ostensibly, the goods on any preference erosion list are there to help
preference beneficiaries, such as the ACP countries. As explained earlier,
because goods on the list are considered “tropical” and are the subject of a
preference, rapid tariff reduction under a Doha Round agreement would
erode the margin of preference enjoyed by the beneficiaries quickly. But, a
number of third countries—that is, poor countries that were not recipients
of preferences in respect of the tropical products at issue—claimed that the
real goal harbored by developed countries that grant preferences was to
shield their sensitive sectors from third-country competition. For example,
the presence of sugar on both the EU and U.S. lists suggested an interest in
protecting their own sugar producers from low-cost imports from non-pref-
erence receiving third countries.
Thus, just two days after the 15 December 2009 Bananas War settle-
ment, India and Pakistan jointly declared they might not accept the tropical
products terms that were part of that settlement. They were not even signa-
tories to the deal, which was among the EU, United States, ACP countries,
and Latin countries. That fact in itself meant the tropical products terms
could not automatically become part of a larger deal. India and Pakistan had
legitimate trade concerns at stake. They were among the prominent third-
country exporters of tropical products. Agricultural exports account (as of
2008) for 12% of total merchandise exports for India and 19% for Paki-
stan.310 In both countries, the growth trend has been upward: from $3.5 to
$21.4 billion between 1990 and 2008 in India and from $1.1 to $3.9 billion
between those same years in Pakistan. Manifestly, the larger the number of
items on a “tropical products” list and the longer the phase out of tariffs on
them by developed countries, the worse for India and Pakistan, and the
better for their preference-recipient competitors in the Third World.
Achieving consensus on a “tropical products” list was only the first
matter. A second problem was to agree on how to balance the basic tension
between preference beneficiary countries and third countries. The rules pro-
posed in the December 2008 Text, as in its predecessor, suggested that to
310. See Pruzin, India, Pakistan, supra note 309, at 1761.
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achieve the fullest possible liberalization of trade in tropical products, all
WTO Members would cut their bound MFN duty rates on these products
according to the tiered tariff formula. Further, they would apply the follow-
ing modality, which consisted of two options.
First, if the scheduled tariff on a tropical product is equal or below
25% ad valorem, then that tariff must be cut to zero. If the tariff is 25% or
more, then it must be cut by 85%.311 All developed countries would have
four years to phase in the cuts (through four equal, annual installments), and
they could not treat as a Sensitive Product any tropical good. Second, alter-
natively, if the scheduled tariff on a tropical product is equal or below 25%
ad valorem, then that tariff must be cut to zero. If a tropical product tariff is
equal to or above 10%, then it must be cut by 70%.  (A steeper cut would
apply if the tariff exceeded 75%.) All developing countries would phase in
the tariff cuts in a prescribed implementation period.
Interestingly, under the 15 December 2009 agreement, developing
countries also agreed to cut their tariffs on many tropical products.312 They
promised to do so by 80% on tropical product tariff lines that had an MFN
rate over 20%. For products attracting a duty of 20% or less, they said they
would cut that MFN rate to zero. The cuts would cover 65% of all tariff
lines on a list (which was not finalized) of tropical products.
A third problem in dealing with preference erosion was timing. How
fast or slow should developed countries phase in tariff reductions on tropi-
cal products that are the subject of a preference? Obviously, preference ben-
eficiaries favored the slowest possible implementation (to preserve their
margin of preference for as long as possible), and non-preference benefi-
ciaries favored the speediest (to get to a level playing field at an MFN rate
as quickly as possible). The terms of the 15 December 2009 Bananas War
settlement called for the EU and United States to cut their tariffs on prod-
ucts covered by one of their trade preference agreements over ten years,
with no cuts in the first two years of implementation—in effect, a twelve-
year phase out.313 The December 2008 Text, like its predecessor, created a
reverse age discrimination rule that had two options.
Under the first option, no tariff cuts would be imposed by any prefer-
ence-granting country on a product that has been the subject of a preference
(listed in Annex H to the Texts) for ten years.314 After a decade, tariff cuts
would be implemented across five years through equal annual installments.
311. Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶¶ 147–48,
with July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶¶ 138–39.
312. Daniel Pruzin, EU, Latin Nations Formally Sign Agreement on Bananas; First Tariff
Cuts Take Effect, 27 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 828 (June 3, 2010) [hereinafter Pruzin,
EU, Latin Nations]; Pruzin, supra note 308, at 7.
313. Pruzin, EU, Latin Nations, supra note 312, at 828.
314. Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶¶ 149–50,
with July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶¶ 140–41.
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In other words, the longer a poor country had relied on a preference, the
slower the phase out of that preference—a presumptively fair result that
would minimize adjustment costs from the long-standing detrimental
reliance.
Under option two, as an alternative, preference-grantors could impose
tariff cuts on a preferential product in equal annual installments in a period
that is two years longer than the implementation period for developing
countries under the tiered formula (i.e., over twelve years). But, these cuts
would apply only to a preferred product if its pre-Round bound MFN rate
exceeded 10%, the value of trade from the beneficiary was above a thresh-
old (U.S. $50,000 or 3% exports from that beneficiary to the grantor coun-
try), and there is an unconstrained, long-standing preference in the market
of the grantor country.
The 15 December 2009 deal provided the following compromise: a
ten-year phase out, with no cuts in the first two years, for most tropical
products.315 That is, for all sixty-two tropical product tariff lines, the EU
said it would phase in tariff reductions over ten years, with no cuts in the
first two years. The United States agreed to implement tariff cuts over eight
years, with the first two years free from any cuts on cane sugar, fresh cut
flowers, and ground-nut oil. It pledged to cut tariffs on cigars over five
years. For all other tropical products on the U.S. list, cuts would be phased
in over ten years, with none in the first two years.
Contrary to the December 2008 Text, the 15 December 2009 deal al-
lowed for the designation of tropical products as Sensitive. Under the deal,
if (1) a tropical product were designated as Sensitive and (2) imports of that
product from preference beneficiary countries accounted for more than 10%
of total domestic consumption in the importing country, then the importing
country would have to adjust its TRQ on the product.316 Specifically, the
importing country would have to cut the out-of-quota tariff rate of the TRQ,
and phase in the new in-quota quantity limits, over a seven-year period.
Supposedly, this complex rule would help ensure that the EU and United
States would not abuse the Sensitive Product designation for the protection-
ist purposes in respect of tropical products. Rather, they would liberalize,
albeit gradually, trade in that product. Yet, the very allowance to designate
an item as Sensitive surely was a step back from free trade. After all, the
December 2008 Text had prohibited designation of any tropical product as
Sensitive and called on developed countries to implement tariff cuts in four
years.
315. Pruzin, supra note 308, at 7.
316. Id.
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D. Settlement of the Bananas War: The General Agreement on Trade in
Bananas (GATB)
Linked to the problem of tropical products and preference erosion was
a difficulty that had plagued the world trading system since before the crea-
tion of the WTO (specifically, 1993) and had become the longest-running
dispute in WTO history. The EU, which is the largest importer of bananas
in the world and imports (as of 2011) over 70% of the fruit from Latin
America, battled several Latin American countries over bananas, many of
which market their fruit through prominent American companies like
Chiquita Brands and Dole.317 Following losses in eleven GATT and WTO
cases, including a November 2008 Appellate Body ruling in favor of the
United States and Ecuador that discriminatory EU tariffs giving preference
to ACP bananas (which are far more expensive than Latin bananas) contin-
ued to violate WTO rules, the EU promised to change its offending regime.
The EU pledged to implement a single-tariff (i.e., tariff-only) regime
by 1 January 2006 and grant at least the same level of market access to third
country exporters as to its preferred ACP trading partners.318 Indeed, with-
out such a pledge, third country producers (located mainly in Latin
America) had threatened in November 2001 to block the launch of the Doha
Round. While the EU did drop its quota and licensing system and shift to a
tariff-only system in 2006, it also maintained a duty-free quota of 775,000
tons for ACP producers. Thus, the regime generated one of the legal cases
against the EU, yielding another WTO judgment that is discriminatory.
Initially in the regime it commenced in 2006, the EU set the tariff at
C= 230 per metric ton. Latin American countries challenged that rate suc-
cessfully in two WTO arbitration proceedings as the C= 230/ton level failed
to maintain equivalent market access for their banana exports to the EU.
The EU responded by dropping the tariff to C= 176/ton but also set up an
annual duty-free quota of 775,000 metric tons for ACP exporters. Ecuador
(the world’s largest banana exporter) and the United States (headquarters of
two major banana distributors, Chiquita and Dole) prevailed against the EU
in WTO proceedings, obtaining rulings that the EU quota was illegal be-
cause it unfairly discriminated among WTO Members.319
317. Joe Kirwin, EU Parliament Backs Banana Trade Deal With Latin America to Reduce
Tariffs, 28 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 6, at 224, 225 (Feb. 10, 2011); Joshua Chaffin, End of
Banana Wars Brings Hope for Doha, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2009, at 8. As of June 2010, the EU
imported $4 billion worth of bananas. Len Bracken, U.S., EU Agree to Settle Dispute Over Latin
American Bananas, USTR Says, 27 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 23, at 856 (June 10, 2010).
318. See Raj Bhala, The Bananas War, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 839, 948–49 (2000) (detailing
the EU’s pledge); Alan Beattie, Expectations Low as Doha Talks Commence, FIN. TIMES, July 22,
2008, at 8; Daniel Pruzin, WTO’s Lamy Delivers Compromise Text Aimed at Resolving EU Ba-
nana Dispute, 25 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 29, at 1048 (July 17, 2008) (quoting an unnamed
Latin American official).
319. Those rulings also included a WTO Appellate Body compliance report, issued Nov. 26,
2008, which upheld two Panel decisions that the EU had failed to comply with previous adjudica-
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To avoid further adjudicatory proceedings, WTO Director-General
Pascal Lamy agreed to mediate a solution. His report, delivered on 12 July
2008, suggested a compromise whereby the EU would make an immediate
down payment to Latin American exporters of a large cut to its C= 176/ton
tariff and make further cuts across a defined transition period. Specifically,
the final tariff would be C= 114/ton, which the EU would reach over an
eight-year period starting on 1 January 2009 with an immediate cut on that
date of C= 28/ton.320 (The July 2008 Text called for the EU to reach the final
rate of C= 114/ton by the end of 2016.) Thus, there would be a tariff cut of
just over 35% (from C= 176/ton to C= 114/ton). In exchange, the Latin banana
exporting countries would drop all WTO litigation and rights of retaliation
against the EU and acquiesce to the EU giving ACP exporters duty-free
access.321
The Lamy compromise pleased no one—even though, ironically, a sin-
gle tariff-only regime of C= 176/ton was the deal struck years earlier to end
the Bananas War.322 The ACP countries—most of which were former Brit-
ish, French, or Portuguese colonies—feared for their historical preferences.
If a banana tariff cut through the Lamy compromise were too steep, then
their access to the EU market would be jeopardized. Likewise, if bananas
were not designated as Sensitive and subject to the July 2008 Text proposal
of an 85% tariff reduction, the new tariff would be C= 26.4/ ton—effectively
eroding the ACP margin of preference.
The ACP position was influential in the EU. It accorded with the com-
mercial interests of the two major banana producers in the EU, France and
Spain, which have considerable operations in the ACP. The EU insisted that
if it cuts its banana tariff via the compromise, then the compromise must
unambiguously permit it to exclude bananas (along with melons, rum, and
sugar) from the list of tropical products slated for Doha Round tariff reduc-
tions. That is, the EU should be allowed to declare bananas as a Sensitive
Product, so that it does not have two legal obligations to slash banana tar-
tory rulings, as its banana import regime continued to discriminate in favor of ACP bananas and
against Latin and other non-ACP supplying countries. Daniel Pruzin, Latin Countries Slam EU
Inaction on Banana Tariffs, Push 2008 Side Deal, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 5, at 155 (Jan.
29, 2009).
320. Id.
321. Daniel Pruzin, EU Official Optimistic on Banana Deal, But Latin Exporters See Key
Differences, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 15, at 484 (Apr. 9, 2009).
322. See Bhala, supra note 318, at 948–49 (detailing the deal that ended the Bananas War);
Jeremy Smith, EU, Latin America Look to WTO Talks for Banana Deal, REUTERS, Dec. 5, 2008,
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/12/05/us-eu-banana-analysis-idUSTRE4B4273
20081205 (describing displeasure with Lamy’s compromise).
Note that a few Latin banana exporting countries, namely, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador,
Guatemala, and Panama, were reported to have agreed with the EU to the deal. Pruzin, supra note
321, at 484. Of course, Colombia and Costa Rica were Banana Framework Agreement (BFA)
countries, and thus had cut a deal with the EU in the past.
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iffs. Further, the EU was adamant that any deal on bananas would have to
be contingent on an overall agreement in agriculture.
The EU position, shaped by the ACP, was the diametric opposite of
the Latin American stance. For Latin banana exporting countries, resolving
the Bananas War was a separate matter. There should be no deal in the
Round without its settlement. Latin American countries attacked the Lamy
compromise as “very much biased” in favor of the EU, which they said
already had agreed in negotiations to an immediate 20% cut in the C= 176/
ton figure.323 The implementation period, too, was a battlefront, with the
EU arguing for a transition period of fifteen years and the Latin American
exporting countries demanding four or five years. In brief, the Bananas War
heated up, and Ecuador—the largest banana exporter in the world—said
that without a settlement it found agreeable, it would not join a consensus to
conclude the agriculture modalities.324
Seeking a middle ground, the EU proposed in February 2009 that the
C= 114/ton end-tariff for non-ACP bananas apply even if there were no, or a
delayed, Doha Round deal.325 Negotiations proceeded through 2009, with
the EU on one side and five key Latin banana exporters on the other side—
Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Panama. Once all coun-
tries agreed on a bananas deal, then the EU would commence cuts for three
years. The EU would freeze further reductions for three years, if the Round
were not concluded, and then resume the cuts, regardless of the status of the
Round.
Accordingly, the new EU proposal would mean a cut from the initial
MFN tariff of C= 176/ton to C= 114/ton by 2019 (approximately an eight-year
period, and three years later than the July 2008 Text specified), with a re-
duction to C= 136/ton in the interim. As a down payment, the EU would
make an immediate cut of C= 28/ton (to C= 148/ton) from C= 176/ton (with
“immediate” meaning in October 2010).326 The C= 136/ton rate would apply
from 2011 to 2014, followed by gradual cuts. The final result of a C= 114/ton
tariff would be reached by the end of 2019 (instead of 2016, under the
Lamy compromise), if the Round were not concluded.327 Likewise, the EU
323. Pruzin, supra note 318, at 1048–49 (quoting an unnamed Latin American official).
324. Update 1—Ecuador Threatens Doha Deal Over Banana Dispute, REUTERS, Nov. 26,
2008, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/11/26/ecuador-banana-doha-idUSN26364
52920081126.
325. Joshua Chaffin, ‘Banana Wars’ Pact Between EU and Latin America Nears Fruition,
FIN. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2009, at 4; Pruzin, supra note 321, at 484.
326. Daniel Pruzin, EU, Latin Americans Conclude Banana Deal, but Haggling Remains over
Tropical Products, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 48, at 1662 (Dec. 3, 2009).
327. Note that following the Seventh WTO Ministerial Conference in Geneva in November-
December 2009, the precise details of the transition period were not entirely clear. By one ac-
count, following the cut in October 2010 to C= 148/ton, the EU would reduce the tariff in annual
installments to C= 132/ton in 2013. If no Doha Round agreement were reached by the end of 2013,
then the C= 132/ton rate would remain in effect until the Round was completed. Id.
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would cut tariffs on other tropical products, such as pineapples and sugar, at
least until the outcome of the Doha Round was clear.
As part of its proposal, the EU insisted on three conditions.328 First,
any settlement would obligate Latin American countries to drop their out-
standing legal challenges at the WTO and waive any rights of retaliation
they had based on their previous adjudicatory victories. (After their major
victory at the Appellate Body level in 1997, the United States and Ecuador
won the right to retaliate against the EU.329 The United States was author-
ized to impose $191 million of sanctions, which it did on goods from coffee
makers to handbags, though it lifted the sanctions in 2001. Ecuador was
authorized to impose $202 million in trade sanctions on EU imports, includ-
ing—for the first time in the annals of GATT-WTO dispute resolution—the
right to suspend intellectual property protection and wholesale distribution
rights for EU goods and services. Ecuador never imposed the sanctions.)
The EU did not want to come to a settlement in the Bananas War, only to
have that War reignited by another legal fight or suffer retaliation based on
a previous one. The EU wanted the “Peace Clause” to take effect as soon as
the settlement deal was signed by all relevant parties.330 However, some of
those parties—potential complainants—argued the Clause should not enter
into force until the EU registered the deal with the WTO. Until such regis-
tration—technically known as “certification,” whereby the WTO approves
in the tariff schedule of the EU and the new rates become legally bind-
ing331—the EU could renege on the deal.
Second, the EU would be permitted to continue to grant duty-free ac-
cess to ACP bananas. The EU had no interest in entirely abandoning its
former colonies. Moreover, these cuts would slash the margin of preference
historically enjoyed by ACP countries. To help those countries face adjust-
ment costs and restructure, the EU would grant them C= 190 million in de-
velopment aid. That figure was too low to mollify some ACP producers,
such as Cameroon. Caribbean countries queried how the EU would divide
the funds among ACP countries with divergent interests.332 After all, as the
Trade Minister of Trinidad poignantly noted, banana exports are critical to
Caribbean economies, and not exporting them would be “like not exporting
watches from Geneva.”333
Third, bananas would be treated as a normal agricultural good, not as a
tropical product. Consequently, bananas would not be subject to the faster,
deeper tariff cuts imposed on tropical products under the proposed July
328. Jonathan Lynn, Exclusive—Banana Deal Emerging—Trade Sources, REUTERS, Nov. 3,
2009, available at http://in.reuters.com/article/2009/11/02/idINL21012120091102.
329. Daniel Pruzin, EU, Latin, U.S. Officials Welcome Beginning of End to WTO Dispute on
Banana Imports, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 50, at 1733 (Dec. 17, 2009).
330. Lynn, supra note 306.
331. Pruzin, supra note 326, at 1662.
332. Lynn, supra note 306.
333. Id. (quoting Mariano Browne).
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2008 Doha Round agricultural text. If they were, then the problem of pref-
erence erosion would be exacerbated, against the interests of the ACP, be-
cause those cuts would be applied on top of the special transitional rules for
bananas.
This purported middle ground appeared to the ACP to be tilted in favor
of the EU and Latin America. In May 2009, the ACP asked the EU for
compensation of C= 500 million, along with any agreed-upon tariff-cutting
deal.334 No less than that level of compensation would be needed to cover
the drastic economic losses, and the attendant social dislocations and politi-
cal instability, which assuredly would occur immediately after the EU im-
plemented any deal. The ACP averred they would occur because, in a
liberalized trading regime for bananas, its fruit would lose yet more share of
the EU market to competition from Latin suppliers (i.e., Latin bananas
would flood the EU market, drowning out the ACP bananas). Initially, the
EU balked at the compensation figure, offering what the ACP regarded as a
paltry sum—C= 100 million—before boosting it to C= 190 million.
Happily, on 15 December 2009, the Bananas War finally ended with a
settlement along the above-delineated lines of the EU’s middle-ground pro-
posal of February 2009. The settlement consists of two key documents.
First, there is the “General Agreement on Trade in Bananas” (GATB),
formally signed on 31 May 2010 at the WTO, and contingent in part on
completion of the Doha Round. The signatories to GATB were the EU and
eleven Latin American countries—Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador
(which is the largest banana exporter in the world), Guatemala, Honduras,
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela.335 The EU Parliament
approved the settlement in February 2011.336 Second, on 8 June 2010, the
EU and United States signed a separate, linked deal, the “Agreement on
Trade in Bananas Between the United States of America and the European
Union.” The only material changes rendered by this Agreement and GATB
from the above-described parameters in the February 2009 EU proposal
were the exact transition dates and compensation figure:337
334. Darren Ennis & Bate Felix, African States Seek 500 Mln Euros in EU Banana Deal,
REUTERS, May 29, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/05/29/trade-eu-acp-ba-
nanas-idUSLT58973 220090529.
335. Bracken, supra note 317, at 856; Pruzin, supra note 329, at 1733.
336. Kirwin, supra note 317, at 224. The EU Parliament was granted veto power over trade
agreements under the Treaty of Lisbon, which was signed in December 2007 and entered into
force in December 2009, and following its approval of the EU-South Korea Free Trade Agree-
ment, the Bananas Settlement was its second use of that power. In approving the Settlement, the
Parliament asked the EU to boost aid for ACP banana producers, and for EU producers (which are
in the Canary Islands and the French territories of Guadeloupe and Martinique), as they cannot
compete with large Latin American producers. See id.
337. Pruzin, supra note 312, at 828; Pruzin, supra note 329, at 1733; Chaffin, supra note 317,
at 8; Darren Ennis, Update 1—EU Ends Banana War With Latin America—Diplomats, REUTERS,
Dec. 14, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/12/14/eu-bananas-deal-idUSLDE
5BD24K20091214.
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• The EU will cut its MFN tariff on bananas from Latin America
and any other non-ACP origin from C= 176/ton to C= 114/ton by 1
January 2017 (or, possibly, 2019). The overall cut in the tariff,
from C= 176/ton to C= 114/ton, is 35%.
• The EU will make an immediate, initial cut (i.e., a down pay-
ment) to C= 148/ton (as of 1 June 2010 retroactive to 15 Decem-
ber 2009 when the Agreement and GATB were initialed).
• After the first cut, the EU will drop its tariff to C= 143/ton on 1
June 2011; C= 136/ton on 1 January 2012; and C= 132/ton on 1
January 2013.
• As of 1 January 2013, if there is a Doha Round agreement on
agriculture, then the EU will continue to cut the tariff to C= 127/
ton in 2014, C= 122/ton in 2015, and C= 117/ton in 2016. Thus,
the final rate of C= 114/ton will apply on 1 January 2017.
• However, if there is no final deal on farm trade, then the EU
will freeze its tariff at C= 132/ton for two years—2014 and
2015—before re-commencing cuts in January 2016. Then, it
will reach the final rate of C= 114/ton in January 2019. In other
words, the final duty level will be achieved two years faster
under the scenario of a successful outcome to the Round, which
itself is an incentive for some Members to achieve that success.
• The EU agreed to boost the compensation figure to ACP coun-
tries to roughly C= 200 million.
Accordingly, the Latin countries agreed to all three of the EU’s afore-
mentioned conditions. First, there will be no more law suits, and an end to
all legal proceedings, as soon as the EU inscribes its new tariff commitment
into its legally-binding Schedule of Concessions. Second, the EU can con-
tinue its tariff-only preference for ACP bananas under the new Economic
Partnership Agreements the EU reached with ACP countries, which entered
into force in January 2008, and which are WTO compliant. Third, bananas
will be treated as a good subject to normal tariff reductions under any deal
(not accelerated duty elimination as a tropical good).
E. Least Developed Countries
As the poorest of the poor countries, least developed countries always
knew they could count on the most favorable derogations from any Doha
Round obligation. After all, they account for just one percent of world
trade.338 Thus, even under the most mercantilist of calculations by devel-
oped countries, a grace for the poorest hardly would be a sacrifice for the
richest. What the least developed countries did not know, nor had much
practical control over, was how generous those derogations might be. They
338. Pascal Lamy, Director Gen., World Trade Org., Address to the UN Conference on Least-
Development Countries (May 9, 2011), in Global Trading System Must Deliver More to the Least-
Developed—Lamy in Istanbul, WORLD TRADE ORG. (May 9, 2011), http://www.wto.org/english/
news_e/sppl_e/sppl191_e.htm.
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\9-1\UST102.txt unknown Seq: 124  1-OCT-12 14:33
128 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 9:1
had secured, at the December 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial Conference, a
Decision on Measures in Favor of Least Developed Countries. The Decem-
ber 2008 Text, like its July predecessor, essentially incorporated the text of
this Decision, with minor adjustments.
With these developments, the extent of generosity started to become
clear. Least developed countries would not have to undertake reductions in
bound MFN tariff rates on agricultural products.339 But, most of the rest of
the provisions for least developed countries were exhortative in nature.340
For instance, WTO Members reaffirmed their commitment to integrate
these countries into the world trading system and to ensure preferential
rules of origin would be simple and transparent.
The key substantive commitment from developed countries, and from
developing countries in a position to make the commitment, concerned duty
free, quota free (DFQF) treatment for exports originating in least developed
countries.341 The obvious generous rule would be to provide immediate,
lasting DFQF treatment on 100% of these exports immediately upon the
entry into force of any Doha Round accords. Indeed, Australia, New Zea-
land, Norway, and Switzerland all provide DFQF treatment to 100% of
their imports from least developed countries.342 As of 2009, the EU pro-
vides 100% coverage, except for arms and ammunition, under its “Every-
thing but Arms” (EBA) initiative.343 Thus, the EU eliminated tariff quotas
on rice and sugar imports from least developed countries.344
Shamefully, though, that level of generosity—towards the poorest of
the poor—is too much to ask of some rich countries, even though non-oil
exports from least developed countries account for only 0.7% of total im-
ports by developed countries.345 Several developed countries protect their
sensitive sectors from competition from least developed countries: Canada
excludes from DFQF treatment dairy products, eggs, and poultry and Japan
denies such treatment to fisheries products, leather goods, sugar, and rice.
339. Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 151, with
July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 142.
340. Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶¶ 152, 154,
with July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶¶ 143, 154.
341. Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 153, with
July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 145. If a developing country was
not in a position to provide DFQF treatment to least-developed country cotton exports, then it
would have “to look positively at possibilities for increased import opportunities” of the product.
December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 156; July 2008 Draft Agricul-
ture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 146.
342. Daniel Pruzin, Key WTO Members Discuss Elements for LDCs in Doha ‘Deliverables’
Package, 28 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 27, at 1112 (July 7, 2011).
343. Id.
344. Daniel Pruzin, WTO Lauds EU on Resisting Protectionism; Trading Partners Hit Out at
Some Barriers, 28 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 28, at 1173 (July 14, 2011). Also in 2009, the EU
adopted more flexible rules of origin under its Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) scheme
to widen the eligibility of products from poor countries. Id.
345. Pruzin, supra note 54, at 1229.
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As for the United States, it says “no” to (inter alia) cotton, dairy, leather,
sugar, and T & A merchandise.346 Consequently, for all least developed
countries, the United States gives DFQF access on just 82.4% of tariff lines
and, for such countries that participate in AGOA, 90% of tariff lines.347
Indeed, the United States maintains more DFQF exceptions on least devel-
oped country exports—covering 1,800 tariff lines—than any other rich
country in the world.348
Thus, the rule proposed for the Doha Round, in the December 2008
Draft NAMA Modalities Text, was to grant DFQF treatment on at least
97% of least developed country exports, by a date yet to be agreed. That is,
the target of 100% DFQF treatment remained, but Members unable to hit it
would have to provide such treatment for at least 97% of their imports from
least developed countries and try to achieve progressive compliance with
the 100% target.349
SVEs, in contrast to least developed countries, were unable to secure
any numerical target. Developed countries, and developing ones in a posi-
tion to do so, agreed only to provide “enhanced improvements in market
access” for products of export interest to SVEs.350 Unsurprisingly, rich
countries hunted for the 3% exemption for farm sectors they aimed to pro-
tect. A few major developing countries made some effort to help their least
developed brethren, which, on the one hand, was symbolically important,
but, on the other hand, substantively limited.351
First, India became the first developing country to offer DFQF treat-
ment to least developed country exports, doing so in 2008. India boasted it
grants DFQF access to 94% of all goods from least developed countries
(i.e., 94% of the products exported by least developed countries).352 Cov-
ered products of keen export interest to those countries included cane sugar,
cocoa, cotton, and ready-made garments (RMGs). India pledged that by
2013, it would give DFQF to 85% of all tariff lines.353 But, India’s scheme
was fully operational (as of April 2010) for only fourteen least developed
346. Pruzin, supra note 342, at 1112–13.
347. Id. at 1112.
348. Id.
349. See Daniel Pruzin, U.S. Textile Industry Group Slams WTO Push for LDC Duty-Free/
Quota-Free Deal, 28 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 24, at 972, 973–74 (June 16, 2011).
350. Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 158, with
July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 148.
351. See, e.g., Brazil, India to Push Ahead on Duty-Free Schemes for the Poorest Countries,
WORLD TRADE ORG. (Mar. 18, 2010), http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news10_e/devel_18mar
10_e.htm. In addition to the Indian measures noted above, India signed FTAs with Afghanistan
and MERCOSUR in 2009–2010, invoking the Tokyo Round Enabling Clause, and notifying the
WTO Committee on Regional Trade Agreements. India also has FTAs with Chile and Bhutan, and
is part of the South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA). See id.
352. Pruzin, supra note 349, at 974.
353. Pruzin, supra note 342, at 1112.
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countries, including neighboring Bangladesh. Most of the eligible countries
simply did not take advantage of it.
Second, Brazil offered DFQF treatment on 80% of its tariff lines,
though coverage would start at 60%. Brazil promised to increase it to 80%
over four years.354 Eventually, Brazil promised, coverage would reach
100%. Yet, it failed to implement this pledge.
Third, China said it already was generous to least developed countries.
It said it commenced DFQF benefits (as of June 2011), covering nearly
4,800 tariff lines.355 DFQF treatment on those lines represented 60% of
tariff lines and 98% of export value (i.e., 98% of the value of exports from
least developed countries). So, China boasted, it was the largest market for
exports from least developed countries in the world—taking 23% of all
such exports. China said it expected to raise the percentage of tariff lines
eligible for DFQF treatment to 95%.356 Unfortunately, China’s claims—
plus those of India and Brazil—proved difficult to verify.
As indicated above, T & A was one sector in which the United States
and other developed countries were reluctant, if not loathe, to offer DFQF
treatment to least developed country exports. Cotton was another such sec-
tor. The United States had poured billions of dollars into cotton subsidies,
as had been widely reported throughout the Doha Round.357 Protecting
these subsidies was important; all the more so after Brazil successfully at-
tacked them in WTO litigation and won retaliatory rights against the United
States.358 Less widely known was the Chinese stance in favor of protecting
its cotton producers.
Many of China’s cotton farmers are Muslim, and ethnically not Han.
They reside in the far western province of Xinjiang. About the last outcome
from the Round that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) wanted was to
enrage these Uyghur Muslims. What the CCP calls the “Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region” might become a movement for “Uyghurstan” or
“East Turkistan,” redolent of a “Free Tibet” campaign, threatening not only
354. Id.; Pruzin, supra note 349, at 972–73; Gary G. Yerkey & Daniel Pruzin, U.S. Ready for
‘Endgame’ of WTO Talks But Needs More from Others, Kirk Says, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No.
48, at 1675 (Dec. 3, 2009).
355. Pruzin, supra note 196, at 1065; see Pruzin, supra note 349, at 974 (reporting China
claimed to have increased the percentage of least developed country exports eligible for DFQF
treatment from 38% to 97%); Geoff Dyer & James Lamont, China and World Bank in Talks to
Establish Industrial Zones in Africa, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2009, at 1 (reporting China added that it
planned to eliminate tariffs on 60% of exports from least developed countries).
356. Pruzin, supra note 342, at 1112; Pruzin, supra note 196, at 1065.
357. See, e.g., Bradley S. Klapper, Doha Deal Falters as WTO Fails to Set Meeting Date,
SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 8, 2008, available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/business
technology/2008482430_apeuwtotradetalks.html?syndication=rss (observing “the U.S. was on the
defensive over the hundreds of millions of dollars in cotton subsidies it hands out each year”).
358. Appellate Body Report, United States—Subsidies on Upland Cotton, ¶ 763, WT/DS267/
AB/R (Mar. 3, 2005) (adopted Mar. 21, 2005) (complaint by Brazil); Bhala & Gantz, supra note
124, at 215–27.
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the monopoly of the CCP on political power but the integrity of China it-
self. The tragic Han-versus-Uyghur violence in Urumqi (capital of Xinji-
ang) in July 2009, which left over 197 dead and 800 injured, and which
provoked a predictable iron-fisted response from the CCP that restored or-
der but not real peace because it addressed symptoms, not causes, of the
violence, graphically illustrates the problem.359 Thus, for the ruling elite in
Beijing, retaining China’s 40% tariff on imported cotton was critical.360
The United States took the position it would not cut its cotton subsi-
dies unless China cut its cotton tariff so as to increase market access for
American farmers. It took this position notwithstanding the fact that be-
tween 2004 and 2008, cotton was the second largest American farm export
to China, totaling $7.8 billion.361 From the American perspective, the po-
tential to ship yet more cotton to China’s T & A mills was enormous, and
the unscrupulous behavior of the Chinese government—manifest in a new
non-tariff barrier against cotton, namely, a registration system for imports—
was of serious concern. Moreover, with a sharp fall in American cotton
exports that occurred between the 2005–2006 and 2008–2009 crop years—
a fall of 25%—the American side was all the more insistent.362 That insis-
tence applied to India too, which by 2009 accounted for 24% of global
cotton production and 19% of global cotton exports. In brief, the Americans
demanded market access for their cotton in China and India in exchange for
relenting on cotton subsidies. As for the Cotton Four countries, they had
become a sideshow in a high-stakes game played by giants.
The Chinese response was silence; that is, right through July 2011 and
beyond, China refused to state its position on cotton.363 To the CCP, given
its fear of restive Muslims, the Americans had taken a position that had to
be resisted. Textually, the result was obvious—a fudge. The December
2008 Text, like its predecessor, stated that developed and developing coun-
tries alike must give DFQF treatment to cotton exports from least developed
countries, but only if they “declar[ed] themselves to be in a position to do
359. David Pilling, Beijing Strains to Hear the Voice of the People, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 10,
2009, at 13; Kathrin Hille, Ethnic Violence in China Leaves at Least 150 Dead and 800 Injured,
FIN. TIMES, July 7, 2009, at 1; Kathrin Hille & Richard McGregor, ‘Premeditated’ Violence
Blamed on Outsiders, FIN. TIMES, July 7, 2009, at 7; Beijing is Unwise to Play with Fire: China
Must Address, Not Suppress, Its Ethnic Tensions, FIN. TIMES, July 7, 2009, at 8.
360. See Pruzin, supra note 54, at 1229 (noting the forty percent rate); Pruzin, supra note 342,
at 1113 (noting the forty percent rate); Pruzin, supra note 196, at 1065 (also noting the forty
percent rate); Daniel Pruzin, G-7 Makes No Progress on Resolving Differences on WTO Decem-
ber Package, 28 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 25, at 1016, 1017 (June 23, 2011) (also noting the
forty percent duty rate); Pruzin, supra note 193, at 887 (also noting the forty percent rate).
361. See Amy Tsui, China’s Imported Cotton System Violates WTO Commitments, Senators
Tell Vilsack, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 10, at 323 (Mar. 5, 2009).
362. See Doug Palmer, Changed Market Makes WTO Cotton Deal Harder, REUTERS, July 21,
2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/07/21/us-usa-africa-cotton-analysis-idUS
TRE56K6XZ20090721.
363. See Pruzin, supra note 196, at 1064.
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so.”364 Practically, the losers from the Sino-American gridlock on generos-
ity to foreign cotton farmers became clear—least developed countries.
More particularly, the Muslim farmers of the Cotton Four seemed forgotten,
if not doomed.
America’s reluctance to accord DFQF treatment to 100% of the ex-
ports from least developed countries was based on more than concerns spe-
cific to sensitive domestic sectors like cotton. The United States questioned
whether all least developed countries wanted such treatment. Deputy USTR
and U.S. Ambassador to the WTO, Michael Punke, said in May 2011:
“[F]rankly, we hear very different viewpoints from different LDCs [least
developed countries], with some expressing grave concern about [tariff]
preference erosion.”365 Was this remark meant to divide-and-conquer, pit-
ting poor countries that benefit from tariff preferences (and thus fear across-
the-board preference erosion that would occur from DFQF treatment)
against ones that do not get such preferences (and thus clamor for DFQF
treatment)? Was it an effort to link DFQF treatment to resolution of the
problem of preference erosion and thus buy extra time for American pro-
ducers who benefit from tariff protection on merchandise exported by least
developed countries? Was it an honest assessment of divergent interests
among the poorest of poor countries? Or, was it an adulteration of concern
for these countries with commercial self-interest?
Reiterated in May 2011, the American position shed light on the an-
swer: namely, a deal on DFQF was certain to be rejected by Congress un-
less the United States benefited from some other dimension of the Doha
Round package, such as trade facilitation obligations implemented by poor
countries in a manner that enhanced market access for American exporters,
or an elimination of trade barriers on environmental goods and services.366
Offering DFQF treatment, without reciprocal benefits, was regarded on
Capitol Hill as “unilateral disarmament.”367 In June 2011, Lloyd Wood,
spokesman for the American Manufacturing Trade Action Coalition
(AMTAC), which represents American T & A producers, explained:
With U.S. unemployment hovering at nearly 9 percent, conceding
duty-free/quota-free market access for all LDC [least developed
country] textile and apparel exports would only put more middle-
class manufacturing jobs on the chopping block to be offshored.
This would be a tough sell to the industry and [the United States]
Congress during a booming economy, let alone . . . in these un-
certain times.
364. Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 155, with
July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 143(e).
365. Pruzin, supra note 193, at 887.
366. Id.
367. Beattie, supra note 181, at 6 (quoting an unnamed senior aide in the U.S. House of
Representatives).
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A key reason why any such early harvest proposal would be a
nonstarter for U.S. textile manufacturing [is] because LDCs like
Bangladesh and Cambodia already are textile and apparel export-
ing superpowers.368
Why should Bangladesh or Cambodia, which are internationally com-
petitive in certain T & A merchandise markets and are the sixth and ninth
largest clothing suppliers to the United States, respectively, get a boost from
DFQF treatment?369 Similarly, under AGOA, the United States offers DFQF
treatment to 99.7% of all non-petroleum exports from thirty-seven Sub-
Saharan African countries.370 Why should T & A exporters in Ghana or
Zambia, which enjoy AGOA preferences, get a Doha Round benefit too?
What if DFQF treatment through the Round helped some poor countries,
like Bangladesh and Cambodia (because of the elimination of barriers to
their exports), but hurt others, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa (because of
unrestricted competition their exports would face vis-a`-vis Bangladeshi and
Cambodian exports)?371
Plausible responses, to be sure, exist to these questions. First, generos-
ity towards the poorest of the poor should know no bounds, if America
indeed prides itself as being the most generous of nations. Second, America
has a good national security motive to be magnanimous. Many least devel-
oped countries—Bangladesh included—have both produced and been a vic-
tim of terrorism. And, actually benefitting from an AGOA preference is
contingent on satisfying restrictive rules of origin, including the use of
American-grown cotton.372 As for a differential impact of DFQF treatment
across least developed countries, surely a simple formula embracing com-
petitive need limits could be negotiated. That is, once achieving a sustain-
ably strong position in relevant product markets, an exporting country
would graduate from DFQF treatment, thereby ensuring the benefits of such
treatment are targeted for the poor countries based on need.
Gripped by its short-term manufacturing interests at home rather than
its long-term national security interests in poverty alleviation and threat re-
duction overseas, the United States was in no mood to broker a compro-
mise. The United States, along with other major trading powers, was
unwilling to revert to an exclusive focus on the key original intention be-
hind the DDA, conveyed by the middle “D” in the acronym—development.
The better acronym, from the perspective of American and other developed
countries, was “DRA”—the Doha Reciprocity Round. Reciprocal conces-
368. Pruzin, supra note 349, at 973.
369. See id.
370. See id. at 974.
371. See Pruzin, supra note 54, at 1229.
372. See Raj Bhala, The Limits of American Generosity, 29 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 299, 380
(2006) (discussing Oxfam’s finding that African countries must use U.S. or African fabrics to
benefit from AGOA which discriminates against Asian fabric).
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sions should be expected of even the poorest countries most vulnerable to
spawning and suffering from Islamist extremism.
To be clear, the United States was not the only WTO Member block-
ing a slimmed-down “deliverables” package in the Doha Round for the De-
cember 2011 Ministerial Conference in Geneva that would have included
reaffirmation of the 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial Conference Decision on
DFQF treatment. That is, the United States was by no means alone in its
unwillingness to grant 100% DFQF treatment to least developed countries
without gaining a reciprocal benefit.373 Brazil said it would not offer such
treatment unless its demands on export competition were met—namely, re-
straints by developed countries.374 Canada countered by refusing to link
export competition to DFQF treatment because it wanted to avoid disci-
plines on its state trade enterprises (STEs).375 The EU and Switzerland ap-
proved of a link between DFQF treatment and export competition, but not
in the way Brazil hoped: they refused to eliminate agricultural export subsi-
dies unless other Members (especially China) imposed disciplines on indus-
trial subsidies and on state owned enterprises (SOEs).376 The EU and
Switzerland also refused to give least developed countries DFQF treatment
unless their demands for extended protection for geographical indications
were satisfied.377 In brief, driven if not blinded by their own short-term
demands for reciprocity, Members could not forge even a simple, develop-
ment-friendly agreement on just a few topics—an accord that would have at
least indirect counter-terrorist benefits in the poorest of countries.
VII. FARM EXPORTS
A. Export Competition
Support for agricultural product exports is the most pernicious form of
farm subsidy, in the sense of distorting global trade patterns. The intrinsic
purpose of a farm export subsidy is to boost exports from the subsidy-grant-
ing country to the detriment of competitive products from third countries. It
does so by making up the difference between a domestic floor or target
price, on the one hand, and the world market price, on the other hand. Thus,
a high-profile goal in the Doha Round of almost all WTO Members—with
the notable exception of some EU states, like France, which traditionally
use export subsidies—was to eradicate this kind of support, and as quickly
as possible, to boot.378 That is true even though, or perhaps because, the EU
373. See Daniel Pruzin, Hopes Fading for WTO ‘Deliverables’ Deal as Delegations Take
Hard Line on LDC-Plus, 28 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 28, at 1164 (July 14, 2011).
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. The EU spent over C=  3 billion annually, for Marketing Year 2002–2003, on agricultural
export subsidies, far in excess of the U.S. or any WTO Member. See Daniel Pruzin, EU Reports
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committed under the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture to reduce
its export subsidies.
The December 2008 Text bore the same pledge as its predecessor—
namely, that developed countries eliminate agricultural export subsidies by
the end of 2013.379 This obligation would include eliminating subsidies dis-
guised as non-emergency food aid or veiled by credit programs.380 It also
would include eradicating cotton export subsidies by the end of the first
year of the implementation period of any Doha Round agreement.381
The pledge was not new. WTO Members had agreed to it in the De-
cember 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial Conference. Likewise, they also
agreed in that Ministerial Conference to a rule against back-end loading.
Continued Decline in Spending on Export Subsidies for Agricultural Goods, 25 Int’l Trade Rep.
(BNA) No. 48, at 1716, (Dec. 4, 2008). However, the general expenditure trend has been down,
with the EU notifying the WTO of agricultural export subsidies of C=  1.46 billion for Marketing
Year 2006–2007. See id. The largest crop receiving an EU export subsidy is sugar. See id. Dairy
products (butter, cheese, milk, and skim milk powder), grains, poultry, wheat and wheat flour are
other major recipients. See id.
An issue related to elimination of export subsidies is the identification of Members that are
“significant exporters.” Article 9 of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture contains com-
mitments to reduce export subsidies. See Agreement on Agriculture, art. 9, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867
U.N.T.S. 410, 417–18. Any Member obliged to reduce its export subsidies must notify the WTO
Committee on Agriculture of the amounts of the products it exports that it subsidizes. See Re-
stricted Exports, Breached Limits and Cotton Aired in Farm Committee, WORLD TRADE ORG.
(June 23, 2011), www.wto.org/english/news_e/news11_e/agcom_23jun11_e.htm. That is true
whether or not the Member actually has paid out export subsidies. See id. In addition, a Member
that did not make export subsidy reduction commitments in the Uruguay Round, but which is a
“significant exporter” of a product, must notify the Committee of its export amounts. See id. That
is true even if the “significant exporter” has not paid out or is too poor to pay out export subsidies.
See id. The Chairman of the WTO Committee on Agriculture compiles a list, on a product-by-
product basis, of “significant exporters” that have no export subsidy reduction commitment. See
id. A Member that is a “significant exporter” of a particular agricultural product is not supposed to
do so.
In other words, there are two categories of Members for export subsidy purposes: (1) Mem-
bers that made reduction commitments during the Uruguay Round; and (2) Members that did not
make such commitments, but which are “significant exporters.” The discipline on the first cate-
gory is to adhere to the reduction commitment. The discipline on the second group is not to
commence subsidization.
What, then, is the criterion for “significant exportation”? The term is nowhere used in the
Agreement on Agriculture. However, in 1995, the WTO agreed that a Member is defined to be a
“significant exporter” of a commodity if it has a share of total world exports in excess of five
percent. See id.
379. Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶¶ 160, 162,
with July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶¶ 150, 152. The new Text
made modest alterations to quantity commitment levels. Compare December 2008 Draft Agricul-
ture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 162(b), with July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text,
supra note 128, ¶ 152(b) (the July text requires a reduction in equal annual installments to zero or
an eventual reduction in actual applied or bound levels by twenty percent while the December text
requires no new subsidies and a standstill in quantity commitment levels).
380. Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 167, An-
nex L, with July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 157, Annex L.
381. Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶¶ 168–69,
with July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶¶ 158–59.
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They would cut half of the export subsidies by 2010 in equal annual install-
ments and get to zero by the end of 2013. For their part, developing coun-
tries agreed to eliminate their farm export subsidies in equal annual
installments by the end of 2016.382 The December Text added that during
the phase-out period, no new export subsidy programs (either in respect of
new markets or products) could be created.383
Arguably, the pledge was not resolute either. With a 50% fall in the
wholesale price of milk amidst the global economic recession that started in
2008 and amidst loud protests from EU farmers, in early 2009 the EU Com-
mission temporarily re-established export subsidies for dairy products.384
The Commission also acquiesced to continued public intervention buying of
surplus butter and skim milk powder and granted private storage aid for
these products.385 However, it averred it would not abandon its agricultural
reforms agreed to in November 2008.
Indeed, by July 2011, it was clear the pledge was not resolute at all. As
the Doha Round talks continued to flounder in 2010 and 2011, the WTO
Director-General, Pascal Lamy, called for agreement by the December 2011
Ministerial Conference in Geneva on at least a five-part package—a “de-
liverables” deal, or “early harvest” of accords, which would emphasize the
interests of developing and least developed countries:
(1) Trade facilitation.
382. Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 163, with
July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 153. Developing countries would
be permitted to continue to subsidize marketing costs (including international transport and
freight) and internal transport and freight charges, associated with farm products, as allowed under
Article 9:4 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, until the end of 2021. See December 2008
Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 164; July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities
Text, supra note 128, ¶ 154. This dispensation also was not new, having been set out in the
December 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial Conference. See December 2008 Draft Agriculture Mo-
dalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 164; July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶
154.
383. Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 162(b) (last
sentence), with July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 152.
384. See Fischer Boel Says Protesting Dairy Farmers Tarnish Image of Common Agricultural
Policy, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 40, at 1358 (Oct. 8, 2009); European Commission Calls for
Continued Dairy Export Subsidies to Help EU Farmers, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 31, at
1030 (July 30, 2009).
385. See European Commission to Offer New Dairy Support to Prop Up Prices, 26 Int’l Trade
Rep. (BNA) No. 1429 (Oct. 22, 2009).
Specifically, the Commission proposed to (1) extend the time for intervention buying from
the normal period of March 1 through August 31 of each year to March 1 through the end of
February 2010, and (2) to make purchases above the normal quota limits of 30,000 tons of butter
and 109,000 tons of skim milk powder. See Fratini Vergano, Are the Measures Taken by the EC to
Combat the Dairy Crisis WTO Compatible?, TRADE PERSP. (Oct. 30, 2009), available at http://
www.fratinivergano.eu/TradePerspectivesArchive.html. All such purchases are stored in public
warehouses. See id. In other words, the Commission agreed to make year-round purchases and
storage with no quantitative limit. On 19 October 2009, the EC Council approved the proposal of
the Commission. See id.
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(2) Export competition, including export subsidies, as well as ex-
port credits and food aid.
(3) A mechanism to monitor commitments on S & D treatment
for poor countries.
(4) Progress on addressing fishing subsidies.
(5) Progress on cutting market access barriers to trade in environ-
mental goods and services.
However (as intimated above in the discussion of DFQF treatment),
demands for reciprocity and linkages of various sorts impeded any such
deal. The EU responded that elimination of export subsidies was contingent
on an overall agreement.386 It was linked to other items on the DDA, in-
cluding reductions in farm and industrial subsidies, enhancements in market
access, and protection for geographical indications. In other words, a matter
of keen interest to developing and least developed countries—that devel-
oped countries cut their farm export subsidies—was a bargaining chip for
ambitious, reciprocal concessions from those countries.
Consequently, as demands from various WTO Members piled up, the
prospect of a slimmed down, development-friendly Doha Round package
died in July 2011. The Director-General himself conceded defeat:
What we are seeing today is the paralysis in the negotiating
function of the WTO, whether it is on market access or the rule-
making. . . .
What we are facing is the inability of the WTO to adapt and
adjust to emerging global trade priorities, those you cannot solve
through bilateral trade deals.387
The first sentence is objectively correct. However, in the second sen-
tence, Mr. Lamy erred. The correct diagnosis is not an inability to adapt but
an inability to stick to the plan. The Members had lost sight of their original
purpose, and the Director-General appeared to have done little to remind
them of it. As the Members strayed, they sought to obtain as many of their
self-interested objectives through bilateral deals as possible—and under-
standably so.
What about other development-friendly objectives, in particular, ex-
port credits, export credit guarantees, and insurance programs? The term
“export competition” refers not only to overt export subsidies but also to
implicit support through domestic policies like export promotion, and even
taxes. The EU had long claimed that these programs, utilized intensively by
the United States, were a hidden export subsidy. The United States had long
386. See Pruzin, supra note 196, at 1064.
387. Pascal Lamy, Director Gen., World Trade Org., Statement to Informal Trade Negotia-
tions Committee Meeting (July 26, 2011), in Members to Think About ‘What Next for Doha,
WTO’ for December Meeting, WORLD TRADE ORG. (July 26, 2011), www.wto.org/english/
news_e/news11_e/tnc_infstat_26jul11_e.htm; see also Pruzin, supra note 54, at 1228 (quoting and
discussing the Lamy speech).
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responded that they were not per se export subsidies but also had agreed to
eliminate any trade-distorting element in them. The December 2008 Text
followed the July Text, which in turn followed earlier documents. The key
rules would be as follows:388
(1) There would be disciplines on export credits. For instance,
the repayment period would be limited to 180 days, or be-
tween 360 and 540 days for least developed countries and
NFIDCs. Obviously, the longer the repayment period, the
more a credit looks like a subsidy. Programs would have to
be self-financing, in the sense of not making losses over a
period and recovering costs according to a commercially via-
ble standard over a rolling four- or five-year period. Mani-
festly, a loss-making credit scheme is presumptively a
subsidy. There also would be disciplines on export credit
guarantees or insurance programs.
(2) International food aid could be subject to loose disciplines.
Essentially, for such aid to qualify for a Safe Box (and
thereby be immune from a WTO lawsuit), an international
organization (such as the United Nations, World Food Pro-
gram, or Red Cross) would have to declare an emergency.
Such a declaration would alleviate doubts as to whether the
food was aid or an offloading of surplus production. Non-
emergency food aid would be subject to a needs assessment
conducted by an appropriate United Nations agency to ensure
this aid does not displace commercial trade.
It remained unclear how monetization of food assistance (i.e., selling
donated products to raise funds for aid) might be disciplined. Also left am-
biguous was whether monopoly power associated with agricultural export-
ing state trading enterprises (STEs, as defined in GATT Article XVII)
would be prohibited or simply restricted in some way.389
Finally, the December 2008 Text included the same conflict of law, or
pre-emption, rule as its predecessor in July on food crises.390 The rule en-
sured commitments made to NFIDCs during the Uruguay and Doha Rounds
would be undiminished by any other provision in the Text. Indubitably, this
provision reflected the global economic context in which it was drafted in
the summer of 2008—namely, one of sharp food price increases threatening
tens of millions of people, especially in poor countries.
388. Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 165, An-
nexes J, K, L, with July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 155, Annexes J,
K, L.
389. See December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 166, Annex K;
July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 156, Annex J.
390. Compare December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 161, with
July 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 151.
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B. Export Restrictions
As for restrictions on exports, especially food, the December 2008
Text was nearly identical to the July Text, which in turn had not changed
much following issuance of the February 2008 Text. Accordingly, the De-
cember Text proposed strengthening Article 12 of the WTO Agreement on
Agriculture, the only provision in the GATT-WTO regime containing direct
disciplines on measures to limit farm product exports.391 (GATT Articles
XI:2(a) and XX(i)–(j) condone such limits, under certain circumstances.)
In particular, Article 12 of the Agriculture Agreement, which is inap-
plicable to developing and least developed countries, contains two loose
requirements: a WTO Member (1) should give due consideration to the ef-
fects on NFIDCs of any prohibitions or restrictions it might impose on its
food exports as well as (2) provide notice of the nature and duration of any
constraints as far in advance as practicable to the WTO Committee on Agri-
culture.392 From the perspective of NFIDCs, “due consideration” and “no-
tice” are not strong restrictions on their food imports falling victim to
export restrictions from food exporting countries. Accordingly, in April
2011, one change NFIDCs sought in the December 2008 Draft Agriculture
Text was an explicit rule that neither they nor least developed countries
would be subject to food export restraints.393 In effect, this S & D treatment
would be a waiver from an MFN requirement (i.e., that food export re-
straints would apply equally to all Members).
Broadly speaking, a key concern with export constraints is if they
cover food, including food aid, such constraints put NFIDCs at the mercy of
the restraining countries. The December 2008 Text contained five further
disciplines:
(1) Extant food export restrictions must be eliminated by the first
year of implementation of any Doha Round deal.394
391. See December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 171; July 2008
Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 161. For journalistic accounts, see, for exam-
ple, Daniel Pruzin, French Trade Minister Sees No Action in Doha Round on Food Export Re-
strictions, 25 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 18, at 637 (May 1, 2008) (discussing different
countries’ proposed export restrictions in addition to the restrictions found in Article 12 of the
Agreement on Agriculture); Daniel Pruzin, WTO Members in Ag Talks Fail to Tackle Growing
Problem of Food Export Restrictions, 25 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 14, at 479, 479–80 (Apr. 3,
2008) (discussing a proposed limit in export restriction length).
392. See Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 117, art. 12. Effective March 2010, exchanges
by WTO Members of information on their agricultural policies become publicly available, 60–90
days after restricted circulation among the Members, on the WTO website, www.wto.org. See
Committee Going Public on Farm Trade Concerns, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Mar. 10, 2010), www.
wto.org/english/news_e /news10_e/ag_com_10mar10_e.htm.
393. See Farm Talks’ Chair, supra note 303.
394. See December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 178; July 2008
Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 166 (both texts contain the provision).
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(2) The duration of any new limits must be capped at twelve
months (or eighteen months, if affected importing Members
agreed).395
(3) The exporting Member implementing the restrictions must
give notice of the reason for them.396
(4) Notice of export restrictions is required within ninety days of
their entry into force.397
(5) Annual updates must be provided by the exporting Member
about its export constraints to the Committee on Agriculture,
which is in charge of monitoring compliance with all
disciplines.398
The December 2008 Text added a sixth discipline that was not explicit
in its predecessor, about consultation.399
The sixth discipline had an interesting history. As commodity prices
rose in 2007–2008, proposals to help NFIDCs, such as rice importers like
Bangladesh, Indonesia, and the Philippines, were floated in WTO circles.
But, exporting WTO Members like Argentina, Brazil, China, Egypt, India,
Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam, as well as non-Members like Kazakhstan
and Russia, resisted any constraint on their sovereign freedom to manage
domestic food problems. All of these exporting countries had, in early and
mid 2008, imposed export tariffs, outright export bans, or other export re-
strictions on basic staples and foodstuffs such as barley, edible oils, rice,
soybeans, and wheat. They took these measures to promote their own food
security. Consequently, the exporting Members fervently opposed an April
2008 joint proposal by Japan and Switzerland—each of which is a net food
importer—to strengthen Article 12 of the Agriculture Agreement.400 That
395. See December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 179; July 2008
Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 167 (both texts contain the provision).
396. See December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 173; July 2008
Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 163 (both texts contain the provision).
397. See December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 172; July 2008
Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶ 162 (both texts contain the provision).
398. See December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶¶ 176–77; July
2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 128, ¶¶ 164–65 (both texts contain the
provisions).
399. See December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶¶ 174–75 (requir-
ing a Member intending to institute export prohibitions and restrictions to consult with any other
Member having substantial interest as an importer upon request and to report progress made in
consultations to the Committee on Agriculture).
400. See Daniel Pruzin, Developing Countries Cool to Ag Proposal by Japanese, Swiss on
Export Restrictions, 25 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 19, at 673, 673–74 (May 8, 2008).
In June 2010, it was suggested by Charlotte Hebebrand, President, International Food and
Agricultural Trade Policy Council, that:
Developing countries could use export restrictions as a bargaining chip in Doha Round
trade negotiations, as they have little else to offer beyond market access. . . . Revisiting
the issue of export restrictions could introduce a negotiating dynamic that could help to
break the present logjam.
Len Bracken, Rebalancing of Exporter, Importer Rights, Responsibilities Could Help Revive Doha
Talks, 27 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 25, at 930 (June 24, 2010). While a creative argument, its
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proposal was to require advance notice to the WTO Committee on Agricul-
ture of any impending export restriction (especially as to the duration and
reasons for the measure) and consultations in the event of a dispute. The
proposal also called for establishment of a standing committee of experts to
be used if consultations failed, and which would render a binding judgment
as to whether the disputed restriction is necessary. Its implementation
would be prohibited pending outcome of the case.
The sixth discipline in the December 2008 Text was a compromise of
sorts. An exporting Member that intends to institute an export restriction or
prohibition would have to consult with any other Member that has a “sub-
stantial interest” as an importer of the product in question. This requirement
of a priori consultation effectively offset the fact that under the fourth disci-
pline, formal notice need not be given in advance of implementing an ex-
port constraint. The exporting Member would be obliged to provide (upon
request by the importing Member) necessary economic information about
the expected constraint. However, the new Text did not define “substantial
interest”; thus it remained unclear precisely which countries might invoke
the consultative mechanism. Equally unclear was what would happen in the
event of a disagreement—other than, perhaps, formal WTO adjudication.
Notwithstanding all six disciplines, as a practical matter of political
economy, no government—except one of pirates and bandits—would sell
domestic food production to the highest bidder overseas when its citizens
were desperately short of food. The above six disciplines all amount to pro-
cedural checks to give warning, and modest comfort, to third country food
importers. None of the restrictions is a substantive benchmark to gauge
whether the restrictions enhance the global distribution of a foodstuff dur-
ing a crisis to ensure that goods reached in a timely fashion the people in
greatest need. Perhaps, then, the real consolation for food-importing coun-
tries would be the fact that none of the disciplines applied to least devel-
oped countries or NFIDCs.401 Assuming they had an exportable surplus,
they could impose export prohibitions or restrictions as they saw fit.
VIII. LOSING THE PLOT
A. The Doha Round as a Stimulus Package
The argument—that a Doha Round deal would limit the extent to
which WTO Members could boost applied tariff rates and farm subsidy
levels, simply by virtue of a single undertaking to cut bound rates and
levels—is poignant in the climate of a global economic slump. It is repeated
vulnerability is the negotiating dynamic introduced might well pit developing country food ex-
porters against NFIDCs. Any kind of poor-versus-poor dynamic is regrettable. Moreover, the
logjam is not so much between these two groups, but between the U.S. and major developed
countries on one side, and Brazil, China, India and their allies, on the other side—though even this
characterization is simplistic, as there are plenty of schisms in the Round.
401. See December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 74, ¶ 180.
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ad nauseum by WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy.402 In June 2010, he
did so and testified that the Round is not anchored by its original purpose of
poverty alleviation and counter-terrorism: “in 2009 our focus was on fight-
ing protectionist tendencies, [and] the 2010 focus will be on making the
case for the Doha Round as a low cost fiscal stimulus package for all.”403
The statement almost gives the impression of grasping at straws: saying
anything that might somehow coax out a conclusion.404
Certainly, the argument about fighting recession and economic stimu-
lus is reinforced by the statistic that if every Member raised all of its ap-
plied tariff levels to the maximum legally permissible bound rates, then the
average tariff level in the world would roughly double.405 In turn, exporters
would be about 100% worse off than before. Thus, the argument continues,
avoid a re-run of the Great Depression, during which protectionist, beggar-
thy-neighbor trade measures and competitive devaluations exacerbated the
severity and length of the world-wide declines in output, employment, and
wages. Act now to counter protectionism, and thereby stimulate the global
economy and foster the political economy dynamics of reform.
402. See, e.g., Pascal Lamy, Director Gen., World Trade Org., Address to German Engineer-
ing Federation Summit (Oct. 13, 2009), in Doha Success Can Yield Double Dividend of Global
Stimulus and Structural Reform—Lamy, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Oct. 13, 2009), www.wto.org/
english/news_e/sppl_e/spp l137_e.htm.
403. Pascal Lamy, Statement to Trade Negotiations Committee (June 11, 2010), in Lamy: No
Ambitious Doha Result Possible Unless All Parties Gain, WORLD TRADE ORG. (June 11, 2010),
www.wto.org/english/news_e/news10_e/tnc_dg_stat_11jun10_e.htm (emphasis added).
404. As another example, one claim by the Director-General is that a Doha Round conclusion
will enhance energy security (whatever that means) by (1) building on existing disciplines like
national treatment and applying them to trade in energy goods and services, (2) cutting tariffs on
renewable fuels like biodiesel and ethanol and on equipment used in energy production and distri-
bution, (3) strengthening rules on subsidies, (4) improving rules on transit and trade facilitation,
(5) liberalizing trade in energy-efficient, climate-friendly technology, and (6) opening energy ser-
vices such as engineering, drilling, technical testing, pipeline construction, and distribution. See
Pascal Lamy, Director Gen., World Trade Org., Address to World Energy Congress 2010 (Sept.
16, 2010), in Lamy: “A Stronger WTO Rule Book Could Benefit the Energy Sector,” WORLD
TRADE ORG. (Sept. 16, 2010), www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl169_e.htm.
Still another example is the claim by Lamy the Doha Round will lead to enhanced rules on
trade in natural services. See Lamy: Doha a “Stepping Stone” to Better Trade Rules in Natural
Resources, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Oct. 26, 2010), www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl175_e.
htm. And, yet another example is that a deal will enhance world commodities trade, leading to
lower commodity prices, by dismantling barriers to such trade. See Lamy: Doha Will Oil the
Wheels of World Commodities Trade, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Jan. 31, 2011), www.wto.org/english/
news_e/sppl_e/sppl184_e.htm.
Perhaps such happy outcomes might occur. The point here simply is that virtually any poten-
tial salubrious benefit is seized upon by the Director-General in his pleas for concluding the
Round. The larger the number of straws grasped at, the further the Round drifts from its original
purposes of employing trade as a weapon against poverty and Islamist extremism.
405. See Pascal Lamy, Director Gen., World Trade Org., Keynote Address at World Trade
Organization Public Forum (Sept. 28, 2009), in G20 Must Now “Walk the Talk” on Doha—Lamy,
WORLD TRADE ORG. (Sept. 28, 2009), www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl136_e.htm.
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B. Five Rebuttals
Yet this argument has five serious limitations. The first is the obvious
point that not all WTO Members are going to raise all of their applied du-
ties to the maximum bound rates. The fact that the policy space exists for
them to do so does not mean they are likely to move into that space. To the
contrary, it would be more reasonable to expect many Members would re-
sist raising their barriers at all, so as not to trigger or hasten a march toward
protectionism, a march that would reciprocally redound to their detriment.
It also would be more reasonable to expect that a Member boosting applied
rates would not do so on every single tariff line. Why raise the applied rate
to the bound level on, for example, artificial Christmas trees, and thereby
penalize consumers through higher costs, if there is no vociferous domestic
constituency to protect?
Empirical evidence buttresses this first point. Consider the fact the
WTO itself, in its 2010 biennial review of American trade policy, lauded
the United States for resisting protectionist pressures and maintaining some
of the most open trade and investment markets in the world.406 Consider,
too, that in November 2009, the European Commission put out its annual
report in which it monitors protectionist measures around the world.
The European Commission report listed 223 “potentially trade-restric-
tive measures” implemented by the forty major trading partners of the EU
between October 2008 and October 2009.407 (The greatest number of such
measures were put up by Russia (forty-eight), which is not a WTO Mem-
ber; Argentina (thirty-five); the United States (sixteen); and China (thir-
teen).408 They included buy national policies in government procurement
contracts and certain discriminatory criteria in fiscal support schemes.) But,
the report explicitly stopped short of labeling them “protectionist.” Moreo-
ver, the report credited existing GATT-WTO disciplines for containing
traditional protectionism measures, namely, tariff hikes and non-tariff bar-
rier increases (e.g., import bans, quota or license restrictions, and reference
pricing schemes). Most importantly, the Commission declared that the
world had avoided the worst-case scenario of a tit-for-tat, downward spiral
of protectionism.409
Shortly after the EU issued its report, the WTO itself conceded the
point. In a report of its own on annual developments in international trade,
the WTO admitted “[t]here has been no systemic breakdown in the interna-
tional trading system and WTO [M]embers have resisted the allure of pro-
406. See Daniel Pruzin, WTO Praises United States for Resisting Protectionism, Partners
Voice Complaints, 27 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 39, at 1506 (Oct. 7, 2010).
407. Bengt Ljung, Global War of Protectionism Resulting from Economic Crisis Avoided, EC
Says, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 45, at 1542 (Nov. 12, 2009).
408. See id.
409. See id.
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tectionism.”410 Indeed, all of the trade-restricting or trade-distorting
measures that Members implemented since October 2008 collectively af-
fected a maximum of one percent of world trade and were concentrated in a
few sectors (particularly agriculture, iron, steel, and to some degree in elec-
tronics, footwear, and textiles and clothing).411 Likewise, WTO Director-
General Pascal Lamy wrote in a letter to trade ministers that “[t]he world
economy is about as open for trade today as it was before the crisis
started.”412
The Director-General had little choice but to climb down. In March
2010, in their joint second Report on Group of 20 (G-20) Trade and Invest-
ment Measures, the WTO, Organization for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment (OECD), and United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD) admitted the G-20 countries had imposed fewer
trade-restrictive measures between September 2009 and February 2010 than
they had in the preceding six-month period (April–August 2009) covered in
the first Report.413 (The G-20 is an informal talk shop of 19 industrialized
410. Jonathan Lynn, WTO Urges Non-Discrimination as Crisis Ends, REUTERS, Nov. 19,
2009, available at www.reuters.com/article/2009/11/19/idUSLJ379965.
411. See Daniel Pruzin, WTO Chief Says Protectionism Surge Has Been Avoided, but Vigi-
lance Needed, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 47, at 1606 (Nov. 26, 2009).
412. Lynn, supra note 410; see also Daniel Pruzin, WTO Chief Says Economic Downturn Led
to 12 Percent Drop in 2009 Global Trade, 27 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 9, at 294 (Mar. 4, 2010)
(quoting Director-General Lamy as saying that import demand and trade finance were the causes
for the twelve percent drop in the volume of world trade in 2009 and “[t]o a much lesser degree,
trade has been adversely affected by some instances of increased tariffs and domestic subsidies,
new non-tariff measures, and more antidumping actions”) (emphasis added).
413. See Daniel Pruzin, OECD, WTO, UNCTAD Find Major Economies Eased Protectionist
Measures in Last Period, 27 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 11, 375, 375–76 (Mar. 18, 2010). In
October 2010, UNCTAD also reported that at least 41 countries around the globe had imple-
mented new investment measures to attract FDI in the preceding 6 months, plus 50 new interna-
tional investment agreements involving 79 countries, leading it to conclude that despite the global
economic slump, the review period “witnessed an ongoing trend towards more investment liberali-
zation, facilitation, and promotion.” Daniel Pruzin, UNCTAD Report Cites Continued Trend To-
ward Liberalization in Investment Pacts, 27 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 40, at 1548 (Oct. 14,
2010).
Likewise, in its November 2010 report on new measures that impede trade and investment,
UNCTAD said G-20 countries generally resisted protectionist pressures. Covering the period mid-
May to mid-October 2010, UNCTAD observed the rate of increase in new protectionist measures
slowed. See Daniel Pruzin, Reports Say G-20 Countries Resisting Protectionism, Despite Increase
in Measures, 27 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 44, at 1712 (Nov. 11, 2010) (citing fifty-six trade-
restrictive measures between March and May 2010 and 54 such new measures—including thirty-
three trade remedies, fourteen border measures, and four export restrictions—in May–October
2010).
Notably, some of the new trade-restrictive measures take the form of sanitary and phytosani-
tary (SPS) and technical barriers to trade (TBT) rules, and they may be either entirely new rules,
or stricter application of existing rules. It may well be that governments resort increasingly to SPS
and TBT measures for protectionist purposes, notwithstanding the global economic slowdown, as
these devices have a politically palatable basis for legitimacy: the protection of consumer health
and welfare. See generally Amy Tsui, USTR Will Seek to Address NTBs, Outstanding Trade Dis-
putes, Reif Says, 27 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 12, at 413 (Mar. 25, 2010) (reporting on the view
of Tim Reif, General Counsel, USTR, that non-tariff barriers are the hardest kind of problem to
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and big emerging market countries, plus the EU, with the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank as ex-officio members.)414 The sec-
ond Report also conceded that new AD, CVD, and safeguard measures af-
fected only about 0.7% of G-20 imports, or 0.4% of total world imports.
(The comparable figures for the first Report were 1.3% and 0.8%, respec-
tively.) Overall, the WTO omitted in its November 2010 report on protec-
tionism, from October 2008 through October 2010, trade restrictions
imposed by G-20 countries during this period covered in aggregate only
1.8% of G-20 imports and 1.4% of total world imports.415 Even these min-
iscule amounts were over-estimates for two reasons.
First, the trade coverage of a measure is not exactly equal to the dimi-
nution of trade caused by the measure, unless that measure is prohibitive
and shuts down trade in the targeted product. Second, trade coverage esti-
mates are at the six-digit customs classification level when in fact the value
of trade affected by the measure may be at the eight-digit level. So, the
argument that the Doha Round is an essential tool to keeping trade open and
fighting the global economic recession was retracted by its proponents. The
lasting impression is the WTO Secretariat and its Director-General grasp at
any expedient assertion to exhort Members to finish the Round, rather than
focus on the original purposes of the Round and the extent to which negoti-
ating texts match those purposes.
The results from the joint second Report, which the WTO, OECD, and
UNCTAD issued in June 2010 covering the period November 2009 through
mid-May 2010, were even more encouraging.416 G-20 countries continued
deal with in dispute resolution proceedings and that bilateral negotiation often is preferable to
litigation to resolve them).
414. The G-20 was created in response to the 1997–1999 Asian financial crisis and first met in
December 1999 in Berlin. See Factbox—What is the G20?, REUTERS, Mar. 30, 2009, available at
in.reuters.com/article/2009/03/30/financial-g20-group-idINLU96805420090330. Accounting for
ninety percent of world Gross National Product (GNP), eighty percent of world trade, and two-
thirds of world population, the members are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, the EU,
France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Mexico,
Russia, South Africa, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the U.S. Id. The G-20 is a forum for
discussing global economic governance and stability, and resolving cross-border problems.
415. See Daniel Pruzin, G-20 Leaders Say Time to Conclude Doha; Obama Prepared to Take
Risks for Approval, 27 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 45, at 1755 (Nov. 18, 2010).
416. See Daniel Pruzin, Survey Sees G-20 Warding Off Protectionism, as Limits on Exports,
Bailouts Cause Concern, 27 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 24, at 886 (June 17, 2010).
Likewise, a report by an NGO, Global Trade Alert (GTA), issued in September 2010 found
that in the first 8 months of 2010, the rate of discrimination against foreign commercial interests
was about the same as in 2009. This report, the seventh issued by GTA, was notable in that for the
first time, it covered not only traditional import protectionist measures, but also export manage-
ment measures, that is, export-enhancing measures such as bailouts, export subsidies, local con-
tent requirements, and tax rebates. It did so for two reasons: first, such measures consume
domestic resources that could be used for alternative purposes, and make the cost of exports
cheaper for foreigners to purchase; and, second, export incentives allow exporters to lower their
prices, which compels exporters from other countries to follow suit so as not to lose out on profits
or market share. Both reasons mean export-enhancement is tantamount to a beggar-thy-neighbor
policy, benefiting one country (specifically, its exporters) at the expense of another (i.e., harming
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to refrain from imposing trade-restrictive measures though some Members
had resorted to or extended export restrictions on commodities, particularly
food products. As for trade remedies, AD, CVD, and safeguard measures
collectively covered just 0.4% of annual world imports, but this trade cover-
age probably over-stated their actual impact. Moreover, the Members had
cooled off in their recourse to remedial actions during the first four months
of 2010.
Certainly, past is not always prologue. In their joint fifth Report, is-
sued in May 2011 and covering mid-October 2010 to April 2011, the WTO,
OECD, and UNCTAD said protectionist pressures were more manifest than
before: there were 122 new trade-restrictive measures, more than double the
previous reporting period, and the highest recorded in any of the five re-
ports.417 Export restrictions (such as export quotas and taxes) increased, and
protectionist measures (especially tariffs and non-automatic import licens-
ing) impacted 0.6% of all G-20 imports.418 Thus, the fifth Report sounded a
negative tone. But, the export restraints were no surprise: imposed particu-
larly on agricultural products, metals, and minerals, they could be explained
as defensive measures against rising food and commodity prices. As for the
import measures, they still affected only 0.5% of global imports, and trade
remedy actions were in decline. Moreover, of the 550 measures that coun-
tries had taken since October 2008, 18% had been rescinded or modified to
reduce their negative impact on trade whereas 15% had been altered since
issuance of the fourth Report in November 2010. Such measures tended to
be temporary duty increases or trade remedy actions. Also, WTO Members
were adhering to their market access commitments across services sectors,
exporters from other countries). See Len Bracken, NGO Finds 2010 Rate of Protectionism Tracks
Previous Year Despite Trade Rise, 27 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 36, at 1375 (Sept. 16, 2010).
417. See Daniel Pruzin, WTO Cites Jump in G-20 Trade Protection: OECD, UNCTAD See
Positive Investment News, 28 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 23, at 938 (June 9, 2011).
418. Protectionist Pressures on the Rise, Latest G20 Monitoring Report Says, WORLD TRADE
ORG. (May 24, 2011), http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news11_e/igo_24may11_e.htm;
Pruzin, supra note 417, at 938.
A WTO report circulated in June 2011 to the Trade Policy Review Body (TPRB) offered
conclusions nearly the same as those in the joint fifth Report. Covering the period mid-October
2010 through the end of April 2011, and based on data from 30 of the then 153 WTO Members,
the WTO report said import-restrictive measures had increased. But, the amount of trade affected
by them had fallen—to just 0.53 percent of global trade, from 0.8 percent in the previous six-
month review period—and nearly half of the share of affected trade was the result of only three
measures: (1) EU restrictions on steel; (2) EU AD and safeguard proceedings against Chinese
wireless modems; and (3) an increase by China in its import tariffs on fuel oil and jet fuel. Moreo-
ver, the WTO report conceded AD investigations fell by 10 percent, CVD investigations by 36
percent, year-on-year during the six-month review period, and the number of safeguard cases fell
from 13 to 7. See Daniel Pruzin, WTO Report Says Members Have Boosted Trade Restrictions as
Crisis Resolve Fades, 28 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 25, at 1021 (June 23, 2011).
The point, then, is that the argument made by the WTO Director-General, Pascal Lamy, that
a conclusion to the Doha Round is necessary to prevent a descent into protectionism is false.
There was no such descent during or in the aftermath of the global recession.
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though understandably some emerging countries were resorting to capital
controls, thus affecting the supply of financial services.419
If there is any worrying possibility about trade-restrictive measures im-
plemented in the wake of the global economic crisis, then it concerns per-
sistence. In May 2010, the European Commission put the number of such
measures at 278 and said that none had been lifted even though the overall
trade climate had improved during the first half of 2010.420 Further, some
measures took the form of traditional protectionism, like the decision by
MERCOSUR to increase certain tariffs and the decision by Russia, Belarus,
and Kazakhstan to create a customs union as of 1 January 2010 that consoli-
dated tariff hikes implemented by Russia since the onset of the crisis. To be
sure, the 278 measures affected only 1.7% of EU exports (mainly in agri-
food, automotives, steel, and textiles) and only 1% of total world trade in
goods. Nonetheless, the concern was the trade-restrictive measures may lin-
ger long after a full economic recovery has occurred. And yet, after a 13%
contraction in the volume of world goods traded in 2009, 2010 saw a surge
of 15.1%, bringing world trade back to its 2008 level.421
Second, political rhetoric outstrips political courage. Leaders of the G-
20 nations champion this argument.422 The G-20 calls for “Keynes [i.e.,
fiscal stimulus] at home and Smith [i.e., free trade] abroad,” as Professor
Razeen Sally puts it.423 Yet, as he provocatively observes:
The G-20 is unlikely to be more than a chat forum given to non-
binding pledges. Even in the improbable event of a Doha conclu-
sion anytime soon, it will not contain protectionism: what is on
the table is a very low common denominator and a dog’s breakfast
of loopholes and exemptions.424
The “very low common denominator” and “dog’s breakfast” are the
subject of much of the present article. For now, the key point is the chatter.
G-20 leaders issue a plethora of commitments to resist protectionism
and complete the Doha Round on what they promise would be ambitious,
balanced terms.425 Likewise, apparently oblivious to the original develop-
419. See Pruzin, supra note 417, at 938–39.
420. See Joe Kirwin, Trade Restrictions Adopted During Economic Crisis Still in Place, EC
Says, 27 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 820 (June 3, 2010).
421. See Alan Beattie, World Trade Back at 2008 Levels, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2011, at 6.
422. See Pope Urges World Leaders to Stabilize Markets without Excluding Poor, CATH.
NEWS SERVICE (Mar. 31, 2009), http://www.catholicnews.com/data/stories/cns/0901475.htm.
423. Razeen Sally, The Quest for a Global Solution Is Misguided, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2009,
at 9 [hereinafter Sally, The Quest]. See generally RAZEEN SALLY, NEW FRONTIERS IN FREE
TRADE—GLOBALIZATION’S FUTURE AND ASIA’S RISING ROLE (2008) (critiquing global economic
organizations and governance).
424. Sally, The Quest, supra note 423, at 9 (emphasis added).
425. See, e.g., Kirk Meets with New Japanese Agriculture Minister, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA)
No. 1397 (Oct. 15, 2009). The G-20 is not the only plurilateral venue in which such calls are
issued. They come, for example, from the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. In
January 2011, trade ministers from nineteen countries (Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Costa
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ment orientation of the Round in a post-9/11 context, WTO Director-Gen-
eral Lamy calls for “a combination of ambition and balance for ALL
participants.”426 They even (1) toss in a preferred target date, if they can
agree to one; (2) default to an ambiguous future period; (3) abandon an
earlier target completion date entirely, as they did at the June 2010 G-20
Summit in Toronto; or (4) somehow proclaim trade remains high on their
agenda, and they are determined to resist protectionism, engage in horizon-
tal negotiations, and conclude the Round as they did at the November 2010
G-20 Summit in Seoul.427 The anodyne phrase “ambitious and balanced” is
commonly used among politicians and trade negotiators when pressed to
characterize their expectations for the Doha Round.428
Rica, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand,
Norway, Peru, South Africa, Switzerland, and the U.S.) vowed to “seriously accelerate” efforts to
reach a Doha Round breakthrough by mid-2011. Daniel Pruzin, Trade Ministers Vow to Overcome
Differences, Achieve Doha Breakthrough, 28 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 5, at 178 (Feb. 3, 2011).
426. Lamy, supra note 403 (emphasis in original).
427. See Daniel Pruzin, South Korea Pushing to Put Trade Talks High on Agenda of Novem-
ber G-20 Meeting, 27 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 29, at 1102–03 (July 22, 2010). At the Toronto
Summit, the G-20 backed away from earlier commitments to finish the Doha Round by the end of
2010. See Len Bracken, G-20 Omits Doha Round Target Date, Seeks Jobs from Trade in Declara-
tion, 27 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 26, at 974 (July 1, 2010); see also Paul Taylor, Do-Little G20
Summit Cheers Spared Bankers, REUTERS, June 28, 2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/
assets/print?aid=USTRE65L3O720100628 (stating “that the G-20 has stepped away from impos-
ing an arbitrary timeline”). Notably, just prior to the G-20 meeting, at the June 2010 Group of
Eight (G8) Summit in Toronto, the G8 countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United
Kingdom, and United States, which are the G-7 countries, plus Russia) not only backed off from
earlier calls to finish the Round in 2010, but also from multilateral trade liberalization in favor of
regional trade agreements (RTAs):
We will continue . . . to promote liberalisation of trade and investment under the WTO,
through the national reduction of barriers, and through bilateral and regional
negotiations.
Alan Beattie & Chris Giles, U.S. Pledge to Revise S Korea Trade Deal, FIN. TIMES, June 27, 2010,
at 2 (emphasis added) (quoting final communique´ of G8).
428. The ambitious-and-balanced formula was used, for example, by the leaders of the Asia-
Pacific countries in their joint declaration—calling for an “ambitious and balanced conclusion to
the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) in 2010”—following the November 2009 summit of the
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum hosted by Singapore. Tripti Lahiri, APEC
Leaders Call for Completion of Doha Round in 2010, Urge Flexibility, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA)
No. 46, at 1580 (Nov. 19, 2009). It was used again by the Deputy USTR in a 5 June 2010 press
release. See also Toshio Aritake, APEC Ministers Deliver Statement in Support of Concluding
Doha Round ‘As Soon As Possible,’ 27 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 23, at 845 (June 10, 2010).
Similarly, in Seoul, the G-20 heads of state reaffirmed their:
strong commitment to direct our negotiators to engage in across-the-board negotiations
to promptly bring the Doha Development Round to a successful, ambitious, comprehen-
sive, and balanced conclusion consistent with the mandate of the Doha Development
Round and built on the progress already achieved. We recognise that 2011 is a critical
window of opportunity, albeit narrow, and that engagement among our representatives
must intensify and expand. We now need to complete the end game. Once such an
outcome is reached, we commit to seek ratification, where necessary, in our respective
systems. We are also committed to resisting all forms of protectionist measures.
G-20 Leaders Statement from Seoul Summit (Nov. 12, 2010), available at www.bbc.co.uk/news/
business-11741674 (emphasis added). This statement, while providing somewhat more detailed
instructions to trade negotiators than previous communique´s, left out any reference to a target date
for completing the Round. Pruzin, supra note 415, at 1755.
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Notably, the phrase does not appear in the Ministerial Declaration that
launched the Round, nor does the word “ambitious.”429 The word “bal-
anced” appears three times, in Paragraphs two, eleven, and twenty-two of
that Declaration. In Paragraph two, in a sentence that highlights the impor-
tance of poor country interests, it is remarked that “enhanced market access
[and] balanced rules” are important, too. In Paragraph eleven, the Work
Program for the Round is characterized as “broad and balanced.” In Para-
graph twenty-two, it is said that any deal on trade and investment “should
reflect in a balanced manner the interests of home and host countries,” fol-
lowing which the interests of poor countries are highlighted.
On reflection, it appears the terms “ambitious” (or a synonym, such as
“broad”) and “balanced” are meant by developed countries to counter-bal-
ance the aspirations poor countries have (or once had) for the Round. Inter-
preted literally, if cynically, “ambitious” connotes coverage of every topic a
developed country thinks is important, and “balanced” means the developed
country believes what its country gained from a Doha Round deal is at least
as good, and preferably better, than what its country conceded. Certainly, in
a world of real politik bargaining, developing and least developed countries
could well apply the same meanings to these terms. For the United States, at
least under the Administration of President Barack H. Obama, “balanced”
means a return to the ways of the past, in which Asia exported manufac-
tured goods, America imported them, and thus the American consumer was
indispensable to Asian growth and prosperity, and is unthinkable. Those
ways were unsustainable, as the global economic recession of 2008–2009
had revealed.
In any event, the G-20 made pledges for an ambitious, balanced, and
timely conclusion of the Doha Round at their November 2008 Summit in
Washington, D.C., at their April 2009 Summit in London, and at their Sep-
tember 2009 Summit in Pittsburgh.430 But, the Summits have failed to kick-
start the Round. Worse yet, after the November 2008 Summit, fourteen of
429. The Ministerial Declaration is available on the WTO website, www.wto.org, and re-
printed in BHALA, supra note 1, at 633–45.
430. See Gary G. Yerkey, G-20 Leaders Seek (Again) to Revive WTO Talks but Success Far
From Certain, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 1279 (Sept. 24, 2009) (quoting from the draft joint
communique´ of the Pittsburgh Summit) [hereinafter Yerkey, G-20 Leaders Seek]; Daniel Pruzin,
Indian Minister Affirms Plans to Host G-20 Trade Meeting on WTO Doha Round, 26 Int’l Trade
Rep. (BNA) No. 27, at 874 (July 2, 2009) (reporting on efforts in the run-up to the Pittsburgh
Summit to draft a positive final communique´); Guy Dinmore & Marco Pasqua, Trade Promise at
Heart of Draft Communique´, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2009, at 5 (reporting on efforts to complete the
stalled global trade talks at the London Summit). The 2 April 2009 communique´, entitled “The
Global Plan for Recovery and Reform,” states in paragraph 23 that the G-20:
remain[s] committed to reaching an ambitious and balanced conclusion to the Doha
Development Round, which is urgently needed. This could boost the global economy by
at least $150 billion per annum. To achieve this we are committed to building on the
progress already made, including with regard to modalities.
The Global Plan for Recovery (Apr. 2, 2009), available at http://www.g20.org/Documents/final-
communique.pdf, (Apr. 3, 2009) (emphasis added).
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the twenty countries raised trade barriers in one manner or another.431 By
The first sentence is standard rhetoric but lacks a deadline, the second sentence is speculative
and cites a small figure in light of the magnitude of the crisis, and the third sentence suggests the
December 2008 Draft Texts would be the basis for any conclusion.
The pledge made at the Pittsburgh Summit was modestly more detailed and hopeful. Para-
graph 49 of the communique´ states:
We are determined to seek an ambitious and balanced conclusion to the Doha Develop-
ment Round in 2010, consistent with its mandate, based on the progress already made,
including with regard to modalities. We understand the need for countries to directly
engage with each other, within the WTO bearing in mind the centrality of the multilat-
eral process, in order to evaluate and close the remaining gaps. We note that in order to
conclude the negotiations in 2010, closing those gaps should proceed as quickly as pos-
sible. We ask our ministers to take stock of the situation no later than early 2010, taking
into account the results of the work program agreed to in Geneva following the Delhi
Ministerial, and seek progress on Agriculture, Non-Agricultural Market Access, as well
as Services, Rules, Trade Facilitation and all other remaining issues. We will remain
engaged and review the progress of the negotiations at our next meeting.
Text: G20 Final Communique—Opening the Global Economy, REUTERS, Sept. 25, 2009, available
at http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USTRE58O6TZ20090925 (emphasis added).
The ideas of an “ambitious and balanced conclusion” based on existing progress, including
modalities, are not new. Referring to 2010 thrice at least identifies a target end-point, along with
an interim stock-taking exercise. The second sentence is a reference to the two-track approach
(discussed later in this article) whereby multilateral consensus on modalities and bilateral negotia-
tions on concessions occur simultaneously. Mentioning topics other than agriculture and NAMA
in the penultimate sentence is useful in identifying how much further negotiations have to proceed
for closure to occur.
Notably, however, the U.S. rejected a proposal made at the Pittsburgh Summit by Australia,
Brazil, the EU, and other WTO Members to reach agreement on core formulas—that is, modali-
ties—on agriculture and NAMA by early 2010. Led by the Deputy National Security Advisor for
International Economic Affairs, Michael Froman, the U.S. thought substance, not artificial time-
lines, should govern. See Gary G. Yerkey, G-20 Leaders Vow to Work on Completing Doha in
2010, See No Early Breakthrough, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 39, at 1310 (Oct. 1, 2009). That
argument is, of course, correct. However undisciplined by deadlines, talks can drag on, and the
impression conveyed can be one that the U.S. is either ambivalent about or reluctant to lead. In
that regard, roughly 100 developing countries issued a joint statement during the Pittsburgh Sum-
mit supporting conclusion of the Doha Round by 2010, so long as developed nations showed “true
engagement, flexibility, and political will.” Id. at 1311.
431. Amy Tsui, Avoiding Protectionism Key to Reversing Economic Downturn, Former USTR
Asserts, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 11, at 359 (Mar. 12, 2009).
In March 2009, the World Bank published a study identifying forty-seven trade-restrictive
measures that countries, including seventeen of the G-20 nations, had implemented since the onset
of the global economic crisis in fall 2008. Prime illustrations were:
• Tariff increases, which made up one-third of the trade-restrictive measures:
For example, Ecuador raised tariffs on over 600 products, and Russia boosted tariffs
on used cars.
• Non-tariff barriers:
For instance, Argentina imposed non-automatic import licensing requirements for
auto parts, leather goods, televisions, textiles, and toys. Indonesia announced all im-
ports of five categories of merchandise—electronics, food and beverages, garments,
shoes, and toys—could be admitted only at five of its air or sea ports.
• Tightened Product or Sanitary Standards:
For example, China banned imports of some kinds of Belgian chocolates, British
sauce, Dutch eggs, Irish pork, and Spanish dairy products. India banned imports of
Chinese toys.
• Export Subsidies:
The EU temporarily implemented new subsidies for exports of butter, cheese, and
milk powder.
• Sector-Specific Subsidies:
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September 2009, seventeen of the twenty G-20 states had violated the
pledge they re-took at the April 2009 Summit—not to resort to protection-
ism to fight the recession.432
Put bluntly, hypocrisy abounds. Fortunately—from a free trade per-
spective—the hypocrisy does not always manifest itself in measures that
affect a broad swath of traded goods.433 Trade remedies (that is, AD, CVD,
and safeguard measures) typically strike only a small percentage of com-
Several governments had subsidized their domestic auto industry, with the amount
summing to $48 billion. The U.S. had provided direct subsidies of $17.4 billion, and
Argentina, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom had given either direct or indirect subsidies to their national producers.
Diana I. Gregg, World Bank Takes 17 Nations in G-20 to Task for Implementing Trade-Restricting
Measures, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 13, at 406 (Mar. 26, 2009).
Note, however, many WTO Members—including India and the U.S.—rejected the character-
ization of WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy that there had been “significant slippage” toward
protectionism since the advent of the crisis. To the contrary, they urged, WTO disciplines had
helped prevent a descent into protectionism. Moreover, the world was a different place—far more
inter-dependent through global supply chains and manufacturing processes—than in the 1930s,
when the U.S. passed the notorious Smoot–Hawley Act and other countries responded with protec-
tionist and beggar-thy-neighbor policies. See Daniel Pruzin, U.S. Challenges WTO Chief Lamy’s
Assertion of ‘Significant’ Slipping Toward Protectionism, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 16, at
505, 505–06 (Apr. 16, 2009).
Additionally, the fact is that not all Members raised barriers following the onset of the global
economic crisis. G-20 countries such as Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, and the Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia, as well as Russia (which is not a Member), all reduced import duties, fees, and
surcharges, and removed non-tariff barriers on a range of products. China even lessened restric-
tions on some services. Thus, suggesting world-wide descent into protectionism is akin to using
fear-mongering to push Members to complete the Round. See Daniel Pruzin, Agencies Say G-20
Countries Have Avoided ‘Widespread Resort’ to Trade Protectionism, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA)
No. 37, at 1235 (Sept. 17, 2009).
Note, too, that some skepticism of the World Bank’s analysis may be appropriate. After the
April 2009 G-20 Summit, the Bank reported G-20 countries had taken, or were contemplating
taking, twenty-three actions that were trade restrictive, seven of which were by the U.S. Yet,
several of the actions, including the American imposition of a 10 percent duty on Canadian soft-
wood lumber, and the Section 421 safeguard investigation of Chinese tires, were pursuant to
normal trade remedy procedures. See Diana I. Gregg, World Bank Says More Trade Restrictions
Imposed by G-20 Countries Since Summit, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 18, at 569 (Apr. 30,
2009). There is a certain automaticity built into these procedures, and inferring they are taken in
response to the global economic crisis, and in defiance of G-20 pledges, is a bit of a stretch.
432. Yerkey, G-20 Leaders Seek, supra note 430, at 1280. In September 2009, Global Trade
Alert, a London-based monitoring service at the Center for Economic Policy Research, reported
that since the November 2008 Washington, D.C. Summit, the G-20 states had implemented 121
“blatantly protectionist” measures—roughly one every three days—and were on the verge of en-
acting another 134 such measures. Id. Here again, some skepticism is in order. The service is
supported by the World Bank, and its ideological inclination appears to be toward free trade.
433. Interestingly, and not surprisingly in an era of globalization, over fifty percent of world
trade in goods, and seventy-five percent of services trade, is in intermediate products or services
used to make or offer other goods or services. See Rick Mitchell, Protectionist Measures Had
Small Role in 12.5% Trade Plunge of 2009, OECD Says, 27 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 23, at
854 (June 10, 2010). The Boeing 787 Dreamliner is a case in point: its engines are made in the
United Kingdom and U.S., its doors are made in Sweden and France, its flaps and ailerons are
made in Canada and Australia, the fuselage is made in Japan, Italy, and the U.S., its horizontal
stabilizers are made in Italy, its landing gear is made in France, and its wings are made in Japan.
Overall, there are 43 suppliers in over 135 production sites around the world. See id. (reporting on
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merce. For example, between the first quarter of 2008 and first quarter of
2009, trade remedies affected only 0.4% of the value of imports into the
United States and EU. Proposed remedies in that period affected just 0.6%
and 1.8% of imports into China and India, respectively.434 By the account
of the OECD, the use of protectionist measures in general, by all countries,
was “relatively muted,” affecting only about one percent of world trade.435
(However, dollar-for-dollar, the effect is serious: raising tariff revenues by
$1, which entails a direct trade-distorting measure, causes a $2.16 fall in
world exports and $0.73 fall in world income.) Moreover, launching a trade
remedy investigation—while it might have an in terrorem effect on respon-
dent producer-exporters, forcing them to raise their prices or otherwise
change their behavior—results in imposition of a remedial measure in 50%
of the cases as of 2009, which is a decrease from the 80–90% figure of
2008.436
Nevertheless, the point is that what G-20 leaders say with aplomb,
eloquence, and gravitas in a G-20 communique´ does not translate into para-
digmatic shifts at the WTO bargaining table. That is true notwithstanding
efforts by thirteen WTO Members, which in May 2009 produced a commu-
nication urging the entire WTO Membership to back the G-20 pledge to
refrain from any new trade barriers though 2010.437 In other words, there is
a mismatch between, on the one hand, grandiloquent political rhetoric, and,
on the other hand, foot-dragging behavior of WTO Members in multilateral
negotiations and protectionist-oriented domestic trade policy.438 To the ex-
tent G-20 (and indeed, all other) leaders sincerely seek to conclude the
Round with alacrity, their representatives would do more than wrap up un-
resolved technical matters. These representatives also would engage seri-
ously in horizontal discussions that cut across sectors.439
a May 2010 report from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Trade and
the Economic Recovery: Why Open Markets Matter).
434. See Alan Beattie, Barriers Failing to Dent Global Trade, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2009, at 4.
435. Mitchell, supra note 433, at 854 (reporting on a May 2010 OECD report, Trade, Policy,
and the Economic Crisis).
436. See Beattie, supra note 434, at 5.
437. Daniel Pruzin, WTO Members Fighting Protectionism Gain Support in Push for Trade
Barrier Standstill, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 698 (May 28, 2009). The thirteen Mem-
bers were Colombia, Costa Rica, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Paki-
stan, Peru, Singapore, Switzerland, Turkey, and Uruguay. They had the support of Israel,
Lichtenstein, South Korea, Macedonia, Thailand, and Ukraine, as well as of least-developed coun-
tries (for which Tanzania spoke). Australia, China, and the U.S. all welcomed the support for the
G-20 standstill pledge. See id.
438. See Daniel Pruzin, WTO Members Highlight ‘Mismatch’ in Doha Ambitions; U.S. Cites
Mixed Progress, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 31, at 1023 (July 30, 2009). A related mismatch
is between the ambitions of WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy, and the Chairs of the negotiat-
ing groups. In the summer of 2009, the Director-General pushed them to issue revised draft mo-
dalities texts. But, as the Chair of the agricultural negotiations, Ambassador David Walker said in
July 2009, there was no basis for doing so, as no material progress had been made. Id. at 1023–24.
439. See Daniel Pruzin, WTO Chief Cites Need to Broaden Doha Talks Beyond Agriculture,
NAMA, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 30, at 988, 988–89 (July 23, 2009).
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That is, WTO Members would put out on the bargaining table pro-
posed trade-offs in agricultural, non-agricultural, and services trade, and in
rules, so that each Member could come to a final decision, at the political
level, as to whether the overall package was ambitious and balanced. And,
in the meantime, Members would eschew any new protectionist measures.
Yet, summits of the leaders simply were not matched by this kind of vigor-
ous follow up. Not surprisingly, then, in July 2009 Brazil announced a re-
versal of its long-standing policy of focusing exclusively on completion of
the Doha Round and eschewing free trade agreement (FTA) negotiations
such as the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).440 With the Round
going nowhere, and with pressure from the Brazilian business community,
Brazil said it would seek a pact between MERCOSUR (of which it, of
course, is a member along with Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay, with
Bolivia, Chile, and Venezuela as associate members) and the EU.441 By
May 2010, EU officials, frustrated at the lack of progress in the Round, no
longer insisted on waiting for the outcome of the Round or trying to resolve
market access and farm subsidy issues on a multilateral level, and negotia-
tions commenced—after a six-year hiatus—in July.442
Third, the argument has led to a problem of forum, which has cascaded
into a problem of puissance. The G-20 is not a forum in which to negotiate
trade deals. That mandate rests with the WTO. The WTO Director-General
was not invited to the November 2008 Summit. When he is asked to join a
meeting, as in the April 2009 Summit, he can do little else than (1) report
on the state of the Doha Round, (2) re-dedicate his good offices to the
Round, and (3) offer to serve as a watchdog by shaming WTO Members
through public blacklisting if they raise trade barriers.443 The more the G-20
440. See Ed Taylor, Brazil Losing Hope on Doha Round, To Concentrate on Mercosur–EU
Trade Pact, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 32, at 1059 (Aug. 6, 2009).
441. See Beattie, supra note 434, at 5.
442. See David Haskel, EU Lawmakers Minimize Hostility to FTA with Mercosur, Say Talks
to Begin in June, 27 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 23, at 869 (June 10, 2010); David Haskel,
Mercosur, EU to Hold First Round of Formal Free Trade Talks in Early July, 27 Int’l Trade Rep.
(BNA) No. 783 (May 27, 2010); David Haskel, Mercosur-EU Free Trade Negotiators Meet;
Mood Upbeat but No Sign of Solid Progress, 27 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 18, at 678 (May 6,
2010).
To be sure, the negotiating issues are difficult. All MERCOSUR states are major exporters of
beans, beef, fruit, and grain, as are many EU states. On such products, MERCOSUR seeks greater
market access to the EU through lower tariffs and an end to quotas, as well as the reduction or
elimination of EU farm subsidies—all of which EU members like Austria, Cyprus, Finland,
France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Luxembourg, Poland, and Romania oppose. MERCOSUR also
demands greater and speedier concessions from the EU given the asymmetry in development
between the two sides. Conversely, the EU seeks greater market access from MERCOSUR for
industrial goods, in conflict with the interests of infant industries in MERCOSUR states, as well as
better opportunities for EU financial service providers and government procurement bidders, plus
better protection for EU copyrights and geographically-indicated products.
443. Indeed, the G-20 communique´ from the April 2009 summit calls on the WTO to monitor,
on a quarterly basis, adherence of the G-20 countries to their pledge not to implement new protec-
tionist barriers. See Sion Barry, G20 Six Pledge Communique, WALES ONLINE (Apr. 2, 2009),
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grabs the headlines on the trade policy and the more it vaults itself into the
role of the puppeteer, the more marginal the WTO becomes and the more
the Director-General becomes the G-20 marionette. A cynic might say that
is precisely what some G-20 leaders would like to happen.
Fourth, the strength of the argument depends on critical details. In the
1990s and early years of the new millennium, amidst favorable economic
conditions, many Members cut their applied rates unilaterally. For example,
on industrial products, the average world-wide applied rate fell from 26% in
1986 to 8.8% in 2007.444 Thus, as of 2008, the average amount of “water”
(the difference between bound and actually applied tariff rates) was three-
fold (i.e., countries could raise duties by three times before hitting their
bound ceiling level).445 But, it is important to look past averages and focus
on individual countries and product categories. A trebling of an applied
duty from 2% to 6% is marginally significant. A trebling from 20% to 60%
imposes major commercial hardships on producer-exporters. In brief, the
gain from binding duty rates hinges on the Member and merchandise at
issue.
Related to this fourth point is a critical reality about how international
trade works. Over 90% of import-export transactions are paid for through
trade finance, such as commercial and standby letters of credit, performance
guarantees, and insurance, and the global market for trade finance is about
$10 trillion annually.446 Suppose the G-20 commitments were more than
chatter and catalyzed a Doha Round deal that resulted in pure free trade in
agriculture and industrial goods. With all tariff and non-tariff barriers set to
zero under this unlikely deal, would the value and volume of import-export
transactions jump immediately?
The surest answer is “no.” What is needed to boost trade flows is trade
finance, not merely the eradication of trade barriers, nor the discipline on
WTO Members not to hike their barriers. To be sure, the decline in global
trade following the onset of the global economic recession fell even more
than the decline in the availability of trade finance.447 In other words, a key
reason for the decline in world trade (which was 12% by volume in 2009,
http://www.walesonline.co.uk/news/wales-news/2009/04/02/g20-six-pledge-communique-91466-
23299550/550/. By at least one indicator, adherence was dubious. In the spring 2009, the EU re-
introduced dairy export subsidies, and on May 22, 2009, the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture, Tom
Vilsack, announced allocations under the Dairy Export Incentive Program for 2008–2009 to
counter the EU subsidies and level the playing field for American exporters. See Griffin, supra
note 79, at 772.
444. Barriers to Entry: A Rise in Protection Would Worsen the Already Grim Outlook for
World Trade, ECONOMIST, Dec. 20, 2008, at 121.
445. Fare Well, Free Trade, ECONOMIST, Dec. 20, 2008, at 15.
446. See Daniel Pruzin, Global Downturn Drives Down Demand for Trade Financing, Fund-
ing Stabilizes, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 37, at 1237 (Sept. 17, 2009).
447. According to World Bank President Robert Zoellick, trade finance (i.e., the higher cost of
it) accounted for no more than 10–15 percent of the overall contraction in global trade following
the onset of the global economic recession. Those figures, while hardly inconsequential, are de-
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bigger than in any year since the Second World War, and was about 20%
between October 2008 and January 2009, a faster drop relative to economic
growth than during the Great Depression) was the synchronized drop in
import demand in all major economies.448 That drop was made worse by
global supply chains, which quickly transmitted a decline of one component
from one country to a decline for other parts in other countries. Neverthe-
less, trade finance was a causal factor, too. To get unstuck trade credit,
leaders at the April 2009 G-20 Summit in London agreed to set up a two-
year, $250 billion Global Trade Liquidity Program (GTLP).449 The result
was a drop in the cost of trade finance, measured in terms of fees above the
London Inter-Bank Offer Rate (LIBOR), though this consequence also fol-
lowed from a drop in demand for trade finance with the fall in trade.
Fortunately, by March 2010, trade financing had recovered to its pre-
financial crisis levels.450 But, the recovery did not necessarily benefit devel-
oping or least developed country exporters. The International Chamber of
Commerce (ICC) reported in March 2010 that of 5.2 million letter of credit
transactions between 2005 and 2009, only 1,140 of them (0.02%) resulted
in default. However, in the sixty poorest countries of the world, two-thirds
of exporters get no trade finance support from regional development banks
(e.g., African Development Bank, Asian Development Bank, European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank). That means the exporters and importers must deal with the
international financial markets directly, which can unfairly punish them
simply because of their location.451 As one example, traders in a particular
poor country may be asked to pay an extra 10% (1000 basis points) and
post 50% of the value of the merchandise being traded as collateral to se-
cure issuance of a letter of credit. As another example, although there never
has been a case of a Pakistani trader defaulting on a letter of credit, Pakis-
tani traders find it difficult to get letters of credit to finance their import-
export deals.
The point is two-fold. First, trade finance is every bit as important to
reigniting trade as is vigilance against protectionism. Second, resolving
market inequities in trade finance can assist poor countries. Focusing on the
latter phenomenon as a justification to complete the Doha Round is a post
hoc rationale for the Round, one in no way associated with the launch of the
Round in November 2001. Moreover, the indispensable mechanism for un-
locking trade finance is reform of the banking system, to unstick lending.
bated among observers. See Alan Beattie, Volume of Global Trade Rises at Sharpest Rate in over
Five Years, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2009, at 1.
448. See Pruzin, supra note 412, at 294; Alan Beattie, Global Trade Index Shows Rapid Re-
covery, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2010, at 4.
449. See Pruzin, supra note 446, at 1237.
450. See Daniel Pruzin, Reinforce Regional Development Banks to Close Trade Finance Gap,
Group Says, 28 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 13, at 521 (Mar. 31, 2011).
451. See id.
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That is because banks are the purveyors of that finance. Consequently,
whatever politicians say about the trade-promoting effects of a successful
outcome in the Round, they are right to focus on the removal of toxic assets
from the balance sheets of banks and the recapitalization of those banks.452
They also are quite correct to reexamine international bank capital ade-
quacy standards—the so-called Basle II Framework, which was finalized in
June 2004 by the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision. That Frame-
work compels banks to post more capital than is necessary for extensions of
trade finance because it assigns unreasonably high risk weightings and long
maturities to fixed, short-term, trade-related finance transactions.453 The
Framework sets higher capital requirements for riskier credit exposures.
Longer-term exposures are riskier; thus capital set aside rules are more
stringent in proportion with the maturity length of an exposure. The Frame-
work imposes a one-year maturity floor for all lending facilities. In doing
so, it fails to recognize that short-term trade finance is self-liquidating, al-
most always with a maturity of 0 to 180 days. Posting large amounts of
capital for a year is not rational. The disproportionate capital requirement
results in a diminution of funds available for trade finance (because the
funds are tied up to meet capital requirements), an increase in the costs of
this finance (to cover the costs of the capital set aside), or both.
Ominously, new international capital adequacy rules, known as the Ba-
sle III Framework, categorize trade finance instruments as off-balance sheet
exposures, just like credit derivatives.454 These rules are scheduled to be
phased in through 1 January 2019. The rules compel banks to allocate up to
100% of the value of a trade finance transaction as capital against the risk
of default by the obligor on the instrument. Under the Basle III Framework,
an import/export letter of credit required a 20% capital charge, and a per-
formance guarantee required a 50% capital charge. Yet, the default rate on
452. In this respect, the July 2009 statement by WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy, that
“government bailouts had constrained risk-taking” outside of national boundaries, and his fear that
the “finance industry will be on the side of the forces of deglobalization,” simply misses the
greater need to re-start trade finance. See Peggy Hollinger, Lamy in Warning Over Bank Bail-
Outs, FIN. TIMES, July 6, 2009, at 4 (quoting Mr. Lamy).
453. See Daniel Pruzin, Experts Cite Basel Capital Accord as Barrier to New Trade Financ-
ing, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 38, at 1272 (Sept. 24, 2009); Alan Beattie, Doubts Remain
Over Resilience of Trade Finance System, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2009, at 2. For an analysis of the
Basle I Framework, see generally RAJ BHALA, PERSPECTIVES ON RISK-BASED CAPITAL (1989), and
for the transition to value at risk (VAR) models of capital adequacy and Basle II, see Raj Bhala,
Applying Equilibrium Theory and the FICAS Model: A Case Study of Capital Adequacy and Cur-
rency Trading, 41 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 125, 125–262 (1996).
454. See Pruzin, supra note 450, at 522. The reason for classifying a letter of credit as an off-
balance sheet activity is that a letter of credit typically has a provision known as a “cancelable
payment commitment.” This provision can be invoked if all of the necessary documents concern-
ing collateral to back the letter of credit are not presented. But, only a payable commitment may
be included on the balance sheet of a bank. See Daniel Pruzin, Survey Finds Recovery from Crisis
for Trade Financing; Fears About Basle III Rules Linger, 28 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 14, at
576, 577 (Apr. 7, 2011).
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letters of credit is extraordinarily low. A study published by the Banking
Commission of the International Chamber of Commerce in March 2011
covered a five-year period (including the 2008–2010 global economic
slump), nine banks, and 5.2 million transactions: it found only 1140 letter of
credit transactions, or 0.02% of them, resulted in default.455 Ironically, if
the Basle III rules are not changed, then banks subject to them may sell
their trade finance businesses to non-bank entities not subject to the rules,
such as hedge funds, or securitize their trade finance portfolios—with the
likely investors being hedge funds.
Fifth, and perhaps most importantly, as just intimated, the argument
obfuscates (and maybe even suppresses) the whole purpose of the DDA.
Neither eliminating water in tariff schedules nor fighting global economic
slumps was the primary motivation for a Doha Round. Rather, in the imme-
diate post-9/11 environment, it was the nexus between trade liberalization,
alleviating poverty, and fighting extremism that galvanized WTO Members.
Continue the march to an open international capitalist system in which all
persons—including Muslims—can compete on a reasonably level playing
field. With every victory on that field, a person obtains a greater stake in the
global economic order and becomes that much more immune to the vile,
violent vituperation of Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and their misguided sympa-
thizers. She appreciates the bad guys not only are evil but also are lousy
economists. Certainly, some Members anticipated in November 2001 that
trade liberalization would assist in fighting a future, then-unseen recession.
But, to catapult that anticipation into the key argument for finishing the
Round is to risk betraying the original intent for the Round.
Indubitably, following the July 2008 collapse of multilateral trade ne-
gotiations under the DDA, only truly optimistic trade souls could keep faith
in the resurrection of the Round.456 In May 2009, the WTO General Coun-
cil announced a Ministerial Conference for Geneva from 30 November to 2
December 2009.457 That proclamation was a de facto admission the WTO
had operated in violation of its own rules. It was two years overdue, given
the (1) legal fact of Article IV:1 of the Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization (WTO Agreement) and (2) practical fact the WTO had
455. See Pruzin, supra note 454, at 576–77.
456. For a gossipy account of the collapse, see generally PAUL BLUSTEIN, MISADVENTURES OF
THE MOST FAVORED NATIONS—CLASHING EGOS, INFLATED AMBITIONS, AND THE GREAT SHAM-
BLES OF THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM (2009) (narrating the slide into dysfunctionality of the July
2008 ministerial meeting); Paul Blustein, The Nine-Day Misadventure of the Most Favored Na-
tions: How the WTO’s Doha Round Negotiations Went Awry in July 2008, BROOKINGS GLOBAL
ECONOMY AND DEVELOPMENT (Dec. 5, 2008), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/articles/
2008/1205_trade_blustein/1205_trade_blustein.pdf (narrating the unraveling of the July 2008 min-
isterial meeting).
457. WTO to Hold 7th Ministerial Conference on 30 November–2 December 2009, WORLD
TRADE ORG. (May 26, 2009), http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news09_e/gc_chair_stat_26may
09_e.htm; Daniel Pruzin, WTO Members Will Hold Fall Ministerial with Focus on Global Econ-
omy, Not Doha, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 699 (May 28, 2009).
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not held a Ministerial Conference since the December 2005 Hong Kong
meeting.
Worse yet for Doha Round optimists, the announcement came with a
disclaimer: the Round was not the purpose for the Conference. Rather than
negotiate DDA items, the trade ministers would chat about the Conference
theme, “The WTO, the Multilateral Trading System, and the Current Global
Economic Environment.” To boot, in that “Environment,” the Chairman of
the General Council, Ambassador Mario Matus of Chile, instructed them to
chat without materialist extravagance or fanfare. In retrospect, the pessi-
mists proved correct. The Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy (IATP),
headquartered in Minneapolis, said “This Ministerial [Conference] was so
meaningless that many trade ministers actually left before the meeting was
over.”458 The International Policy Network (IPN), based in London, called
the Conference a “pointless exercise.”459 The Financial Times sarcastically
remarked the Round was “deadlocked,” and the exclusion of it from the
formal agenda was “the rough equivalent of holding the 1919 Versailles
Conference without talking about the war.”460
As is well known, the DDA launched the Round in the Qatari capital,
Doha, in November 2001. It is the ninth iteration of multilateral trade nego-
tiations since the birth of the modern world trading system with the signing
of the GATT on 30 October 1947. Coming immediately in the wake of the
terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the launch was dramatic. In the sub-
sequent eight years, most of the high drama in the Round took the form of
incremental evolutionary developments toward a yet-elusive consensus
among Members on agriculture and NAMA issues, and to a lesser degree
on trade remedies. The discussion below chronicles and critiques this
drama, as it were.
C. The Challenge of Resurrection
Metaphorically speaking, the key Doha Round challenge is resurrec-
tion. To many participants and observers, the Round is dead, and has been
since at least July 2008 when a major Ministerial meeting collapsed. An-
other figurative phrase is the Round is “at least comatose if not dead.”461
Less conclusively, the characterizations of the Round facing a “cold snap,”
or being in “hibernation,” “semi-hibernation,” or a “deep freeze,” some-
times are used.462 So also are the terms “deadlock,” “impasse,” “fatigue,”
458. Pruzin, supra note 78, at 1638 (quoting Anne Laure Constantin, IATP).
459. Id. (quoting Alec van Gelder, Trade Policy Analyst, IPN).
460. See Alan Beattie, Retread Required, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2009, at 7.
461. Yerkey, supra note 430, at 1279 (quoting Steven P. Schrage, Analyst, Center for Strate-
gic and International Studies, Washington, D.C.).
462. See, e.g., Daniel Pruzin, Hopes for Conclusion to Doha Round Talks Go into Hibernation
in Early 2009, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 4, at 107, 107–08 (Jan. 22, 2009); Daniel Pruzin,
USTR Schwab Sees Period of ‘Quiet’ Talks on Doha Round Negotiations in Early 2009, 26 Int’l
Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 2, at 37 (Jan. 8, 2009).
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“frustration,” and “absence of trust and confidence.”463 Indubitably, the
most antipathetic diagnosis and prescription is this: the Doha Round “has
been dead for some time and the corpse is putrefying: so a burial, a wake,
and some appropriate words of farewell” are in order.464
For its part, the United States—both under the Bush and Obama Ad-
ministrations—has made it crystal clear that no deal is better than a bad
deal reached simply for the sake of accord.465 For instance, in May 2010,
when again confronted with the demand that to kick-start the Round, the
United States must lay out hypothetical additional concessions it would
make if Brazil, China, and India offered further concessions of their own,
President Obama’s USTR, Ambassador Ron Kirk, said:
We’ve asked everyone to engage with us in honest, tough
negotiations, [and] we’ll do that. But the notion that we somehow
have to prepay or advance pay in those negotiations is one we
expressly reject. [The United States has] paid a pretty heavy price
to produce what are the results in agriculture without having the
ability to balance that with what we might be able to achieve in
services and [industrial tariffs]. I will tell you unequivocally that
we reject the notion that we now have to make another advance
There are sometimes radically different perceptions of the same events (as fans of Akira
Kurosawa’s 1951 classic movie, Rashomon, can well appreciate). At the World Economic Forum
in Davos, Switzerland in January 2009, trade ministers met to discuss prospects for the Doha
Round. WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy gave a rosy review to the WTO General Council,
saying:
They continue to attach the highest priority to a successful conclusion of the Round and
they recognized the major progress made in 2008 towards finalizing modalities, which
they believe provides a sound basis for an early resolution of the remaining differences.
Pascal Lamy, Director Gen., World Trade Org., Report to General Council (Feb. 3, 2009),
in“Ministers Continue to Attach Highest Priority to the Round’s Conclusion”—Lamy, WORLD
TRADE ORG. (Feb. 3–4, 2009), http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news09_e/tnc_chair_report_03
feb09_e.htm. The Financial Times, however, did not play the role of cheerleader:
The completion of the Doha trade round appeared as far away as ever at the week-end,
when a gathering of trade ministers at the World Economic Forum in Davos descended
into acrimony.
Normally, the closing session of the forum displays ritualistic expectation that the trade
round will be completed in the coming year, but there was little such optimism in 2009.
Chris Giles, Acrimony Dashes Doha Hopes, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2009, at 2.
463. See Aritake, supra note 428, at 845; Daniel Pruzin, WTO Doha Round Talks at Impasse,
but Negotiators Commit to Press on, 27 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 810 (June 3, 2010).
464. Jean-Pierre Lehmann, End the Charade in Talks on Global Trade, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 25,
2011, at 8 (emphasis added).
465. See, e.g., Gary G. Yerkey, U.S. Says No WTO Deal Possible Until Other Countries Im-
prove Their Offers, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 10, at 304 (Mar. 5, 2009); Gary G. Yerkey,
Clinton Says Chances of Reviving WTO Talks Still Unclear, U.S. Will Not Accept ‘Bad Deal,’ 26
Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 6, at 182 (Feb. 5, 2009) (quoting Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
that the U.S. will not accept a “bad deal just for the sake of an agreement,” and observing this
position is a long-standing one of the Bush Administration). Indeed, the 2009 Trade Policy
Agenda and 2008 Annual Report from the Obama Administration USTR shows no sense of ur-
gency to obtain from Congress trade promotion (i.e., fast track) authority, which it requires to
negotiate an agreement that Congress would have to consider without amending.
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payment to have negotiations that we contemplated from the very
beginning.466
China replied with its own bluster: America was making “dangerous
unilateral” demands that contributed to a “lack of good faith” in the talks
and “could kill the Round.”467
If the Doha Round is dead or moribund, then what happens? Given the
content of the negotiating texts, poverty will not be alleviated, nor will Is-
lamic countries be more fully integrated into the world trading system. Un-
fortunately, even if WTO Members complete the Round, the same
outcomes are likely: little dent will be made to reduce the suffering of the
poor. Hence an opportunity to reduce vulnerability to Islamist extremism
will have been lost. Why? Simply put, because of the hideously hacked-up
terms and conditions in the negotiating texts that betray the initial purpose
of the Round. What might have been accepted—at least by seasoned trade
professionals—as an appropriate level of complexity required to forge con-
sensus among diverse, selfish interests has crossed the boundary between a
necessary evil and pure hell.468
466. Pruzin, supra note 463, at 810 (emphasis added).
467. See id. (quoting Chinese Vice Minister for Commerce Yi Xiaozhun).
468. No less an authority than Aaditya Mattoo, the lead economist in the developmental re-
search group of the World Bank, and a former economic counselor in the Trade in Services Divi-
sion of the WTO, declares that “Doha’s promise is very limited,” and argues against resurrecting
the Round, because it is an “inconsequential enterprise.” Gary G. Yerkey, WTO Negotiations Need
to be ‘Repositioned’ to Address New Protectionism, Mattoo Says, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No.
9, at 270 (Feb. 26, 2009). His solution is a change in the DDA to cover what he views as more
significant issues than traditional trade protectionist devices (e.g., tariff barriers) and subsidies,
namely, exchange rate misalignment and climate change. See Mattoo & Subramanian, supra note
12, at 15–26 (2009). That solution is dubious, because if the WTO Members cannot come to a
reasonably balanced bargain on territory that is familiar to them, a fortiori they will have greater
difficulty doing so on a radically expanded agenda covering unfamiliar matters. In other words,
while care must be taken to assure the DDA remains relevant, just as much care must be given to
ensuring the agenda does not crumble under its own weight.
Interestingly, even the WTO Director-General, Pascal Lamy, concedes “elements of the
Washington consensus . . . have failed, such as deregulation,” though understandably he warns
against increased protectionism. Pascal Lamy, Director Gen., World Trade Org., Address to Japan
Institute of International Affairs (Feb. 25, 2009), in Lamy Underscores Doha Round Benefits for
Japan, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Feb. 25, 2009), http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/
sppl116_e.htm. In his address to the WTO General Council on 29 April 2009 (in which he
sought—successfully—reappointment as Director-General), Mr. Lamy ruled out expansion of the
DDA to topics such as climate change, competition policy, energy, financial protectionism, food
security, FDI, or labor rights. See Daniel Pruzin, Lamy Rules Out Expanding Doha Agenda to
Tackle Climate Change, Other Topics, 26 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 19, at 603 (May 7, 2009).
